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Vancouver Fraser Port Authority(Re), 2026 OIC 6

Date: 2026-01-13
OIC file number: 5821-05702
Access request number: 52100-20-023-2021

Summary

The complainant alleged that the Vancouver Fraser Port Authority (VFPA) had improperly withheld information under the following sections of the Access to Information Act:

  • subsection 13(1) (confidential information from government bodies);
  • subsection 16(2) (facilitating the commission of an offence);
  • subsection 19(1) (personal information);
  • paragraph 18(b) (competitive position of government institutions, negotiations by government institutions);
  • paragraph 18(d) (government financial interests, undue benefit to an individual);
  • paragraph 20(1)(b) (confidential third-party financial, commercial, scientific or technical information);
  • paragraph 21(1)(a) (advice or recommendations); and
  • paragraph 21(1)(d) (plans related to personnel management or administration).

This was in response to an access request for records related to noise and vibration studies conducted for the Pitt Meadows Road and Rail Project. This allegation falls under paragraph 30(1)(a) of the Act.

The complainant also alleged that the VFPA had not met its responsibilities under subsection 4(2.1) of the Act to make every reasonable effort to assist them in connection with the same access request, asserting that the VFPA improperly provided documents that are not readable. This allegation falls under paragraph 30(1)(f) of the Act.

The VFPA and the third parties could not show that the requirements of most of these exemptions were met. The Information Commissioner ordered that the VFPA disclose certain information at issue and provide legible copies of maps, photos and tables to the complainant. The VFPA gave notice to the Commissioner that it would comply with the order. The complaint is well founded.

Complaint

[1]The complainant alleged that the Vancouver Fraser Port Authority (VFPA) had improperly withheld information under the following sections of the Access to Information Act:

  • subsection 13(1) (confidential information from government bodies);
  • subsection 16(2) (facilitating the commission of an offence);
  • subsection 19(1) (personal information);
  • paragraph 18(b) (competitive position of government institutions, negotiations by government institutions);
  • paragraph 18(d) (government financial interests, undue benefit to an individual);
  • paragraph 20(1)(b) (confidential third-party financial, commercial, scientific or technical information);
  • paragraph 21(1)(a) (advice or recommendations); and
  • paragraph 21(1)(d) (plans related to personnel management or administration).

[2]This was in response to an access request for records related to noise and vibration studies conducted for the Pitt Meadows Road and Rail Project. This allegation falls under paragraph 30(1)(a) of the Act.

[3]The complainant also alleged that the VFPA had not met its responsibilities under subsection 4(2.1) of the Act to make every reasonable effort to assist them in connection with the same access request, asserting that the VFPA improperly provided documents that are not readable. This allegation falls under paragraph 30(1)(f) of the Act.

[4]The VFPA provided an interim response to the access request on November 15, 2021, which consisted of 323 pages of records (Part 1) and a final response to the request on December 10, 2021, which consisted of 523 pages of records (Part 2).

[5]During the investigation, the complainant decided it was no longer necessary for the Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC) to investigate the application of subsection 16(2) on page 131 of Part 2.

Investigation

[6]When an institution withholds information that includes information related to third parties, the third parties and/or the institution bear the burden of showing that refusing to grant access is justified.

[7]During the investigation, the VFPA decided to no longer rely on subsection 16(2) on pages 149-150 of Part 2. As such, no information withheld under subsection 16(2) remained at issue.

[8]On August 6, 2025, the VFPA disclosed email domains and residential property information, which it had withheld under subsection 19(1) when it responded to the access request. The VFPA continued to withhold the remaining information under the exemptions listed above.

Subsection 13(1): confidential information from government bodies

[9]Subsection 13(1) requires institutions to refuse to disclose information obtained in confidence from certain government bodies.

[10]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

[11]The information was obtained from one of the following government bodies:

  • a government of a foreign state or an institution of a foreign state;
  • an international organization of states or an institution of such an organization;
  • a provincial government or institution;
  • a municipal or regional government or institution; or
  • an aboriginal government or council listed in subsection 13(3).

[12]The information was obtained from the government body in confidence—that is, with the understanding that it would be treated as confidential.

[13]When these requirements are met, institutions must then consider whether the following circumstances (listed in subsection 13(2)) exist:

  • The government body from which the information was obtained consents to its disclosure.
  • That body has already made the information public.

[14]When one or both of these circumstances exist, subsection 13(2) requires institutions to reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[15]Subsection 13(1) was applied to withhold information on pages 396-398 of Part 2.

[16]The information withheld on pages 396-397 of Part 2 relates to a closed council session of the City of Pitt Meadows and contains points of view or information of various members of the City of Pitt Meadows, as well as a print screen of a slide shared by the city “in a closed session environment”. As such, I accept that the information was obtained from a municipal government and that this information was obtained in confidence.

[17]The information withheld on page 398 of Part 2, however, consists of an email signature for Peter Cohen of the VFPA, as well as a message regarding the VFPA’s COVID-19 response. Such information was not obtained from a government body. The VFPA conceded that this information does not meet the requirements for exemption.

[18]Consequently, I conclude that the information meets the requirements of subsection 13(1), apart from the information on page 398 of Part 2.

Did the institution reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to disclose the information?

[19]Since some of the information meets the requirements of subsection 13(1), the VFPA was required to reasonably exercise its discretion under subsection 13(2) to decide whether to disclose the information when one or both of the circumstances described in subsection 13(2) existed when it responded to the access request.

[20]Based on representations received, I conclude that the information has not been made publicly available by the City of Pitt Meadows and that the City of Pitt Meadows does not consent to its disclosure. Consequently, there is no need to examine the issue of discretion.

Paragraph 18(b): competitive position of government institutions, negotiations by government institutions

[21]Paragraph 18(b) allows institutions to refuse to disclose information that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to harm the competitive position or interfere with contractual or other negotiations of a government institution.

[22]To claim this exemption with regard to competitive position, institutions must show the following:

  • Disclosing the information could injure the competitive position of a government institution.
  • There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility.

[23]To claim this exemption with regard to contractual or other negotiations, institutions must show the following:

  • Contractual or other negotiations are under way or will be conducted in the future.
  • Disclosing the information could interfere with the negotiations.
  • There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility.

[24]When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[25]The VFPA asserted that “releasing budgeted amounts for the project would reveal information about the upper levels of VFPA’s willingness/ ability to pay for works / contracts that will be the subject of RFPs and negotiations”.

[26]I accept that disclosure of some of the withheld information could interfere with negotiations related to procurement, where disclosure would reveal monetary values or which options were selected or preferred. Such information was withheld under paragraph 18(b) on pages 21, 23-25, 45, 54, 57, 70-71, 91, 95-96, 98-105, 117, 119-122, 146, 149-150, 290-291, 311, 318, 322, 336, 338, 347-350, 376, 387-388, 391-392, 395-396, 407, 413-420, 423-425, 436-437, 441-444, 446, 448, 451, 455-457, 460, 464-465, 467, 482, 493-494, 497-498, 501, 505-506, 509, 512, 516-517, 520 and 523 of Part 2.

[27]I also accept that disclosure of the specifics of the draft agreement between the City of Pitt Meadows, Canadian Pacific Kansas City (CP), and the VFPA could interfere with the negotiation of the agreement. Such information revealing details of the agreement was withheld under paragraph 18(b) on pages 91, 149-150, 318, 322, 396, 407, 413-420, 423-425, 436-437, 455-457, 464-465, 505-506 and 516-517 of Part 2.

[28]I note that peripheral details, however, such as where funding was requested from (pages 376 and 482 of Part 2), would not meet the requirements of paragraph 18(b), even where adjacent details of the amount of funding do meet.

[29]The VFPA indicated that disclosure of the information withheld under paragraph 18(b) could distort the market by giving an undue advantage to a third party. As detailed above, I accept that the details of which options had been selected or were preferred meet the requirements of paragraph 18(b) on this basis.

[30]In some cases, however, the withheld information shows no clear preference between the options, or the options listed are not being seriously considered. This includes, for example, information about options that are identified as impractical, mere reference to the design agreement, or where relative cost of the options is the same. I am not convinced that such information could be used by other third parties in such a way that could distort the market. Such information was withheld, for example, on pages 13, 44-45, 150, 321, 392, 407, 413-420, 423-425, 436-438, 441, 443, 446, 448, 451, 455-457, 460, 464-467, 497-498, 505-506, 509, 516-517, 520 and 523 of Part 2. Such information is reasonably severable from the information meeting the requirements for exemption.

[31]The VFPA has not established that any of the remaining information withheld under paragraph 18(b) could reasonably be expected to harm the VFPA’s competitive position or interfere with contractual or other negotiations of a government institution.

[32]While I accept that the VFPA was engaged in negotiations with CP and the City of Pitt Meadows, the VFPA has not provided evidence establishing that disclosure of the totality of the withheld information could interfere with ongoing or future negotiations. The word “interference” in paragraph 18(b) denotes an “obstruction” or “thwarting” of the negotiations (See, for example: Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Supply and Services), 1990 CanLII 8108 (FCA); Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers' Council v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), 2003 FC 1037, at para. 133). It also must be shown that the interference to the negotiations is reasonably expected, meaning that it is considerably above a mere possibility (Merck Frosst Canada v. Canada (Health), 2012 SCC 3 (Merck Frosst)). The fear of interference in the form of an obstruction to actual contractual or other negotiations cannot be merely speculative. It must be supported by cogent and credible evidence.

[33]Consequently, while I conclude that specific estimated costs, specifics of the draft partnership agreement and details of which options had been selected or were preferred, found on pages 21, 23-25, 45, 54, 57, 70-71, 91, 95-96, 98-105, 117, 119-122, 146, 149-150, 290-291, 311, 318, 322, 336, 338, 347-350, 376, 387-388, 391-392, 395-396, 407, 413-420, 423-425, 436-437, 441-444, 446, 448, 451, 455-457, 460, 464-465, 467, 482, 493-494, 497-498, 501, 505-506, 509, 512, 516-517, 520 and 523 of Part 2, meet the requirements of paragraph 18(b), I conclude that the remaining information does not meet the requirements of this exemption.

[34]Since the specific estimated costs, specifics of the draft partnership agreement and details of the selected/preferred options meet the requirements of paragraph 18(b), I did not examine the other exemptions the VFPA applied to the same information.

Did the institution reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to disclose the information?

[35]Since some of the information meets the requirements of paragraph 18(b), the VFPA was required to reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to disclose the information. In doing so, the VFPA had to consider all the relevant factors for and against disclosure.

[36]The VFPA listed several relevant factors that were considered in its exercise of discretion, such as the purpose of the Act, the age and nature of the records and the risk of harm from disclosure. The VFPA indicated that discretion was exercised by its Access to Information, Privacy and Compliance Specialist, who considered input provided by its project manager in coming to a decision.

[37]I conclude that the VFPA considered all relevant factors when it decided not to disclose the information meeting the requirements of paragraph 18(b). The exercise of discretion by the VFPA was reasonable.

Paragraph 18(d): government financial interests, undue benefit to an individual

[38]Paragraph 18(d) allows institutions to refuse to disclose information that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to materially harm their financial interests or the Government of Canada’s ability to manage the Canadian economy, or could unduly benefit someone.

[39]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

  • Disclosing the information (for example, details about Canada’s currency or a contemplated change in the bank rate, as set out in subparagraphs 18(i) to (vi)) could do one of the following:
    • materially harm a government institution’s financial or economic interests;
    • materially harm the Government of Canada’s ability to manage the economy of Canada; or
    • result in an individual or corporation receiving a larger than necessary, improper or unwarranted benefit.
  • There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility.

[40]When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[41]The VFPA stated that “releasing estimated costs related to the Pitt Meadows Road and Rail Improvements Project would be materially injurious to the financial interests of Vancouver Fraser Port Authority, as these amounts are based on confidential financial projections (i.e. what expenses the Project Team estimates will be needed for the project) rather than actual spend.” I have already accepted that such information meets the requirements of paragraph 18(b). I note that paragraph 18(d) was applied alone to such information on pages 389, 394, 426-427, 445, 447, 460, 495, 501, 508, 512, 519 and 521-522 of Part 2, and I accept that information meets the requirements of paragraph 18(d).

[42]I am not convinced that any of the remaining information withheld under paragraph 18(d) could reasonably be expected to harm the financial interests of the VFPA or unduly benefit someone. As with paragraph 18(b), an institution must demonstrate that disclosure of the information could result in a risk of harm that is well beyond mere speculation or possibility and the harm must be linked directly to the disclosure of the information, and this must be supported by clear and cogent evidence.

[43]The VFPA has not established how information such as potential measures the VFPA and CP were considering could be used in any significant way, where these are only presented as options and there is no indication which of the multiple scenarios and options were preferred. It has not been established how the number of mitigation options being considered and the scope of those options meets the requirements of paragraph 18(d).

[44]Consequently, I conclude that the information does not meet the requirements of paragraph 18(d), apart from the costing on pages 389, 394, 426-427, 445, 447, 460, 495, 501, 508, 512, 519 and 521-522 of Part 2.

Subsection 19(1): personal information

[45]Subsection 19(1) requires institutions to refuse to disclose personal information.

[46]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

  • The information is about an individual—that is, a human being, not a corporation.
  • There is a serious possibility that disclosing the information would identify that individual.
  • The information does not fall under one of the exceptions to the definition of “personal information” set out in paragraphs 3(j) to 3(m) of the Privacy Act (for example, business contact information for public servants).

[47]When these requirements are met, institutions must then consider whether the following circumstances (listed in subsection 19(2)) exist:

  • The person to whom the information relates consents to its disclosure.
  • The information is publicly available.
  • Disclosure of the information would be consistent with section 8 of the Privacy Act.

[48]When one or more of these circumstances exist, subsection 19(2) of the Access to Information Act requires institutions to reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[49]During the investigation, the VFPA informed the OIC that it would no longer be applying subsection 19(1) to certain information that it could not support met the requirements of the exemption. The VFPA released this information, which I agree does not meet the requirements for exemption under subsection 19(1), but is no longer at issue.

[50]I accept that the remaining information, which includes the names of third-party employees, is the personal information of identifiable individuals and is not an exception to the definition of personal information.

[51]I conclude that the information at issue meets the requirements of subsection 19(1).

Did the institution reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to disclose the information?

[52]Since the information meets the requirements of subsection 19(1), the VFPA was required to reasonably exercise its discretion under subsection 19(2) to decide whether to disclose that information when one or more of the circumstances described in subsection 19(2) existed when it responded to the access request.

[53]The VFPA indicated that it did not seek consent from the individuals whose information it withheld, as it would not have been reasonable to do so under the circumstances. I am satisfied that seeking consent would not have been reasonable in this case, given the volume of records and the number of individuals involved.

[54]I also find that the information meeting the requirements of subsection 19(1) is not publicly available and that disclosure of the information would not be in accordance with section 8 of the Privacy Act.

[55]I conclude that the circumstances set out in subsection 19(2) did not exist when the VFPA responded to the access request. There is no need to examine the issue of discretion.

Paragraph 20(1)(b): confidential third-party financial, commercial, scientific or technical information

[56]Paragraph 20(1)(b) requires institutions to refuse to disclose confidential financial, commercial, scientific or technical information provided to a government institution by a third party (that is, a private company or individual, but not the person who made the access request).

[57]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

  • The information is financial, commercial, scientific or technical.
  • The information is confidential.
  • The third party supplied the information to a government institution.
  • The third party has consistently treated the information as confidential.

[58]However, subsections 20(2) and 20(4) specifically prohibit institutions from using paragraph 20(1)(b) to refuse to disclose information that contains the results of product or environmental testing carried out by or on behalf of a government institution, unless the testing was done for a fee for an individual or an organization other than a government institution.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[59]The VFPA applied paragraph 20(1)(b) extensively throughout the records, in most cases concurrently with other exemptions. The withheld information relates to three third parties: BKL Consultants Ltd. (BKL), the City of Pitt Meadows and CP.

[60]Representations were sought from all the third parties pursuant to paragraph 35(2)(c). BKL stated that it would not be providing any representations. The other third parties made representations, which I considered in coming to my decision.

[61]The three third parties were also sent notice of my intention to order disclosure of certain information related to them, but none of the third parties provided representations in response to the notice.

[62]I note that the third parties received the records in three parts, with the first part corresponding to Part 1 and the last two parts (361 pages and 162 pages respectively) corresponding to Part 2 when combined.

[63]CP identified information that it believes is exempt but which was released in response to the access request. Information that was released in response to the access request is outside of the scope of the investigation of this complaint, and as such, was not examined.

[64]The City of Pitt Meadows noted it was “still concerned regarding the release of information pertaining to closed Council discussions.” As previously outlined, I accept that the information of this type, withheld on pages 396-397 of Part 2, meets the requirements of subsection 13(1), therefore examination under paragraph 20(1)(b) was unnecessary.

[65]Similarly, since I accept that disclosure of certain information relating to the third parties meets the requirements of paragraphs 18(b) and 18(d), examination of whether this information also meets the requirements of paragraph 20(1)(b) was unnecessary.

[66]With regards to the remaining information withheld under paragraph 20(1)(b), the first requirement of the exemption is that the information be financial, commercial, scientific or technical in nature, within the ordinary meaning of these terms (see: Merck Frosst).

[67]CP asserted that certain information is scientific and/or technical by virtue of being provided by qualified engineers, who used “scientific methods and standards, and reported the results as such”. I accept that the records contain test results and analysis that are scientific and/or technical in nature.

[68]I find that some of information which CP specifically identified as consisting of scientific or technical information does not meet this requirement. Since, ultimately, I do not find any of the information meets all the requirements of paragraph 20(1)(b), it is not necessary to detail my findings on this first requirement.

[69]The second requirement of paragraph 20(1)(b) is that the information be confidential by an objective standard. As a result, a party claiming that information is confidential under paragraph 20(1)(b) must establish that each of the following conditions are met:

  • the content of the record is not available from sources otherwise accessible to the public or obtainable by observation or independent study by a member of the public acting on their own;
  • the information originates and is communicated in a reasonable expectation of confidence that it will not be disclosed; and
  • the information, whether provided by law or supplied voluntarily, be communicated in a relationship between government and the third party that is either a fiduciary relationship or one that is not contrary to the public interest, and that will be fostered for the public benefit by confidential communication. (see: Merck Frosst, para 133; Air Atonabee Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Transport), (1989) 27 FTR 194 (F.C.T.D.)).

[70]Regarding the first part of the confidentiality test, I find that certain information is publicly available. The VFPA shared the results of the noise and vibration study at public sessions on April 26, 2021 and April 28, 2021. Additionally, an April 16, 2021 memorandum (the Memorandum) and associated September 4, 2020 report (the Report) produced by BKL and found within the records were both available for download on the VFPA website at the time the request was processed. Several other sources of public information withheld within the records were put before the VFPA during the investigation. Such information is not objectively confidentiality.

[71]Regarding the second part of the confidentiality test, no representations were received from BKL to establish that any of the information it supplied originated or was communicated with a reasonable expectation that it would not be disclosed. Since the VFPA and BKL were in a client/consultant relationship, I am not convinced that BKL would have a reasonable expectation that the information BLK provided would not be disclosed as the VFPA saw fit.

[72]The City of Pitt Meadows has not established how it had a reasonable expectation that any information related to it, other than the information meeting the requirements of subsection 13(1), would be held in confidence.

[73]CP submitted that the Memorandum and the Report were published contrary to non-disclosure agreements that were in place, however, the evidence suggests the information became public before the signing of the first agreement. None of the parties provided a copy of the non-disclosure agreements, and CP did not establish how any expectation of confidentiality extends to information that was not provided directly by CP, but through BKL.

[74]Since it has not been established that any information meets the second condition of the objective confidentiality test, it is unnecessary to consider whether the last condition is met. I conclude that none of the information has been shown to be objectively confidential.

[75]Turning to the third requirement of paragraph 20(1)(b), CP submitted that the information “was unquestionably supplied to VFPA by CPKC.” Although I accept that substantial amounts of the withheld information were submitted by a third party, for the reasons that follow, I am not convinced that certain information meets this requirement. Moreover, the majority of the information seems to have been provided by BKL, without a reasonable expectation of confidentiality, rather than by CP.

[76]The case law supports that negotiated terms do not constitute information that is supplied by a third party (Canada Post Corp. v. National Capital Commission, 2002 FCT 700, para 14; see also: Halifax Developments Ltd. v. Minister of Public Works, (1994) FCJ No. 2035 (QL) (F.C.T.D.).) The parties did not establish how aspects of the project that were negotiated with the project partners, such as negotiated terms of the draft project partnership agreement, or of the “CNV / VFPA agreement” could be considered supplied by a third party.

[77]I find that negotiated terms do not meet the third requirement of paragraph 20(1)(b). Only information clearly emanating from the third parties, such as CP’s feedback on pages 141-142 of Part 2, meet this requirement.

[78]The fourth requirement of paragraph 20(1)(b) is that the third party has consistently treated the information as confidential. No representations were received from BKL or the City of Pitt Meadows to indicate that the information remaining at issue has consistently been treated as confidential by these third parties.

[79]CP submitted that it has consistently treated the information as confidential and developed policies and procedures regarding access to and transmission of confidential information, including the information at issue, within its organization. I am satisfied that CP has consistently treated the information as confidential. As such, I find this requirement to be met for the information related to CP.

[80]I conclude that the information does not meet the requirements of paragraph 20(1)(b), as the parties did not establish that any of the information meets all four requirements of the exemption.

Paragraph 20(1)(d): negotiations by a third party

[81]Paragraph 20(1)(d) requires institutions to refuse to disclose information that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to interfere with the contractual or other negotiations of a third party (that is, a private company or individual, but not the person who made the access request).

[82]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

  • A third party is or will be conducting contractual or other negotiations.
  • Disclosing the information could interfere with those negotiations.
  • There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility.

[83]However, subsections 20(2) and 20(4) specifically prohibit institutions from using paragraph 20(1)(d) to refuse to disclose information that contains the results of product or environmental testing carried out by or on behalf of a government institution, unless the testing was done for a fee for an individual or an organization other than a government institution.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[84]The VFPA did not apply paragraph 20(1)(d) to any of the information. However, in its representations, CP stated that paragraph 20(1)(d) should be applied to information withheld on page 183 of Part 1, and page 295 of Part 2.

[85]While CP indicated in its representations that it is currently in negotiations with the “VFPA and others”, its submissions fall well short of establishing that the requirements of paragraph 20(1)(d) are met. CP did not demonstrate how the disclosure of the withheld information could thwart or disrupt such negotiations, much less establish that such an outcome could reasonably be expected to occur, especially in light of the information that is publicly available.

[86]During the investigation, the VFPA also provided representations in support of paragraph 20(1)(d), similar to its representations regarding paragraphs 18(b) and 18(d). I find the representations provided by the VFPA with respect to paragraph 20(1)(d) are speculative in nature and thus insufficient to demonstrate the requirements of the exemption are met.

[87]Consequently, I conclude that the information does not meet the requirements of paragraph 20(1)(d).

Paragraph 21(1)(a): advice or recommendations

[88]Paragraph 21(1)(a) allows institutions to refuse to disclose advice or recommendations developed by or for a government institution or a minister.

[89]To qualify for exemption under paragraph 21(1)(a), the records that contain the information must have been created less than 20 years before the access request was made.

To claim this exemption, institutions must then show the following:

  • The information is advice or recommendations.
  • The information was developed by or for a government institution or minister.

[90]When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

[91]However, subsection 21(2) specifically prohibits institutions from using paragraph 21(1)(a) to refuse to disclose the following: 

  • records that contain reasons for or accounts of decisions that affect the rights of a person made by institutions when exercising discretionary powers or carrying out adjudicative functions; and
  • reports prepared by consultants or advisers who were not directors, officers or employees of an institution or members of a minister’s staff at the time.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[92]The VFPA applied paragraph 21(1)(a) concurrently with other exemptions to withhold a variety of information in its responses.

[93]Some of the withheld information is objective, factual, or statistical in nature. The Supreme Court of Canada has noted that information of an objective nature does not fall within the term “advice” (John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), 2014 SCC 36). Similarly, some of the withheld information consists of factors on which advice or recommendation might be formed, but which seem to be severable from the actual advice or recommendations.

[94]The VFPA provided representations supporting that the withheld information on pages 428-429 of Part 2 consists of advice and recommendations from CP to the VFPA. This information was created within 20 years of the access request being made and was developed for a government institution.

[95]The VFPA also made representations as to how the information on page 467 of Part 2 meets the requirements of this exemption, but did not provide sufficient support for me to conclude that data relating to the number of receivers exceeding criteria constitutes advice or recommendations. The VFPA did not provide any representations as to how any other information withheld under paragraph 21(1)(a) meets the requirements for the exemption.

[96]Consequently, I conclude that only the information withheld on pages 428-429 of Part 2 meets the requirements of paragraph 21(1)(a).

Did the institution reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to disclose the information?

[97]Since the information on pages 428-429 of Part 2 meets the requirements of paragraph 21(1)(a), the VFPA was required to reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to disclose the information. In doing so, the VFPA had to consider all the relevant factors for and against disclosure.

[98]The VFPA listed several relevant factors that were considered in its exercise of discretion, such as the purpose of the Act, the age and nature of the records, the risk of harm from disclosure. The VFPA indicated that discretion was exercised by its Access to Information, Privacy and Compliance Specialist, who considered input provided by its project manager in coming to a decision.

[99]I conclude that the VFPA considered all relevant factors when it decided not to disclose the information meeting the requirements of paragraph 21(1)(a). The exercise of discretion by the VFPA was reasonable.

[100]Paragraph 21(1)(d) allows institutions to refuse to disclose plans related to institutions’ personnel management or administration when these plans have yet to be put into operation.

[101]To qualify for exemption under paragraph 21(1)(d), the records that contain the information must have been created less than 20 years before the access request was made.

[102]To claim this exemption, institutions must then show the following:

  • The information consists of plans.
  • These plans relate to the institution’s personnel management or administration.
  • These plans have not yet been put into operation.

[103]When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[104]The VFPA withheld some information relating to its plans for future growth pursuant to paragraph 21(1)(d). For the reasons that follow, I am not convinced that this information meets the requirements of the exemption.

[105]Although I accept that such information may fall within the meaning of a plan, I find the information does not relate to the VFPA’s personnel management or administration.

[106]None of the records relate to personnel management in any way, so I turn to whether the information relates to the VFPA’s administration.

[107]“Administration” is not defined in the Act, but section 3.1 lists some examples of the types of information included in the definition of general administration: “information that relates to expenses paid by the institution for travel, including lodging, and hospitality.” Since the French version of the Act uses the same term under section 3.1 and paragraph 21(1)(d) for administration, I interpret the terms “administration” and “general administration” as having the same meaning for the purpose of paragraph 21(1)(d).

[108]Based on this meaning, I find that none of the information at issue here constitutes plans related to the VFPA’s administration.

[109]In addition, paragraph 21(1)(d) was applied on pages 300-304 and 312-313 of Part 2, which consists of a slide deck prepared by BKL. BKL was a consultant hired by the VFPA, and its employees were not directors, officers, or employees of the VFPA or members of a minister’s staff. As such, the application of paragraph 21(1)(d) to this slide deck appears to be in contravention of paragraph 21(2)(b).

[110]Consequently, I conclude that the withheld information does not meet the requirements of paragraph 21(1)(d).

Subsection 4(2.1): Responsibility of government institutions

[111]Subsection 4(2.1) requires that the head of a government institution, without regard to the identity of a person making a request for access to a record under the control of the institution, make every reasonable effort to assist the person in connection with the request, respond to the request accurately and completely and, subject to the regulations, provide timely access to the record in the format requested.

Did the institution meet its obligations under the Act?

[112]The complainant submitted that some of the records were provided in an illegible format, including maps on pages 4, 7-13, and 23 of Part 1 as well as images/maps on page 94 and information on pages 332, 370, 379, 381, 385-387, 406, 407,440, 441, 476, 485, 487 and 491-494 of Part 2. The information in the black and white copies of these pages, as provided to the complainant, was indeed illegible.

[113]The VFPA indicated that it was not aware that certain pages of its response were illegible, and that it is willing to look for more legible copies to provide to the requester. The VFPA did not provide any representations supporting that it had made every reasonable effort to assist the complainant in connection with the request, or why it would not have been reasonable for it to review the records for legibility before issuing its interim and final responses.

[114]I conclude that the VFPA did not meet its obligation to make every reasonable effort to assist the complainant.

Outcome

[115]The complaint is well founded.

Orders and recommendations

I order the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the VFPA to do the following:

  1. Disclose the information withheld on page 398 of Part 2;
  2. Disclose the information withheld under paragraphs 18(b), 18(d) and 20(1)(b), apart from the specific estimated costs, specifics of the draft partnership agreement and details of the selected/preferred options, as detailed in my report;
  3. Disclose the information withheld under paragraphs 21(1)(a) and 21(1)(b), apart from the information withheld on pages 428-429 of Part 2; and
  4. Provide legible copies of the maps, photos and tables on pages 4, 7-13, and 23 of Part 1 and pages 94, 332, 370, 379, 381, 385-387, 406, 407,440, 441, 476, 485, 487 and 491-494 of Part 2.

Initial report and notice from institution

On December 4, 2025, I issued my initial report to the CEO setting out my orders.

On January 6, 2026, VFPA’s Access to Information, Privacy and Compliance Specialist gave me notice that the CEO will be implementing the orders.

Review by Federal Court

When an allegation in a complaint falls under paragraph 30(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (d.1) or (e) of the Act, the complainant has the right to apply to the Federal Court for a review. When the Information Commissioner makes an order(s), the institution also has the right to apply for a review. The complainant and/or institution must apply for a review within 35 business days after the date of this report. When they do not, third parties may apply for a review within the next 10 business days. Whoever applies for a review must serve a copy of the application for review to the relevant parties, as per section 43. If no one applies for a review by these deadlines, the order(s) takes effect on the 46th business day after the date of this report.

Other recipients of final report

As required by subsection 37(2), this report was provided to BKL, the City of Pitt Meadows and CP.

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