Privy Council Office (Re), 2026 OIC 52

Date: 2026-03-12
OIC file number: 5820-01294
Access request number: A-2016-00866

Summary

The complainant alleged that the Privy Council Office (PCO) had improperly withheld information under subsection 13(1) (confidential information from government bodies), subsection 15(1) (international affairs or national security or defence), paragraph 16(1)(c) (law enforcement or conduct of investigations), subsection 19(1) (personal information), and subsection 24(1) (disclosure restricted by another law) of the Access to Information Act. This was in response to an access request for minutes of the Joint Intelligence Committee between January 1, 1984, and December 31, 1985.

PCO did not demonstrate that all redacted information met the requirements of subsection 13(1), subsection 15(1), paragraph 16(1)(c), or subsection 19(1). Regarding the application of subsection 19(1), the Office of the Information Commissioner consulted with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, who concurred that the exemption had not been properly applied.

The Information Commissioner ordered PCO to disclose all information exempt under subsection 13(1), subsection 15(1), paragraph 16(1)(c), and some information under subsection 19(1). PCO did not give the proper notice required under paragraph 37(1)(c) as to whether they would or would not be implementing the Information Commissioner’s orders; instead, PCO submitted new arguments for withholding the information at issue. The Information Commissioner outlined that the investigation was concluded, and the issuance of her initial report and intended order under subsection 37(1) was not a further opportunity for PCO to provide new arguments or raise additional grounds for refusing access.

The complaint is well founded.

Complaint

The complainant alleged that the Privy Council Office (PCO) had improperly withheld information under subsection 13(1) (confidential information from government bodies), subsection 15(1) (international affairs or national security or defence), paragraph 16(1)(c) (law enforcement or conduct of investigations), subsection 19(1) (personal information), and subsection 24(1) (disclosure restricted by another law) of the Access to Information Act in response to an access request. The request was for Minutes of the Joint Intelligence Committee between January 1, 1984, and December 31, 1985. The allegation falls within paragraph 30(1) of the Act.

Investigation

[1]When an institution withholds information under an exemption, it bears the burden of showing that refusing to grant access is justified.

[2]The Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC) was not convinced that the exemptions had been properly applied in all instances. Over the course of the investigation, PCO conceded that not all exemptions were properly applied. On August 7, 2024, PCO disclosed all information which it had previously withheld under subsection 13(1), subsection 15(1), paragraph 16(1)(c), subsection 19(1), and subsection 24(1), with the exception of:

The names and titles of Liaison Officers from other countries (on which PCO is now applying both paragraph 13(1)(a) and subsection 15(1));
Information regarding the visits of Intelligence Community members from other countries (on which PCO is now applying paragraph 13(1)(a) and subsection 15(1));
Dissemination markings of classified reports (subsection 15(1));
Names of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) employees (subsection 15(1));
Certain Intelligence Report subjects/titles (subsection 15(1));
Reference to technology transfers (subsection 15(1));
Information pertaining to Canada’s intelligence relationship with other countries (subsection 15(1));
Reference to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (subsection 15(1));
Limited information regarding law enforcement and conduct of Canada’s investigations (subsection 16(1)(c));
Limited personal information (subsection 19(1)); and
Names of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) employees (subsection 24(1)).

[3]The complainant maintains that the records should be disclosed in their entirety. In support of this position, the complainant points out that the entirety of the excerpts and materials from the Joint Intelligence Committee meetings from 1984 to 1985 have been publicly available for a number of years, through separate access requests to the federal government.

[4]The complainant does not object to the redaction of the names of Liaison Officers from other allied countries, to the redaction of personal signatures as long as the signature block is retained, or to the application of subsection 19(1) on pages 652, 669, 700, 712, and 713; therefore, the OIC did not further pursue investigation into this information.

[5]Concerning the application of exemptions on the remaining categories of information that PCO continues to maintain, my analysis is as follows:

Subsection 13(1): confidential information from government bodies

[6]Subsection 13(1) requires institutions to refuse to release information obtained in confidence from certain government bodies.

[7]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

The information was obtained from one of the following government bodies:
- a government of a foreign state or an institution of a foreign state;
- an international organization of states or an institution of such an organization;
- a provincial government or institution;
- a municipal or regional government or institution; or
- an aboriginal government or council listed in subsection 13(3).
The information was obtained from the government body in confidence—that is, with the understanding that it would be treated as confidential.

[8]When these requirements are met, institutions must then consider whether the following circumstances exist:

The government body from which the information was obtained consents to its release.
That body has already made the information public.

[9]When one or both of these circumstances exist, subsection 13(2) requires institutions to reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to release the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[10]During the course of the investigation, PCO invoked subsection 13(1) to the following information:

Titles of Liaison Officers from other countries

[11]PCO invoked subsection 13(1) to withhold the titles of Liaison Officers from other allied countries throughout the records at issue.

[12]While it can be inferred that the titles of Liaison Officers at issue were obtained from a foreign state, PCO has not provided specific evidence that this information was obtained in confidence, as required by subsection 13(1). In fact, PCO conceded in its representations that “the requirements for s.13(1) to apply may be invalid”.

[13]The complainant submitted that the fact of the close liaison relationships among members of the “Five Eyes” intelligence alliance is described in many public sources (see, for example, Richelson, The US intelligence Community, Chap. 13 “Liaison with Foreign Services,” and Richelson, The Ties That Bind, Chap. 7 “The Mechanics of Cooperation and Exchange”). The fact that allied Liaison Officers regularly attended Canadian Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) meetings is well demonstrated by numerous records released by federal government departments, including PCO, as well as in published works.

[14]As part of the investigation, the OIC was able to verify that titles of Liaison Officers have been consistently released by allied countries in similar records. The OIC’s own research points to numerous examples of where allied countries released the titles of their own Liaison Officers, and those of other countries, including Canada.

[15]Therefore, for the purposes of this investigation, I find that publicly available information and previous disclosures made by Canada and allied countries discredit PCO’s assertion that this type of information was received in confidence. I find that PCO has not established that the titles of Liaison Officers were obtained in confidence.

[16]Based on the evidence before me, I conclude that titles of Liaison Officers from other allied countries do not meet the requirements of subsection 13(1).

Information regarding the visits of Intelligence Community members from other countries

[17]PCO invoked subsection 13(1) to withhold any information regarding the visits of Intelligence Community members from other countries throughout the records at issue. PCO has maintained that this information was obtained in confidence from a foreign government. PCO further represented that allied intelligence services apply the same policy of exempting the names and positions of visiting foreign delegations. PCO is of the view that the release of this information would therefore be injurious to Canada’s reciprocal relationship with its allies.

[18]As noted above, the complainant does not object to the redaction of the names of working level Intelligence Officers from foreign countries. Regarding the remaining information, while it can be inferred that the titles of employees were obtained from a foreign state, PCO has not provided any evidence that any of the other information regarding the visits was in fact obtained from a foreign country, as the visits appear to have been organized by Canada. In addition, PCO has not provided any evidence regarding an expectation of confidentiality. While PCO maintains that allies exempt similar information, the OIC’s research indicates that this is not the case. Several examples of intelligence-related visits to and from Canada from the same era are publicly available through documents released by the United States and the United Kingdom.

Based on the evidence before me, I conclude that the information regarding the visits of Intelligence Community members from other countries does not meet the requirements of subsection 13(1).

Subsection 15(1): international affairs, national security, defence

[19]Subsection 15(1) allows institutions to refuse to release information that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to harm the conduct of international affairs, or defence or national security (for example, information related to military tactics, weapons capabilities or diplomatic correspondence, as set out in paragraphs 15(1)(a) to (i)).

[20]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

Disclosing the information could harm one of the following:
- the conduct of international affairs;
- the defence of Canada or any state with which Canada has an alliance or treaty, or any state with which Canada is linked, as defined in subsection 15(2); or
- The detection, prevention or suppression of specific subversive or hostile activities, as defined in subsection 15(2).
There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility.

[21]When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to release the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[22]PCO maintains the application of subsection 15(1) to the following portions of the responsive records:

Titles of Liaison Officers from other countries

[23]PCO invoked subsection 15(1) concurrently with subsection 13(1) to withhold the titles of Liaison Officers from other allied countries throughout the records at issue.

[24]PCO has not provided sufficient evidence on how releasing the titles would harm the conduct of international affairs, or defence or national security, or how there is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility.

[25]As part of the investigation, the OIC was able to verify that titles of Liaison Officers have been consistently released by allied countries in similar records. The OIC’s research points to numerous examples of where allied countries released this type of information, including the titles of their own Liaison Officers, and those of other countries, including Canada.

[26]Regarding disclosure of this information by Canada, the OIC is aware that the titles of Liaison Officers were made public in the IAC Minutes for 1980 and 1981, which have been publicly available for several years, through separate access requests to the federal government, and no apparent harm to Canada’s relationship with allies has resulted.

[27]PCO represented that when specific Liaison Officers from other countries are missing from the attendance sheet, it implies that discussion topics were deemed unsuitable to share with said ally. PCO maintained that disclosure would prove injurious to Canada’s relationship with that ally and jeopardize future intelligence sharing agreements.

[28]In response to PCO’s claim that attendance implies which topics Canada wished to discuss with which allies, the complainant argues that the almost invariable reason for an allied Liaison Officer to miss an IAC meeting is because they had more pressing commitments elsewhere or were out of town. In the complainant’s view, it would be extremely unlikely that an allied Liaison Officer would be deliberately disinvited from an IAC meeting.

[29]The complainant represented that on occasion issues were discussed with some Liaison Officers but not others, and that all participants were aware of this and understood that it was normal practice. The complainant provided the example that the Canadian Liaison Officer to the United Kingdom Joint Intelligence Committee was not included in the United Kingdom/United States/Australia discussions on Iraq in 2002-2003 (see Barnes, “Getting it Right,” p. 944). The complainant submits that if there was a subject that the IAC wanted to discuss with a particular Liaison Officer they would be quietly asked to remain behind after the meeting. On the minutes of the meeting, the attendance of all of the allied Liaison Officers would be indicated for the first part of the meeting. No mention would be made in the minutes that a Liaison Officer remained behind for further discussion.

[30]The OIC has recommended PCO release this information in previous investigations (see OIC 3217-00058 / PCO A-2016-00528 for IAC minutes).

[31]I am not convinced by PCO’s speculative arguments. Publicly available information and disclosures made by Canada and allied countries discredit PCO’s argument of harm reasonably occurring should this information be disclosed. That the harm may occur as a result of disclosure must be a reasonable probability and not a mere possibility.

[32]Based on the evidence before me, I find that titles of Liaison Officers from other allied countries do not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

Distribution markings of classified reports

[33]PCO maintains the application of subsection 15(1) to withhold some specific mention of distribution markings throughout the records at issue. PCO’s position is that even though other institutions have released the markings, the release of this information by PCO can pose a reasonable threat to international relations, as it is impossible to know whether a foreign partner will take offence at Canada withholding certain information from them. PCO represents that the disclosure of distribution markings should be decided upon on a case-by-case basis.

[34]I am aware that PCO itself has disclosed these specific dissemination markings, most recently in response to another request for IAC documents from 1984 (PCO access request file number A-2018-00075).

[35]Given that no apparent harm was noted in the previous disclosures, this tends to confirm that the use of subsection 15(1) is not justified in this case, unless PCO would be able to provide evidence in support of reasonable expectation of probable harm occurring as a result of the disclosure of the distribution markings in question in the current file.

[36]Further, when looking at some of the documents on the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) website, it is possible to find CIA-approved documents authorized for publication from countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia with the mention of these specific distribution markings that PCO maintains their application of the exemption on. (CIA Reading Room Document)

[37]In my view, PCO has not demonstrated how the release of these markings on the subject records could harm either the conduct of international affairs. Furthermore, PCO’s representations, thus far, have alluded to perceptions of possible harm, which fails to demonstrate that there is a reasonable expectation that the harm could occur by the release of the identified information. This expectation of harm must be probable, as opposed to merely possible.

[38]Based on the evidence before me, I find that the numerous mentions of distribution markings do not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

Names of CSE employees

[39]PCO invoked subsection 15(1) to withhold the names of CSE employees throughout the records at issue, with the exception of publicly known heads and deputy heads, and that CSE has specified that only the names of those employees can be released.

[40]Evidence gathered during the investigation demonstrates that the CSE employees’ names have been previously released. For example, several disclosures of IAC reports show the attendees, including the mention of CSE and the name of the person attending the meeting. Most recently, PCO released the names of CSE employees participating in IAC meetings in the 1980s in response to access request A-2018-00075. Further, Library and Archives Canda (LAC) has also released the names of CSE employees in documents titled ‘’IAC Doc 86-03 - 87-03 - Science and Technology in the IAC’’, ‘’IAC Doc 85-03-15 IAC Geographic Working Group’’ and ‘’IAC Minutes 81-08-26‘’.

[41]PCO stated that for CSE employees who are not department heads with public standing, regardless of whether they have left the government, identifying these individuals as former intelligence experts places them and the institution at risk. However, PCO has not demonstrated how the reasonable expectation of probable harm required by subsection 15(1) could occur should the names of the CSE employees at issue be released, particularly in light of previous disclosures. It should be noted that the risk regarding the disclosure of names of current or recent employees working at CSE would be easier to justify withholding under subsection 15(1). The difference here, however, is that the records at issue are 40 years old and clear evidence of any probable harm if those names were disclosed has not been provided by PCO.

[42]Based on the evidence before me, I find that the names of CSE employees do not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

Certain Intelligence Report Subjects/Titles

[43]PCO invoked subsection 15(1) to withhold certain intelligence report subjects/titles throughout the records at issue. PCO has maintained that certain country names or topics are identified for specific severances if they are otherwise identified on intelligence priorities lists from the period, thereby implying that Canada may or may not have been using all overt and covert means at its disposal to acquire information on these countries. PCO further represented that the question of if this activity is still sensitive after the passage of time, is problematic in that PCO would need to know when the activity actually ended or if it has ended for PCO to be reasonably sure that there would be no further harm to the national interest if this information were released.

[44]In the matter of Bronskill v. Canada (Canadian Heritage), 2011 FC 983, the Court asserted that in order for subsection 15(1) to apply, the institution cannot rely on an umbrella rationale and that there must be a direct relationship between disclosure and an alleged injury.

[45]Based on a review of the records and PCO’s representations, the injury resulting from disclosure is not apparent, particularly considering that the record at issue contains only the titles of the reports and does not reveal the content of the reports in question. PCO did not provide any evidence that the redacted titles have any ongoing operational relevance or that confirmation of covert operations could be determined from the redacted information. Likewise, PCO offered no detail to support its claim that bilateral operations could be negatively impacted by disclosure, nor what the specific injury would be.

[46]As demonstrated during the investigation, several IAC assessments on this subject from the same time period have already been released without redactions. One example in particular was identified to PCO due to its very similar content.

[47]Based on the evidence before me, I find that the intelligence report subjects/titles do not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

Information Pertaining to Canada’s Intelligence Relationship with Other Countries

[48]PCO invoked subsection 15(1) to withhold information regarding Canada’s discussions and assessment of allied countries.

[49]PCO has maintained that the release of this information would be injurious to Canada’s relationship with the allied country and with members of the Five Eyes.

[50]PCO has not demonstrated how the reasonable expectation of probable harm required by subsection 15(1) could occur should this information be released.

[51]The information discussed on these pages is well documented in the public domain.Given that no apparent harm was noted from the information being made public in numerous articles, this tends to confirm that the use of subsection 15(1) is not justifiable in this case, unless PCO was able to provide evidence in support of reasonable expectation of probable harm occurring as a result of disclosure. In my view, PCO did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate the required harm.

[52]Based on the evidence before me, I find that the exempt information pertaining to Canada’s intelligence relationship with other countries does not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

Reference to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research

[53]PCO invoked subsection 15(1) to withhold information regarding the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) on pages 891 and 899.

[54]PCO has maintained that the release of this information would be injurious to Canada’s relationship with the United States.

[55]PCO has not demonstrated how the reasonable expectation of probable harm required by subsection 15(1) could occur should this information be released.

[56]The information discussed on these pages is well documented in the public domain, and information about the INR has been shared on the United States Department of State website. ^Footnote¹

[57]Given that no apparent harm was noted from the information being made public by the United States government on their public websites, this tends to confirm that the use of subsection 15(1) is not justifiable in this case, unless PCO was able to provide evidence in support of reasonable expectation of probable harm occurring as a result of disclosure. In my view, PCO did not provide any evidence of such harm.

[58]Based on the evidence before me, I find that the references to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research does not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

Paragraph 16(1)(c): law enforcement, conduct of investigations

[59]Paragraph 16(1)(c) allows institutions to refuse to disclose information that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to harm federal or provincial law enforcement or the conduct of investigations (for example, information about the existence of an investigation that would reveal the identity of a confidential source or that was obtained during an investigation, as set out in subparagraphs 16(1)(c)(i) to (iii)).

[60]To claim this exemption with regard to the enforcement of federal or provincial laws, institutions must show the following:

Disclosing the information could harm the enforcement of any law of Canada or a province.
There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility.

[61]To claim this exemption with regard to the conduct of investigations, institutions must show the following:

disclosing the information could harm the conduct of lawful investigations—that is, investigations that are within the authority of an institution and are one of the following:
being conducted to administer or enforce an Act of Parliament or authorized under such an Act; or
of the types described in Schedule II of the Access to Information Regulations.

[62]When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[63]PCO maintains the application of paragraph 16(1)(c) to some information on pages 66, 70, 80, 85, 180, 201, 224, 236, 260, 271, 281, 291, 309, 323, 325, 326, 346, 347, 350, 361, 362, 363, 369, 374, 384, 395, 408, 415, 416, 418, 425, 426, 429, 430, 443, 455, 469, 472, 478, 479, 484, 487, 490, 491, 496, 501, 504, 505, 511, 516, 522, 529, 530, 535, 536, 537, 541, 547, 548, 549, 550, 565, 566, 613, 619, 702, 750, 840, 849, 927, 948, and 1035.

[64]PCO explained that releasing this information would reveal areas of operational interest, sources of specific information, and intelligence sharing information. This in turn could compromise the integrity of Canada’s intelligence and counter-intelligence investigations. Further, PCO shared that disclosing this information could create vulnerability within Canada and make Canada susceptible to hostile and state actors. PCO shared that they consulted with CSIS when deciding not to disclose this information.

[65]The complainant represented that it would be extremely rare for IAC assessments, which are authored for senior readers, and for necessity of space, deal with issues at a broad level of generality, and would not include the injurious information that PCO is claiming to redact under this exemption.

[66]In relation to the records subject to the present complaint, it could be reasonably inferred that the areas of operational interest, sources of specific information, and intelligence sharing information that PCO maintains the exemption on would no longer be used during investigations today. Therefore, it is unlikely that the release of this information could in any way compromise the integrity of Canada’s current intelligence and counter-intelligence investigations.

[67]Further, PCO was unable to confirm that all of the exempt information was provided to CSIS during the course of a lawful investigation—that is, an investigation that was within the authority of CSIS, being conducted to administer or enforce an Act of Parliament.

[68]PCO failed to provide sufficient evidence on how releasing the information would harm the integrity of Canada’s intelligence and counter-intelligence investigations, or how disclosing this information could create vulnerability within Canada and make Canada susceptible to hostile and state actors. PCO failed to provide detailed information on how there is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility. PCO failed to demonstrate the requirements of the injury test as required by paragraph 16(1)(c).

[69]In the decision Lavigne v. Canada (Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages), 2002 SCC 53, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 773, the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized that when applying paragraph 22(1)(b) of the Privacy Act (which is identical to paragraph 16(1)(c) of the Access to Information Act) “there must be a clear and direct connection between the disclosure of specific information and the injury that is alleged.” PCO did not provide a clear link to how release of the information from 40 years ago could lead to harm to future CSIS investigations.

[70]Based on the evidence before me, I find that the information to which PCO maintains paragraph 16(1)(c) does not meet the requirements of the exemption.

Did the institution reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to disclose the information?

[71]The investigation determined that PCO failed to meet the requirements of paragraph 16(1)(c). As a result, the examination of PCO’s exercise of discretion is unnecessary.

Subsection 19(1): personal information

[72]Subsection 19(1) requires institutions to refuse to disclose personal information.

[73]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

The information is about an individual—that is, a human being, not a corporation.
There is a serious possibility that disclosing the information would identify that individual.
The information does not fall under one of the exceptions to the definition of “personal information” set out in paragraphs 3(j) to 3(m) of the Privacy Act (for example, business contact information for public servants).

[74]When these requirements are met, institutions must then consider whether the following circumstances (listed in subsection 19(2)) exist:

The person to whom the information relates consents to its disclosure.
The information is publicly available.
Disclosure of the information would be consistent with section 8 of the Privacy Act.

[75]When one or more of these circumstances exist, subsection 19(2) of the Access to Information Act requires them to reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[76]PCO maintains the application of subsection 19(1) to information on pages 692 and 751.

[77]During the investigation, the OIC consulted with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) on the application of subsection 19(1) to pages 692 and 751. The OPC agreed with the OIC assessments below in both instances.

[78]The information on page 692 is about an individual’s action directly in relation to their role as a government employee. Therefore, I conclude that the information on page 692 does not meet the requirements of subsection 19(1), as the information falls within the exception of personal information set out in paragraph 3(j) of the Privacy Act.

[79]Regarding the information exempted on page 751, I conclude that the information meets the requirements of subsection 19(1), as the information is about an identifiable individual.

Did the institution reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to disclose the information?

[80]Since the information that PCO continues to withhold on page 751 meets the requirements of subsection 19(1), PCO was required to reasonably exercise its discretion under subsection 19(2) to decide whether to disclose the information when one or more of the circumstances described in subsection 19(2) existed when it responded to the access request.

[81]PCO provided the following rationale for why none of these circumstances existed:

It gave specific reasons why it would not have been appropriate to seek the consent of the individual to whom the personal information relates;
It represented that the information is not publicly available; and
It stated that the disclosure of the information would not be consistent with section 8 of the Privacy Act.

[82]I am of the view that PCO did not properly consider section 8 of the Privacy Act when it was considering why none of the circumstances set out in subsection 19(2) existed on page 751, which is the name of an individual who has been deceased since 1999, that is, over 20 years.

[83]Based on the evidence before me, I conclude that one of the circumstances set out in subsection 19(2) did exist when PCO responded to the access request. I conclude that PCO did not consider all relevant factors when it decided not to disclose the personal information on page 751. Therefore, the exercise of discretion by PCO in this regard was not reasonable.

Subsection 24(1): disclosure restricted by another law

[84]Subsection 24(1) requires institutions to refuse to disclose information the disclosure of which is restricted by a provision set out in Schedule II of the Access to Information Act.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[85]PCO maintains subsection 24(1) to names of CSIS employees.

[86]The schedule II provision claimed by PCO is section 18 of the CSIS Act, which states:

Offence to disclose identity

18 (1) Subject to subsection (2), no person shall knowingly disclose any information that they obtained or to which they had access in the course of the performance of their duties and functions under this Act or their participation in the administration or enforcement of this Act and from which could be inferred the identity of an employee who was, is or is likely to become engaged in covert operational activities of the Service or the identity of a person who was an employee engaged in such activities.

[87]As part of the investigation, the OIC reviewed all instances where this subsection was applied and confirmed that the exemption is applied strictly to the names of CSIS employees who were, are, or are likely to become engaged in covert operational activities.

[88]Based on the evidence before me, I am of the view that the information meets the requirements of the exemption.

Outcome

[89]The complaint is well founded because PCO improperly withheld information under subsection 13(1), subsection 15(1), paragraph 16(1)(c), and subsection 19(1) when it responded to the access request.

Orders

I order the Clerk of the Privy Council to:

Disclose the remaining responsive records withheld under subsection 13(1), in their entirety;
Disclose the responsive records withheld under subsection 15(1), in their entirety;
Disclose the responsive records withheld under paragraph 16(1)(c), in their entirety;
Disclose the information on page 692 withheld under subsection 19(1);
Re-exercise his discretion to decide whether to disclose the information on page 751 to which PCO applied subsection 19(1), taking into account all relevant factors for and against disclosure including those identified in this report; and,
Provide a new response no later than 36 business days after the date of the final report.

Initial report and notice from institution

On January 16, 2026, I issued my initial report to the Clerk setting out my orders.

The Clerk did not give me the notice I require under paragraph 37(1)(c) of the actions he took or proposes to take to implement my orders or the reasons why he would not be implementing my orders.

Instead, on February 27, 2026, PCO officials stated to my office that it would be “problematic” for PCO to release certain information for which I only received, and rejected, representations as to the application of s. 15(1). PCO is now claiming that this information was also exempted under subsection 13(1). I note that no representation was provided during the investigation on the application of s. 13(1), apart from a statement indicating that: “Although the requirements for s.13(1) to apply may be invalid, PCO maintains its rationale to protect this information under s.15(1) as marked on the records.” To be clear, until now, PCO provided specific representations on the application of subsection 15(1) to the referenced information, and none with respect to the application of s.13(1). Rather, PCO simply conceded that the exemption may not apply.

The issuance of my initial report of investigation and intended order under subsection 37(1) was not a further opportunity for PCO to provide new arguments or raise additional grounds for refusing access. My initial report made explicitly clear that this was not an opportunity for additional representations to be made. Meanwhile, PCO offered no explanation as to why it had not made its submissions during the investigation itself.

Certain investigative steps are dictated by the Act. Of relevance, paragraph 35(2)(b) specifies that in the course of the OIC’s investigation of complaint, the head of the institution is to be given a reasonable opportunity to make representations. The Act does not envision that following the issuance of my initial report institutions are further authorized or entitled to provide additional representations and / or raise additional basis for refusing access. Paragraph 37(1)(c) expressly states that my initial report is to set out the period within which the head of the government institution shall notify me of the action taken or proposed to be taken to implement the order or recommendation made or reasons why no such action has been or is proposed to be taken. This does not include submitting new arguments or new exemptions for withholding the information at issue. Accordingly, I will not consider the PCO’s response to my initial report and my order stand.

I remind the Clerk that, if he does not intend to fully implement my orders, he must apply to the Federal Court for a review by the deadline set out below.

Review by Federal Court

When an allegation in a complaint falls under paragraph 30(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (d.1) or (e) of the Act, the complainant has the right to apply to the Federal Court for a review. When the Information Commissioner makes an order(s), the institution also has the right to apply for a review. The complainant and/or institution must apply for a review within 35 business days after the date of this report. Whoever applies for a review must serve a copy of the application for review to the relevant parties, as per section 43. If no one applies for a review by these deadlines, the order(s) takes effect on the 36th business day after the date of this report.