WxT Language switcher

Privy Council Office (Re), 2026 OIC 26

Date: 2026-02-25
OIC file number: 5819-03853
Access request number: A-2016-00764

Summary

The complainant alleged that the Privy Council Office (PCO) had improperly withheld information under subsection 13(1) (confidential information from government bodies), subsection 15(1) (international affairs or national security or defence), paragraphs 16(1)(a) (investigative bodies), 16(1)(b) (investigative techniques, plans), 16(1)(c) (law enforcement, conduct of investigations) and subsection 19(1) personal information) of the Access to Information Act in response to an access request. The request was for minutes, records of decision, agendas or any other record of the meetings of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Intelligence Advisory Committee for the period January 1, 1972, to December 31, 1972. The allegation falls within paragraph 30(1)(a) of the Act.

PCO could not show that it met all the requirements of the exemptions claimed and issued a supplementary release to the complainant during the investigation. The Information Commissioner concluded that the information which remains withheld did not meet the requirements of the exemptions, except for limited information which satisfies the requirements of subsection 13(1) but for which discretion was not reasonably exercised under subsection 13(2).

The Information Commissioner ordered PCO to entirely release pages 56, 61, 66, 72, 77, 80, 121, 123, 168, 170, 206, 208, 209, 212, 214, 233, 250, 289, 291, 309, 310, 313, 344, 345, 347, and 349 of the records, to re-exercise discretion as per subsection 13(2) for information exempted on pages 41, 45 and 351 of the records, and to provide a new response no later than 36 business days after the date of the final report. PCO gave notice to the Commissioner that it would implement her orders.

The complaint is well founded.

Complaint

[1]The complainant alleges that the Privy Council Office (PCO) had improperly withheld information under subsection 13(1) (confidential information from government bodies), subsection 15(1) (international affairs or national security or defence), paragraphs 16(1)(a) (investigative bodies), 16(1)(b) (investigative techniques, plans), 16(1)(c) (law enforcement, conduct of investigations) and subsection 19(1) personal information) of the Access to Information Act in response to an access request. The request was for minutes, records of decision, agendas or any other record of the meetings of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Intelligence Advisory Committee for the period January 1, 1972, to December 31, 1972.

[2]The allegation falls within paragraph 30(1) of the Act.

[3]During the investigation, the complainant decided it was no longer necessary for the Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC) to investigate the exemptions applied by PCO to the specific names of allied liaison officers as well as any personal signatures contained in the responsive records, provided the signature block is retained.

Investigation

[4]When an institution withholds information under an exemption, it bears the burden of

[5]showing that refusing to grant access is justified.

[6]The OIC was not convinced that the exemptions had been properly applied in all

instances. Over the course of the investigation, PCO conceded that not all the

exemptions were properly applied. On September 25, 2024, PCO disclosed

information that had been previously withheld under paragraphs 13(1), 15(1), 16(1)(a), 16(1)(b), 16(1)(c) and subsection 19(1), with the exception of:

  • The title of a British Joint Intelligence Committee Draft Paper (subsections 13(1) and 15(1));
  • Information regarding the visits of Intelligence Community members from other countries (subsections 13(1) and 15(1));
  • Reference to the Tripartite Alert Circuit (subsections 13(1) and 15(1));
  • The titles of Liaison Officers from other countries (subsections 13(1) and 15(1));
  • Information regarding other specified countries (subsections 13(1) and 15(1));
  • Mention of a conference (subsections 13(1) and 15(1));
  • Remark concerning an individual from a foreign country (subsections 13(1) and 15(1);
  • Text from a discussion of the Special Research Bureau program forecast (subsections 13(1) and 15(1)); and,
  • Reference to a Joint Intelligence Report.

[7]The complainant maintains that the records should be disclosed in their entirety. In support of this position, the complainant points out that Joint Intelligence Committee and Intelligence Advisory Committee papers have been disclosed in their entirety through separate access requests to the federal government, including PCO, without harming Canadian interests.

[8]Concerning the application of exemptions on the remaining categories of information that PCO continues to maintain, my analysis is as follows.

Subsection 13(1): confidential information from government bodies

[9]Subsection 13(1) requires institutions to refuse to disclose information obtained in confidence from certain government bodies.

[10]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

  • The information was obtained from one of the following government bodies;
  • a government of a foreign state or an institution of a foreign state;
  • an international organization of states or an institution of such an organization;
  • a provincial government or institution;
  • a municipal or regional government or institution; or
  • an aboriginal government or council listed in subsection 13(3).
  • The information was obtained from the government body in confidence—that is, with the understanding that it would be treated as confidential.

[11]When these requirements are met, institutions must then consider whether the following circumstances (listed in subsection 13(2)) exist:

  • The government body from which the information was obtained consents to its disclosure.
  • That body has already made the information public.

[12]When one or both of these circumstances exist, subsection 13(2) requires institutions to reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[13]During the course of the investigation, PCO invoked subsection 13(1) to the following information:

Information regarding the visits of Intelligence Community members from other countries

[14]PCO invoked subsection 13(1) to withhold any information regarding the visits of Intelligence Community members from other countries on pages: 56, 61, 72, 77, and 351.

[15]PCO has maintained that this information was obtained in confidence from a foreign government. PCO further represented that allied intelligence services apply the same policy of exempting the names and positions of foreign visiting delegations. PCO is of the view that the release of this information would therefore be injurious to Canada’s reciprocal relationship with its allies.

[16]As noted above, the complainant does not object to the redaction of the names of working level Intelligence Officers from foreign countries. Regarding the remaining information, while it can be inferred that the titles of employees were obtained from a foreign state, PCO has not provided any evidence that any of the other information regarding the visits was in fact obtained from a foreign country, as the visits appear to have been organized by Canada.

[17]In addition, PCO has not provided any evidence regarding an expectation of confidentiality. While PCO maintains that allies exempt similar information, the OIC’s research indicates that this is not the case. Several examples of intelligence-related visits to and from Canada from the same era are publicly available through documents released by the United States and the United Kingdom.

[18]In light of the above, I conclude that the information regarding the visits of Intelligence Community members from other countries does not meet the requirements of subsection 13(1).

Tripartite Alert Circuit

[19]PCO invoked subsection 13(1) on page 66 of the records outlining the discussions concerning the Tripartite Alert Circuit.

[20]The Tripartite Alert Circuit is a component of the Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Agreement (TIAA) between Canada, the United States (US) and the UK. Information regarding the TIAA can be found in several previous disclosures related to various aspects of the program that have already been publicly disclosed.

[21]While the information relates to a topic involving Canada, the US and the UK, there is no evidence that the exempted information was obtained in confidence solely from either the UK or the USA.

[22]In its representations to the OIC, PCO asserted that no record of this update is publicly available and that disclosure could reasonably be expected to harm international relations.

[23]However, this claim is contradicted by the substantial volume of publicly disclosed material relating to the TIAA of which the Tripartite Alert Circuit is a known component. Numerous documents released through access requests and archival sources demonstrate that the existence and function of this communications network are already in the public domain.

[24]For instance:

  • Library and Archives Canada (LAC) disclosed a letter dated September 24, 1971, detailing an “intelligence circuit” between Ottawa and Trenton, Ontario.
  • The Communications Security Establishment released a document titled “The Threat to Security of Canadian Government Telecommunications” (dated September 18, 1972), discussing upgrades to telecommunications circuits used to monitor Soviet activity.
  • A further LAC disclosure, titled “Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Communications Network Report – April 1974”, identifies a circuit linking London, Ottawa, and Washington.

[25]In light of the above, I conclude that the information regarding the Tripartite Communications Circuit does not meet the requirements of subsection 13(1).

Titles of liaison officers from other countries

[26]PCO invoked subsection 13(1) to withhold the titles of liaison officers from the UK on page 80 of the responsive records.

[27]While it can be inferred that the titles of liaison officers at issue were obtained from a foreign state, PCO has not provided specific evidence that this information was obtained in confidence.

[28]The fact that allied liaison officers regularly attended Canadian meetings is well demonstrated by numerous records already released by federal government departments, including PCO, as well as in published works.

[29]As part of the investigation, the OIC was able to verify that titles of liaison officers have been consistently disclosed by allied countries in similar records. The fact that publicly available information and previous disclosures, by Canada or otherwise, does not lend credence to the assertion that the information was obtained in confidence.

[30]Further, PCO has previously disclosed this information on page 274 of PCO file: A-2016-00842.

[31]In light of the above, I conclude that the titles of liaison officers from other allied countries do not meet the requirements of subsection 13(1).

Information regarding other specified countries

[32]PCO relied on subsection 13(1) to withhold information regarding other specified countries on page 250.

[33]The information, which resides in a Canadian document, does not appear to have obtained in confidence from a government of a foreign state and is void of any specific details. PCO represented that the information was obtained via covert targets of intelligence without providing any further evidence or justification to support this assertion.

[34]Further, PCO disclosed this information on page 104 of a previous access file (PCO file: A-2016-00842).

[35]In light of the above, I conclude that the information related to the information regarding a specific country does not meet the requirements of subsection 13(1).

Mention of a conference

[36]In this instance, PCO has invoked subsections 13(1), concurrently with subsection 15(1), to redact references on pages 310 and 313 to a conference. The historical record clearly demonstrates that Canada routinely engages with various stakeholders through conferences.

[37]However, the information at issue reflects Canada’s own responses and contributions to these discussions, not information received in confidence from a foreign government as PCO asserts.

[38]Further, PCO has previously disclosed this information on pages 43 and 313 of PCO file: A-2016-00842.

[39]In light of the above, I conclude that the information pertaining to mentions of a conference do not meet the requirements of subsection 13(1).

Title of British Joint Intelligence Committee Draft Paper

[40]PCO invoked subsections 13(1) and 15(1) on pages: 41, 45, 351 regarding the title of a British Joint Intelligence Committee Draft Paper.

[41]The OIC agrees that the document title originated from a “government of a foreign state or an institution of a foreign state”, in this case, the Government of the United Kingdom, and was received in confidence.

[42]In light of this, PCO must then consider whether the circumstances listed in subsection 13(2) exist.

[43]I find that PCO did not consider that the title of this report has been made public by the government body in question via the “Gale Primary Sources: Declassified Documents Online” database, evidence of which was provided to PCO during the investigation process.

[44]Therefore, I conclude that PCO did not reasonably exercise its discretion in this regard.

[45]Regarding the information withheld on pages 212 (under “Other Business”) and 215, the OIC agrees that this information meets the requirements of subsection 13(1). As a result, no further review of this information is required.

Subsection 15(1): international affairs, national security, defence

[46]Subsection 15(1) allows institutions to refuse to disclose information that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to harm the conduct of international affairs, defence or national security (for example, information related to military tactics, weapons capabilities or diplomatic correspondence, as set out in paragraphs 15(1)(a) to (i)).

[47]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

  • Disclosing the information could harm one of the following:
  • the conduct of international affairs;
  • the defence of Canada or any state with which Canada has an alliance or treaty, or any state with which Canada is linked, as defined in subsection 15(2); or
  • the detection, prevention or suppression of specific subversive or hostile activities, as defined in subsection 15(2).
  • There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility.

[48]When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[49]As part of the Treasury Board of Canada’s Policy Guidance on the Disclosure of Historical Records under the Access to Information Act, the recommended time threshold for the exemption of historical records under subsection 15(1) stands at 50 years.

[50]In the context of historical records, for the exemption to apply to any category of information described in the provision, the head of an institution or their delegate must be able to demonstrate that there is a current and reasonable expectation of probable harm to one of the three specified public interests flowing from disclosure.

[51]The records that form the response to the complainant’s access request, and for which PCO is still maintaining exemptions, exceed the 50-year threshold established by Treasury Board.

[52]PCO maintains the application of subsection 15(1) to the following portions of the responsive records:

Title of British Joint Intelligence Committee Draft Paper

[53]On pages: 41, 45, and 351, PCO invoked subsection 15(1) on the title on a British Joint Intelligence Committee Draft Paper.

[54]PCO has asserted that the information in question was received from the British government in confidence and that its disclosure would be injurious to Canada’s bilateral relations and whose release could reasonably be expected to harm the conduct of international affairs.

[55]However, as stated previously, the title of the report has already been made publicly accessible through the “Gale Primary Sources: Declassified Documents Online” database — a fact that was substantiated and brought to PCO’s attention during the course of the investigation. This undermines the confidentiality claim and raises serious questions about the actual sensitivity of the material.

[56]In addition, PCO has not provided a clear or substantiated explanation of how the disclosure of this already-public information would meet the threshold of a “reasonable expectation of probable harm” as required under subsection 15(1). This standard demands more than speculative or generalized assertions and institutions must demonstrate a well-founded connection between the disclosure and a specific, foreseeable injury to international relations.

[57]In light of the above, I find that the exempt information pertaining to the title of the report does not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

[58]Information regarding the visits of Intelligence Community members from other countries

[59]PCO invoked subsection 15(1) to withhold information concerning the visits of Intelligence Community members from other countries, specifically on pages 56, 61, 72, 77, and 351 of the records. PCO maintains that this information was received in confidence from a foreign government and that its disclosure could reasonably be expected to harm international relations.

[60]However, the records in question date from the early 1970s and pertain to historical visits that are no longer operationally sensitive. In many cases, such information has already entered the public domain through previous access requests, academic publications, declassified archives, and open-source intelligence. The passage of time significantly diminishes the plausibility of any current diplomatic injury, especially where the individuals or institutions involved are no longer active.

[61]Subsection 15(1) requires a demonstrable reasonable expectation of probable harm. This standard demands more than speculative assertions and requires a clear and direct link between the disclosure and a specific, foreseeable injury to Canada’s international relations. To date, no reasonable expectation of probable harm is evident.

[62]Furthermore, several examples of intelligence-related visits to and from Canada from the same era are publicly available through documents released by the United States and the United Kingdom.

[63]In light of the above, I find that the exempt information pertaining to visits by Intelligence Community members does not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

Tripartite Alert Circuit

[64]PCO invoked subsection 15(1) to withhold information on page 66 of the records concerning discussions about the Tripartite Alert Circuit. In its representations to the OIC, PCO asserted that no record of this update is publicly available and that disclosure could reasonably be expected to harm international relations.

[65]However, this claim is contradicted by the substantial volume of publicly disclosed material relating to the TIAA, of which the Tripartite Alert Circuit is a known component. Numerous documents released through access requests and archival sources demonstrate that the existence and function of this communications network are already in the public domain.

[66]For instance:

  • Library and Archives Canada disclosed a letter dated September 24, 1971, detailing an “intelligence circuit” between Ottawa and Trenton, Ontario.
  • The Communications Security Establishment released a document titled “The Threat to Security of Canadian Government Telecommunications” (dated September 18, 1972), discussing upgrades to telecommunications circuits used to monitor Soviet activity.
  • A further LAC disclosure, titled “Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Communications Network Report – April 1974”, explicitly identifies a circuit linking London, Ottawa, and Washington.

[67]These disclosures undermine the assertion that the information is confidential or unknown. Moreover, subsection 15(1) requires a reasonable expectation of probable harm which requires more than speculative or generalized concerns. The Federal Court’s decision in Bronskill v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2011 FC 983, further affirms that historical and publicly known information cannot be withheld without a clear and demonstrable link to current diplomatic injury.

[68]In light of the foregoing, I find the exempt information pertaining to the Tripartite Alert Circuit does not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

Titles of liaison officers from other countries

[69]PCO invoked subsection 15(1) concurrently with subsection 13(1) to withhold the titles of Liaison Officers from other allied countries on page 80 of the responsive records.

[70]As part of the investigation, the OIC was able to verify that titles of liaison officers have been consistently released by allied countries in similar records. The OIC’s research points to numerous examples of where allied countries released this type of information, including the titles of their own Liaison Officers, and those of other countries, including Canada.

[71]Regarding the disclosure of this information by Canada, the OIC is aware that the titles of Liaison Officers were made public in the IAC Minutes for 1980 and 1981, which have been publicly available for several years, through separate access requests to the federal government, and no apparent harm to Canada’s relationship with its’ allies has resulted.

[72]PCO represented that when specific liaison officers from other countries are missing from the attendance sheet, it implies that discussion topics were deemed unsuitable to share with said ally. PCO maintained that disclosure would prove injurious to Canada’s relationship with that ally and jeopardize future intelligence sharing agreements.

[73]In response to PCO’s claim that attendance implies which topics Canada wished to discuss with which allies, the complainant argues that the almost invariable reason for an allied Liaison Officer to miss an IAC meeting is because they had more pressing commitments elsewhere or were out of town. In the complainant’s view, it would be extremely unlikely that an allied Liaison Officer would be deliberately disinvited from an IAC meeting.

[74]The complainant represented that on occasion issues were discussed with some liaison officers but not others, and that all participants were aware of this and understood that it was normal practice. The complainant provided the example that the Canadian Liaison Officer to the United Kingdom Joint Intelligence Committee was not included in the United Kingdom/United States/Australia discussions on Iraq in 2002-2003 (see Barnes, “Getting it Right,” p. 944). The complainant submits that if there was a subject that the IAC wanted to discuss with a particular liaison officer they would be quietly asked to remain behind after the meeting. On the minutes of the meeting, the attendance of all of the allied liaison officers would be indicated for the first part of the meeting. No mention would be made in the minutes that a Liaison Officer remained behind for further discussion.

[75]Further, PCO has previously disclosed this information on page 274 of PCO file: A-2016-00842.

[76]PCO has not provided sufficient evidence on how releasing the titles would harm the conduct of international affairs, or defence or national security, or how there is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur – that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility.

[77]I am not convinced by PCO’s speculative arguments. Publicly available information and disclosures made by Canada and allied countries discredit PCO’s arguments of harm reasonably occurring should this information be disclosed. That the harm may occur as a result of disclosure must be a reasonable probability and not a mere possibility.

[78]In light of the above, I find that titles of liaison officers from other allied countries do not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

Discussion of the Special Research Bureau (SRB) Program Forecast

[79]PCO redacted discussion points on pages 121 and 123 of the records concerning the SRB Program Forecast, citing subsection 15(1).

[80]PCO represented that the information alludes that Canada targeted other countries for economic intelligence or specific negotiations of an economic nature, which has not been officially avowed. This information constitutes intelligence respecting foreign states that was used by Canada in the conduct of international affairs which is protected under 15(1)(e). This also reveals specific targets of interest for intelligence collection, which we are required to protect under the Security of Information Act.

[81]Releasing this information would injure any current activity of this nature, as well as the conduct of international affairs, as our relationship with those countries/regions would be harmed if we reveal they were targeted during these negotiations.

[82]However, a memorandum dated May 11, 1972, from the Bureau of Security and Intelligence Liaison, disclosed by LAC through a prior access request, contains a detailed review of the same forecast. Notably, the passages redacted by PCO are quoted verbatim in this publicly available document.

[83]Given the age of the records and their presence in the public domain, the rationale for withholding this information is unconvincing. The threshold for invoking subsection 15(1) has already been addressed previously, and in this instance, PCO has not demonstrated how disclosure of content that is already accessible would result in any tangible harm to Canada’s international relations or defence interests.

[84]In light of the foregoing, I find the discussion of the SRB Program Forecast do not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

Information regarding other countries

[85]PCO maintained their application of subsection 15(1) to information regarding other countries on pages: 168, 170, 206, 208, 212, 214, 250, 309, 347, 349, 351 of the responsive records.

[86]The information regarding other countries exempted on these pages are as follows:

  • references to activities in another country (pp. 168, 170, 349);
  • mention of a bi-national relationship (pp. 206, 208, 212, 214, 347);
  • Threats to another country (p. 250);
  • references to the UK Joint Intelligence Committee (pp. 309, 351)

Activities in another country

[87]PCO redacted references to activities in other countries on pages 168, 170 and 349.

[88]In representations provided to the OIC, indicated that disclosure of the information would imply Canadian involvement.

[89]The subject has been well documented in various mediums including disclosures by the National Security Archive of George Washington University. Through American Freedom of Information Act requests, and other avenues of declassification, the University’s National Security Archive has been able to compile a collection of declassified records that shed light on the subject extensively.

[90]Canada’s views on the subject have been well document including Canada’s recognition and response to the activities taking place in this other country.

Mentions of a bi-lateral relationship

[91]PCO redacted references to a bi lateral relationship from 1972 on pages 206, 208, and 212.

[92]PCO represented that the redacted information indicates a specific intelligence target obtained through signals intelligence (SIGINT) which qualifies as special operational information and must be protected under the Security of Information Act.

[93]PCO also redacted references to another bi lateral relationship from the early 1970’s on pages 212, 214, 347. Records pertaining to this very subject, which were provided to PCO, have been publicly disclosed by the US Central Intelligence Agency among others.

[94]In each instance, these references, which represent information that is over 50 years old, are well document in the public domain, the media, and academic circles.

[95]Further, on pages 208, 212 and 214, this information was disclosed on page 139, 145 and 147 in a previous access request (PCO file: A-2016-00842).

Threats to other specified countries

[96]PCO also redacted mentions of threats to other countries during the early 1970’s on page 250.

[97]PCO indicates that information was obtained via covert targets of counterintelligence, which PCO is required to safeguard under the Security of Information Act. PCO determined that disclosure would negatively impact Canada’s ability to effectively detect, prevent or supress subversive or hostile activities and the conduct of international affairs, as Canada could be seen as incapable of maintaining confidentiality of government sources and individuals. Releasing the information, according to PCO, would erode Canada’s ability to safeguard highly classified information.

[98]While the records are void of any details besides this mere mention, there are ample public historical records on this issue. In addition, this information was disclosed on page 104 of PCO file: A-2016-00842.

UK Joint Intelligence Committee

[99]PCO relied on subsection 15(1) to redact mentions of the UK Joint Intelligence Committee (UK JIC) on pages 309 and 351.

[100]In applying the exemption, PCO represented that all relevant factors were considered, including the passage of time, the historical practice of the institution towards similar subject matter, the spirit of the legislation, the likelihood and impact of resulting harm, and weighing the public interest in disclosure against the resulting injury to national security and the conduct of Canada’s international affairs.

[101]Further, PCO asserted that in this case, they determined was that disclosure would negatively harm the conduct of Canada’s international affairs by portraying Canada as incapable of maintaining the confidentiality of foreign government sources and individuals.

[102]Public mentions of the UK JIC are ample. For example, Global Affairs Canada disclosed, via an access request, the visit of the UK JIC Chairman, Sir Stewart Crawford to Ottawa in March of 1972. More than the mere mention of the name and title of the UK JIC Chairman, the records go into detail about the substance of the meeting with Canadian officials. The disclosure of these records does not appear to have been harmful to Canadian interests.

[103]In light of the foregoing, I find the information regarding other countries do not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

Reference to a Joint Intelligence Report

[104]PCO has redacted the mention of a joint intelligence report on page 233 of the responsive records.

[105]According to representations received from PCO, disclosure of this information would reveal that the “Hudson’s Bay problem” was a topic of analysis in a joint bi-national report. PCO indicates that there is a reasonable expectation of harm to Canada’s international relations if this reference was disclosed.

[106]However, the OIC has determined that information pertaining to this report have been previously disclosed through other access requests without any evidence that these disclosures have caused a reasonable expectation of harm to Canadian interests.

[107]In light of the foregoing, I find the redaction of CANUS 73 and the Hudson’s Bay problem do not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

Remark concerning an individual from a foreign country

[108]PCO exempted references regarding an individual from a foreign country on pages 289, 291, 345.

[109]Representations from PCO indicate that the disclosure of this information would reveal a confidential source, which PCO is required to safeguard under the Security of Information Act, specifically to paragraph (a) of the definition of special operational information.

[110]However, contrary to PCO’s concerns, this information has already been disclosed by Library and Archives Canada through an access request. Specifically, the document titled “Minutes of the Intelligence Advisory Committee Meeting Number 43/72 held in room 4435 ‘A Building’ on Wednesday 1 November 1972” contains a detailed account of the same briefing. The fact that this material is publicly available significantly undermines the claim that its release would compromise source confidentiality or cause injury to Canada’s international relations.

[111]In light of the foregoing, I find the redaction of remarks concerning an individual from a foreign country does not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

Mention of a Conference

[112]In this instance, PCO has invoked subsections 13(1) and 15(1) on pages 310 and 313 to redact mentions of a conference.

[113]In applying the exemption, PCO represented that all relevant factors were considered, including the passage of time, the historical practice of the institution towards similar subject matter, the spirit of the legislation, the likelihood and impact of resulting harm, and weighing the public interest in disclosure against the resulting injury to national security and the conduct of Canada’s international affairs.

[114]Further, PCO asserted that in this case, they determined was that disclosure would negatively harm the conduct of Canada’s international affairs by portraying Canada as incapable of maintaining the confidentiality of foreign government sources and individuals.

[115]The historical record clearly demonstrates that Canada routinely engages with various stakeholders through conferences and extensive precedent exists for the public disclosure of records related to allied conferences without any demonstrable harm to Canadian interests.

[116]For example, the Economic Intelligence Committee of the United States Intelligence Board sponsored an international conference in Washington, DC from October 2–6, 1972 to discuss China’s sea power. Records related to this event, including the full agenda, were released by Library and Archives Canada through an access request.

[117]Further, the UK Government disclosed references to the conference that had taken place in previous years.

[118]Moreover, PCO disclosed this information through file: A-2016-00842 in response to an access request.

[119]Given the age of the records, previous disclosures, and the routine nature of such multilateral engagements, the application of subsection 15(1) in this case in not apparent. As previously noted, the threshold for invoking this exemption requires a well-founded expectation of harm, a standard that has not been met here.

[120]As a result, I find that the redaction of references to a conference does not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

Outcome

[121]The complaint is well founded because PCO improperly withheld information under subsections 13(1), and 15(1), paragraphs 16(1)(a), 16(1)(b), and 16(1)(c) and subsection 19(1) when it responded to the access request.

Orders and recommendations

I order the Clerk of the Privy Council to:

  1. Disclose pages: 56, 61, 66, 72, 77, 80, 121, 123, 168, 170, 206, 208, 209, 212, 214, 233, 250, 289, 291, 309, 310, 313, 344, 345, 347, and 349 of the responsive records in their entirety;
  2. Re-exercise his discretion concerning the application of subsection 13(2) to information on pages 41, 45, and 351 in a reasonable manner; and
  3. Provide a new response no later than 36 business days after the date of the final report.

Initial report and notice from institution

On January 8, 2026, I issued my initial report to the Clerk of the Privy Council setting out my orders.

On February 17, 2026, the Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Ministerial Services and Corporate Affairs, gave me notice that he would implement my orders.

Review by Federal Court

When an allegation in a complaint falls under paragraph 30(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (d.1) or (e) of the Act, the complainant has the right to apply to the Federal Court for a review. When the Information Commissioner makes an order(s), the institution also has the right to apply for a review. Whoever applies for a review must do so within 35 business days after the date of this report and serve a copy of the application for review to the relevant parties, as per section 43. If no one applies for a review by this deadline, the order(s) takes effect on the 36th business day after the date of this report.

Date modified:
Submit a complaint