Privy Council Office (Re), 2026 OIC 1

Date: 2025-12-23
OIC file number: 5819-01623
Access request number: A-2018-00232

Summary

The complainant alleged that the Privy Council Office (PCO) had improperly withheld information under subsection 13(1) (confidential information from government bodies) and subsection 15(1) (international affairs, national security, defence), and subsection 24(1) (disclosure restricted by another law) of the Access to Information Act in response to an access request for any reports or briefings, dated January 1, 1988 to January 31, 1989, prepared by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) dealing with global warming or climate change, including any preliminary drafts, as well as the minutes of any meetings of the IAC where such reports were discussed.

The Office of the Information Commissioner concluded that the information did not meet the requirements of the exemptions, in particular that PCO failed to demonstrate that the information was obtained from a foreign government, or that disclosure of the information could result in harm to the conduct of international affairs or the defence of Canada.

The complaint is well founded.

The Information Commissioner ordered PCO to disclose the responsive records in their entirety and provide a new response no later than 36 business days following the date of the final report.

Complaint

[1]The complainant alleged that the Privy Council Office (PCO) improperly withheld, under subsection 13(1) (confidential information from government bodies), section 14 (federal-provincial affairs), subsection 15(1) (international affairs or national security or defence), subsection 19(1) (personal information), and subsection 24(1) of the Access to Information Act, in response to an access request. The request was for any reports or briefings, dated January 1, 1988 to January 31, 1989, prepared by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) dealing with global warming or climate change, including any preliminary drafts, as well as the minutes of any meetings of the IAC where such reports were discussed. This allegation falls under paragraph 30(1)(a) of the Act.

Investigation

[2]When an institution withholds information under an exemption, it bears the burden of showing that refusing to grant access is justified.

[3]During the investigation, the complainant decided it was no longer necessary for the Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC) to investigate PCO’s application of subsection 19(1) (personal information). Further, it was determined that pages 40 to 44 were not relevant to the access request, and the complainant agreed to remove these pages from the scope of the complaint.

[4]PCO conceded during the investigation that section 14 had not been properly applied. In turn, it released all information previously withheld under this exemption.

[5]In addition, PCO subsequently disclosed some other information which it had initially withheld under subsections 13(1) and 15(1) when responding to the access request.

[6]The information which PCO continues to withhold consists of:

Information referencing a foreign government on page 18 (subsection 13(1));
The name of a Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Director and a CSIS employee (subsection 15(1) and subsection 24(1));
The name of a Communication Security Establishment (CSE) Employee (subsection 15(1));
Dissemination markings of classified reports (subsection 15(1)); and
Limited information regarding foreign governments (in many instances, one word or one line) on pages 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 27, 28, 29, and 30 (subsection 15(1)).

[7]The complainant maintains that the records should be disclosed in their entirety. In support of this position, the complainant points out that similar records have been disclosed in their entirety, through separate access requests to the federal government, including in PCO access request A-2018-00075 (OIC file number 5820-00631).

[8]What follows is an assessment of PCO’s exemption of the above information.

Subsection 13(1): confidential information from government bodies

[9]Subsection 13(1) requires institutions to refuse to release information obtained in confidence from certain government bodies.

[10]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

The information was obtained from one of the following government bodies:
- a government of a foreign state or an institution of a foreign state;
- an international organization of states or an institution of such an organization;
- a provincial government or institution;
- a municipal or regional government or institution; or
- an aboriginal government or council listed in subsection 13(3).
The information was obtained from the government body in confidence—that is, with the understanding that it would be treated as confidential.

[11]When these requirements are met, institutions must then consider whether the following circumstances exist:

The government body from which the information was obtained consents to its release.
That body has already made the information public.

[12]When one or both of these circumstances exist, subsection 13(2) requires institutions to reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to release the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[13]PCO relies on subsection 13(1) to withhold two words on page 18. According to PCO:

this information was received from a foreign state in confidence and “[t]here is an expectation from Canada’s foreign partners that such information remains confidential given the nature of the information and the context in which it was provided”; and
disclosure would prove injurious to Canada’s relationship with that ally and jeopardize future intelligence sharing agreements.

[14]In making these assertions, PCO did not provide any specifics regarding the record(s) obtained, the manner in which those records were communicated and/or the expectation that the information relayed in those records would be kept confidential.

[15]When invited to provide additional information or evidence to support its claims, PCO indicated that it would get back to the OIC by early August 2025, upon looking into the issues and likely consulting Global Affairs Canada and CSIS. PCO however failed to do so.

[16]Based on a review of the records and the limited information provided by PCO, it is my view that PCO has failed to establish that the requirements of subsection 13(1) are met.

[17]In light of the above, I find that the information does not meet the requirements of subsection 13(1).

Subsection 15(1): international affairs, national security, defence

[18]Subsection 15(1) allows institutions to refuse to disclose information that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to harm the conduct of international affairs, defence or national security (for example, information related to military tactics, weapons capabilities or diplomatic correspondence, as set out in paragraphs 15(1)(a) to (i)).

[19]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

Disclosing the information could harm one of the following:
- the conduct of international affairs;
- the defence of Canada or any state with which Canada has an alliance or treaty, or any state with which Canada is linked, as defined in subsection 15(2); or
- the detection, prevention or suppression of specific subversive or hostile activities, as defined in subsection 15(2).
There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility.

[20]When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[21]PCO maintains the application of subsection 15(1) to the following information:

Names of CSIS Director and CSIS Employee

[22]PCO’s only submission in support of its reliance on subsection 15(1) to withhold the name of a CSIS Director and the name of another CSIS employee is its assertion that this redaction is consistent with the approach that CSIS takes to redacting the names of its employees.

[23]The identities of the individuals whose names have been redacted, are public information and can be found in open sources.

[24]Further, evidence gathered during the investigation demonstrates that the names, within the context of a number of IAC reports, have also been disclosed in response to a number of previous access requests. This includes the disclosure of IAC reports showing the individuals’ attendance at meetings. Some examples include documents released by Library and Archives Canada (LAC), entitled: ‘’ IAC Minutes 88-09 Meeting 37-88 Ext - IAC Intelligence Review” (released in ATIP A-2016-00701)); “IAC Docs 85-04 - 88-12 - Intelligence Advisory Committee” (released in ATIP A-2016-00316); and “IAC Docs 88-10 - 90-10 - Training and Procedures” (released in ATIP A-2016-00658); ‘’IAC Doc 89-01-13 - List of IAC Products 1988” (released in ATIP A-2016-00700); “IAC Doc 89-02-20 - Meeting to Discuss IAC Reforms” (also released in ATIP A-2016-00700); and “IAC Doc 89-10-20 - DEA USS Taylor to Address IAC Meeting” (also released in ATIP A-2016-00700).

[25]The public availability of the names, including within the context of IAC reports, undermines any claim that disclosing the names could reasonably be expected to result in a harm described in subsection 15(1). PCO provided no submissions, much less any submissions supported by evidence, of any harm resulting from such previous disclosures.

[26]In light of the above, I am of the view that the CSIS information does not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

Names of CSE Employee

[27]During the investigation, PCO indicated that they wished to further exempt under 15(1) the name of a CSE employee on page 20. This information, however, was in fact disclosed to the complainant when PCO initially responded to the access request. It has also been posted online on the complainant’s database since that time.

[28]In addition, evidence gathered during the investigation demonstrates that this CSE employee’s name has been previously released in response to other access to information requests. For example, several IAC reports containing the CSE employee’s name and the fact that they attended certain meetings, have previously been disclosed. Some examples include documents released by LAC, entitled: ‘’IAC Doc 86-03 - 87-03 - Science and Technology in the IAC’’; ‘’IAC Doc 85-03-15 IAC Geographic Working Group’’; and ‘’IAC Minutes 81-08-26‘’.

[29]Again, PCO’s failure to provide any evidence of harm resulting from the previous disclosure of this name seriously undermines its claim that disclosure could reasonably be expected to result in a harm described in subsection 15(1).

[30]In light of the above, I am again of the view that the information does not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

Dissemination markings

[31]PCO invoked subsection 15(1) to withhold dissemination markings on pages 14 to 16, 26, 28 and 31 to 33 of the responsive records.

[32]Three types of dissemination markings have been withheld.

[33]With regard to two types of the dissemination markings (collectively found on pages 14-16 of the responsive records), PCO stated that disclosure would potentially harm Canada’s conduct of its international affairs, because:

The markings show that a country was excluded from the distribution list;
This exclusion was in itself based on communications obtained in confidence from another country; and
The ally with whom the information was not shared may be disappointed that Canada did not relay the information to them.

[34]Further, concerning the specific dissemination marking on page 14:

This particular marking “often denotes” extremely restricted information likely gathered by a particular ally in a particular way; and
The redactions are consistent with redactions of similar reports.

[35]As for the 3^rd type of dissemination marking (found on pages 26, 28, 31, 32, 33 of the responsive records), PCO again stated that disclosure could harm Canada’s conduct of international affairs. By way of explanation, PCO stated that:

The marking would reveal that the Canadian intelligence community intended to include intelligence or judgement in this report that “would not be suitable for sharing with a particular ally” and why;
This would likely upset the ally with whom the information was not to be shared; and
Disclosure of the marking on these pages would reveal markings throughout the record – (albeit without explaining how or why).

[36]Concerning the first type of marking, i.e., that information was not disseminated to a particular ally, it is well known that intelligence sharing among certain allies was suspended during the relevant time period. In light of this, it would be expected for Canada to have abided by restrictions on intelligence information sharing during that period. Thus, I am not satisfied that harm from the disclosure of this information could reasonably be expected to occur.

[37]With regard to the specific dissemination marking located on page 14, the OIC identified numerous examples of analogous markings having been previously disclosed by National Defence (DND) (DND Int Reports 94-02 – UNPROFOR), DND Int Reports 94-03 – UNPROFOR, DND Int Docs 89-01 - 97-10 – DSTI). This previous disclosure, with no evidence of resulting harms, undermines PCO’s claims that the disclosure of such markings could reasonably be expected to result in an injury described in subsection 15(1).

[38]Concerning the third type of marking, the OIC’s investigation identified numerous examples of analogous dissemination markings having previously been disclosed by PCO and other government institutions. Indeed, there are dozens of examples of documents in the public domain where dissemination markings of classified reports are disclosed. Examples include dissemination markings found in documents released by CSIS (CSIS 18-04 - Briefing Notes) and LAC (IAC Assessment 82-07-07 - Brazil-Trends and Prospects, DEA Int Doc 76-01 - Lead Dept on Assessments of Soviet Strategic Threat, Rel to Aus/Can/UK/US, IAC Assessment 81-04-23 - Nuclear Weapons Development in Additional Countries and IAC Assessment 82-06-16 - Latin American Relations in the Aftermath of the Falklands Crisis), just to name a few. Given that no apparent harm was noted in the previous disclosures, this tends to confirm that the use of subsection 15(1) is not justified in this case, unless PCO was able to provide evidence in support of reasonable expectation of probable harm occurring as a result of disclosure.

[39]PCO has not demonstrated how the release of these markings on the subject records could harm the conduct of international affairs, the defence of Canada defence or any state allied with Canada or the detection, prevention or suppression of subversive or hostile activities, much less how any such harms could reasonably be expected to occur. PCO’s representations speak of possible harms, which fail to demonstrate that there is a reasonable expectation that the harm could occur. This expectation of harm must be probable, as opposed to merely possible.

[40]In light of the above, I am of the view that the information does not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

Limited information regarding foreign governments

[41]PCO also has maintained their application of subsection 15(1) to limited information regarding foreign governments, as found on pages 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 27, 28, 29, and 30.

[42]The information regarding foreign governments on these pages was characterized by PCO, in general terms, as follows:

a judgement about an ally (p.14 of the responsive records);
an assessment of an ally’s intelligence (pp.20 22 & 28 of the responsive records);
the subject of an ally’s intelligence information (p.16 of the responsive records);
Canada’s economic goals vis à vis another country, (pp.17, 19 & 29 of the responsive records);
the extent to which information was/was not shared with an alliance and an ally (pp.16 & 27 of the responsive records); and
language critical of another country (p.29 of the responsive records).

[43]In turn, PCO asserted that disclosing this information could harm the conduct of Canada’s international affairs by detrimentally effecting relations with other countries and or Canada’s reputation with allies. This in turn, PCO asserted, could lead to a slowdown in the sharing of intelligence with Canada.

[44]Having considered the information at issue and PCO’s representations, it is my view that PCO has failed to establish that disclosure could reasonably be expected to harm the conduct of international affairs, as alleged.

[45]To the extent that any of the information could be construed as information reflecting discussions or assessments of an ally’s intelligence (p.14 of the responsive records), that information is relatively general in nature and also seemingly innocuous, particularly bearing in mind the passage of time. While PCO suggested that the mere existence of such discussions or assessments cannot be shared, lest it be misconstrued as spying or targeting allies, it is well known that allies routinely engage in internal discussions/analysis of intelligence received. Such discussions and/or analysis are generally based on diplomatic and open source information and therefore are in no way indicative of covert intelligence against allies. This is supported by decades of IAC material that has been disclosed to the public.

[46]Regarding a report involving an ally (p.30 of the responsive records), the information, again, is relatively general in nature and also seemingly innocuous, particularly bearing in mind the passage of time. The information in no way suggests that any such report would be based on covert intelligence.

[47]As for the subject of an ally’s intelligence information (p.16 of the responsive records), PCO asserts that disclosure would reveal the subject matter of intelligence that Canada received in confidence. However, the fact that PCO chose not to apply section 13 of the Act to this information undercuts its claim of confidentiality. In addition, the fact that this ally provided intelligence on a particular topic is of little surprise.

[48]With regard to information involving Canada’s economic goals vis à vis another country (pp.17, 19 & 29 of the responsive records), again, the information is general and outdated. In addition, the likelihood of harm from disclosure is undermined by the Canada and this country’s strong relations, despite Canada’s awareness of this country’s historical economic goals vis à vis Canada and its allies.

[49]As for information revealing the extent to which information was not disseminated to a particular ally (pp.16 & 27 of the responsive records), it is well known that intelligence sharing among certain allies was suspended during the relevant time period. In light of this, it would be expected for Canada to have abided by restrictions on intelligence information sharing during that period. Thus, I am not satisfied that the disclosure of this information could reasonably be expected to occur.

[50]While PCO also asserted that certain information (p.16) could reveal “what sort of information was, and is, regularly sanitized from reports sent to” an alliance, it failed to explain how, much less establish that the disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to result in a harm described in subsection 15(1).

[51]With respect to the first exemption claimed on page 29, PCO asserts that “economic intelligence rarely has a collaborative goal, and is produced to gain a competitive advantage,” and therefore its release could be injurious to international affairs. However, PCO’s rationale relies solely on the assertion that disclosure could be harmful. Jurisprudence under the Act is clear that a mere possibility of harm is insufficient. PCO must demonstrate a reasonable expectation of probable harm—a standard that requires more than speculation or generalized assertions of potential injury. In this case, PCO has not provided a specific or direct explanation of how release of this particular information would cause injury to Canada's international relations. In fact, PCO acknowledges that, at the relevant time, the foreign government in question had also “sought economic intelligence on Canada through a variety of means, both overt and covert.” This acknowledgment significantly undermines the argument that disclosure would cause harm, as this representation by PCO demonstrates that mutual engagement in economic intelligence activities was evidently already known or assumed by both parties. Moreover, I am not persuaded that the disclosure of this information—now 37 years old—could reasonably be expected to harm Canada's international relations today. The passage of time further diminishes any credible claim of probable harm.

[52]Regarding the second exemption on page 29, PCO states that the critical language used to describe this foreign state—given the current political climate—could cause harm to international relations if released. Once again, PCO relies on a general assertion of potential harm without demonstrating a reasonable expectation of probable harm. No specific explanation has been provided to show how disclosure of the information in question would directly injure Canada’s relations with the foreign state. Given that the statements in question were made 37 years ago, I am not satisfied that their disclosure today could reasonably be expected to cause harm to Canada’s international affairs, nor that it would contribute meaningfully to current political tensions or diplomatic sensitivities.

[53]In light of the above, I am of the view that the information does not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

Subsection 24(1): disclosure restricted by another law

[54]Subsection 24(1) requires institutions to refuse to disclose information the disclosure of which is restricted by a provision set out in Schedule II of the Access to Information Act.

[55]PCO invoked this exemption based on subsection 18(1) of the CSIS Act, which reads:

Offence to disclose identity

18 (1) Subject to subsection (2), no person shall knowingly disclose any information that they obtained or to which they had access in the course of the performance of their duties and functions under this Act or their participation in the administration or enforcement of this Act and from which could be inferred the identity of an employee who was, is or is likely to become engaged in covert operational activities of the Service or the identity of a person who was an employee engaged in such activities.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

Name of CSIS Director / Employee

[56]Evidence gathered during the investigation demonstrates that the CSIS names have been previously released. For example, several disclosures of IAC reports show the individuals’ names, including the fact that they were in attendance at meetings.

[57]In light of the above, I am not satisfied that the names of the CSIS Director and employees is restricted by subsection 18(1) of the CSIS Act. In turn, PCO has failed to establish that these names can be withheld under subsection 24(1) of the Act.

Outcome

[58]The complaint is well founded.

Orders and recommendations

I order the Clerk of the Privy Council to:

Disclose the responsive records in their entirety;
Provide a new response no later than 36 business days following the date of the final report.

Initial report and notice from institution

On October 30, 2025, I issued my initial report to the Clerk setting out my intended orders.

On December 18, 2025, PCO provided a supplementary disclosure of information to the complainant, releasing some, but not all, of the information discussed above.

However, the Clerk did not give me the notice I require under paragraph 37(1)(c) of the actions he took or proposes to take to implement my orders or the reasons why he would not be implementing my orders.

I remind the Clerk that, if he does not intend to fully implement my orders, he must apply to the Federal Court for a review by the deadline set out below.

Review by Federal Court

When an allegation in a complaint falls under paragraph 30(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (d.1) or (e) of the Act, the complainant has the right to apply to the Federal Court for a review. When the Information Commissioner makes an order(s), the institution also has the right to apply for a review. Whoever applies for a review must do so within 35 business days after the date of this report and serve a copy of the application for review to the relevant parties, as per section 43. If no one applies for a review by this deadline, the order(s) takes effect on the 36th business day after the date of this report.