Fisheries and Oceans Canada (Re), 2026 OIC 9

Date: 2026-01-23
OIC file number: 5822-03848
Access request number: A-2022-00190/CDS

Summary

The complainant alleged that Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) improperly withheld information under subsection 19(1) (personal information), paragraph 20(1)(b) (confidential third-party financial, commercial, scientific, or technical information), and paragraph 20(1)(c) (financial impact on a third party) of the Access to Information Act to an access request for records relating to the application form for the issuance of an authorization under the Fisheries Act (Non-Emergency Situations) that was submitted by Ridley Terminals Inc. for its berth expansion project. The allegation falls within paragraph 30(1)(c) of the Act. DFO could not show that it met all the requirements of these exemptions; in particular it did not show that all the information meets the requirements for paragraph 20(1)(b) or paragraph 20(1)(c). The Information Commissioner ordered that DFO disclose all the withheld information, with the exception of the information that meets the requirements of subsection 19(1). DFO gave notice to the Commissioner that it would follow the order. The complaint is well founded.

Complaint

[1]The complainant alleged that Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) improperly withheld information under the following provisions of the Access to Information Act in response to an access request:

subsection 19(1) (personal information);
paragraph 20(1)(b) (confidential third-party financial, commercial, scientific, or technical information); and
paragraph 20(1)(c) (financial impact on a third party).

[2]The allegation falls under paragraph 30(1)(a) of the Act.

[3]The access request was for records relating to the application form for the issuance of an authorization under the Fisheries Act (Non-Emergency Situations) that was submitted by Ridley Terminals Inc. for its berth expansion project.

Investigation

[4]When an institution withholds information, including information related to third parties, the third parties and/or the institution bear the burden of showing that refusing to grant access is justified.

[5]During the investigation, one of the third parties, Trigon Pacific Terminals Limited, herein referred to as “Trigon”, asserted that DFO was prohibited from disclosing the withheld information on the basis of paragraph 20(1)(d) (negotiations by a third party), in addition to paragraphs 20(1)(b) and 20(1)(c). Consequently, DFO was asked to address the application of paragraph 20(1)(d) pursuant to paragraph 35(2)(b) of the Act.

Subsection 19(1): personal information

[6]Subsection 19(1) requires institutions to refuse to disclose personal information.

[7]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

The information is about an individual—that is, a human being, not a corporation.
There is a serious possibility that disclosing the information would identify that individual.
The information does not fall under one of the exceptions to the definition of “personal information” set out in paragraphs 3(j) to 3(m) of the Privacy Act (for example, business contact information for public servants).

[8]When these requirements are met, institutions must then consider whether the following circumstances (listed in subsection 19(2)) exist:

The person to whom the information relates consents to its disclosure.
The information is publicly available.
Disclosure of the information would be consistent with section 8 of the Privacy Act.

[9]When one or more of these circumstances exist, subsection 19(2) of the Access to Information Act requires institutions to reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[10]DFO applied subsection 19(1) along with paragraphs 20(1)(b) and 20(1)(c) to withhold information on pages 65, 72, 75, 76, 78, 102, 228, 237, 240, 241 and 243, including names and contact information.

[11]I am satisfied that the information which DFO redacted under subsection 19(1) is:

about an individual;
there is a serious possibility that disclosing the information would identify that individual; and
the information does not fall under one of the exceptions to the definition of “personal information” set out in paragraphs 3(j) to 3(m) of the Privacy Act.

[12]Consequently, I conclude that the information meets the requirements of subsection 19(1).

Did the institution reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to disclose the information?

[13]Since the information meets the requirements of subsection 19(1), DFO was required to reasonably exercise its discretion under subsection 19(2) to decide whether to disclose the information when one or more of the circumstances described in subsection 19(2) existed when it responded to the access request.

[14]Upon considering the information at issue, as well as the totality of representations made by Trigon and DFO, I am satisfied that the information is not publicly available, consent was not provided to release this information, and disclosure would not be consistent with section 8 of the Privacy Act.

[15]I conclude that the circumstances set out in subsection 19(2) did not exist when DFO responded to the access request. There is no need to examine the issue of discretion.

Paragraph 20(1)(b): confidential third-party financial, commercial, scientific or technical information

[16]Paragraph 20(1)(b) requires institutions to refuse to disclose confidential financial, commercial, scientific or technical information provided to a government institution by a third party (that is, a private company or individual, but not the person who made the access request).

[17]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

The information is financial, commercial, scientific or technical.
The information is confidential.
The third party supplied the information to a government institution.
The third party has consistently treated the information as confidential.

[18]When these requirements are met, and the third party to whom the information relates consents to its disclosure, subsection 20(5) requires institutions to reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

[19]In addition, when the requirements are met, subsection 20(6) requires institutions to reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information for public health or public safety reasons, or to protect the environment, when both of the following circumstances (listed in subsection 20(6)) exist:

disclosure of the information would be in the public interest; and
the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any financial impact on the third party, any prejudice to the security of the third party’s structures, networks or systems, or competitive position, or any interference with its contractual or other negotiations.

[20]However, subsections 20(2) and 20(4) specifically prohibit institutions from using paragraph 20(1)(b) to refuse to disclose information that contains the results of product or environmental testing carried out by or on behalf of a government institution, unless the testing was done for a fee for an individual or an organization other than a government institution.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[21]DFO applied paragraph 20(1)(b) concurrently with paragraph 20(1)(c), and in some cases subsection 19(1), to withhold the records in their entirety. The records are comprised of reports prepared for Trigon by consulting group Hemmera, collectively referred to herein as the “Reports”.

Was the information financial, commercial, scientific and/or technical?

[22]Trigon argued that the Reports contain sensitive commercial, scientific and technical information regarding the project.

[23]In the decision Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), 2012 SCC 3 (Merck Frosst), the Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the well-established jurisprudence of the Federal Court that the terms “financial, commercial, scientific or technical” should be given their ordinary dictionary meanings.

[24]I accept that much of the information consists of financial, commercial, scientific or technical information, including, for example:

financial information on pages 63, 226
scientific information on pages 18, 21-22, 26-29, 31, 33, 35-44, 46-64, 99, 112-113, 168, 178-191, 203-225, 272, 274-279
technical information on pages 14-15, 19, 20, 30, 35, 46, 80, 82, 84-85, 87, 96, 111, 116-125, 127-144, 159-160, 174-177, 195-203, 207, 245-246, 248-267, 269-270

[25]Further, one of the reports contains details which consist of commercial information pertaining to the third party’s operations.

[26]However, the courts have indicated that it is not enough that a record was created in the context of a proceeding having financial or commercial implications, for the record to be considered financial or commercial in its entirety. The Supreme Court of Canada recognized in Merck that information such as page and volume numbering, dates, and location of information within the records does not constitute financial, commercial, scientific or technical information. To that end, some of the withheld information does not meet the first requirement of paragraph 20(1)(b). The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples:

lists of symbols, units of measurement and acronyms or abbreviations;
academic references, page numbers, general headers or titles (throughout),
tables of contents;
title pages;
generalized responsibilities and practices of managers, contractors and coordinators; and
blank template forms. (see AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2005 FC 189, para. 73)

[27]This type of information is general or administrative in nature and does not fall into the categories of commercial, financial, scientific or technical, and neither the third parties nor DFO explained how this type of information met the first requirement of paragraph 20(1)(b).

Was the information confidential?

[28]In order for paragraph 20(1)(b) to be applied, the record must be objectively confidential. In Air Atonabee Limited v. Canada (Minister of Transport), 1989 CanLII 10334, the Federal Court outlined three specific sub-criteria, each of which must be met, for the information to be considered confidential:

the information is not otherwise available from public sources;
the information originates and is communicated with a reasonable expectation of confidence that it will not be disclosed; an
the relationship between the government and third party is not contrary to the public interest and will be fostered for public benefit by keeping the information confidential.

Was the information publicly available?

[29]Considering the first criterion for confidentiality, I find that certain information within the record is available from public sources.

[30]Basic information about the project, such as the fact the project would move forward, that an environmental effects report was prepared, and descriptions detailing the construction and components of the project are available online through news stories, slides, and photographs made public by Trigon. This information was available online at the time the request was processed, along with other information such as species at risk. Examples of this type of information are located on pages 12, 22, 32, 95, 114, 123-133, 172, 173, 186, 192-194 and 227. Certain information is also publicly available by virtue of being out in the open – for example, descriptions or pictures of the existing infrastructure at the Terminal.

[31]In 2019, Trigon undertook public consultations on the project, which included preliminary materials and assessments about the project’s impacts. This report, referred to herein as the “Draft 2019 Report”, was made available for long-term public viewing in three locations, including the Prince Rupert Library, where it remains accessible to the public in the reference section.

[32]Trigon provided representations indicating that the information contained in the Reports that is publicly available does not establish that the “synthesis of information” contained with the Reports is publicly available. Trigon also asserted that similarities between the Draft 2019 Report and the Reports by Trigon are not determinative of whether the Reports themselves are publicly available.

[33]I agree that the Reports themselves are not publicly available, however, that is not the case for certain information contained within the reports. As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Merck Frosst, “information is not confidential if it is in the public domain, including being publicly available through another source.” (para 146).

[34]Some of the information withheld in the response is the same as information contained throughout the Draft 2019 Report

[35]While there are differences between the Draft 2019 Report and the withheld records, some of the information is identical, albeit in different locations within the records. A non-exhaustive table identifying similarities between the documents was provided to DFO when its representations were sought. DFO maintained that it did not find this document when it originally processed the request, but agreed there was overlap between the responsive records and the Draft 2019 Report.

[36]Lists and summaries of publicly available reference materials are generally not considered to be confidential information unless it can be demonstrated that disclosure of this information discloses more information than that which is already available in the public domain. The Supreme Court of Canada in Merck Frosst stated that:

[37]the simple reference to a publicly available study or a description of its contents in a submission generally is not confidential information; a mere reference simply notes the existence of the study and a description of its contents simply summarizes information which is publicly available. (at para 149).

[38]Trigon asserted that the inclusion of the studies and reference materials reflected Trigon’s reliance on those studies, and its use of those specific databases and search terms were implicit statements of Trigon and Hemmera’s evaluation of their reliability and relevance. This information, Trigon argued, is not publicly available. In addition, Trigon cited Janssen-Ortho Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2005 FC 1633 (Janssen-Ortho), and argued that the records were more analogous to those in Janssen-Ortho than to those in Merck Frosst.

[39]In my view, the list of studies and reference materials contains no implicit or explicit comments or analyses on the usefulness or reliability of those materials, given that they appear, in part, to have been used to simply perform a review of existing information. The circumstances in the present instance are more akin to those in Merck Frosst than Janssen-Ortho. Further, the Draft 2019 Report referred to a number of the same studies and references. As such, Trigon’s alleged reliance on these studies and references is already publicly known.

[40]Trigon also argued that its commercial relationship with Hemmera constitutes confidential information that should be withheld under paragraph 20(1)(b). However, it is publicly known that Hemmera was previously commissioned to prepare the 2019 report, and it is reasonable to infer that Hemmera likely participated in subsequent work related to these reports. In terms of disclosing Hemmera’s involvement with Trigon, DFO and the third parties did not demonstrate how Hemmera’s involvement in the creation of the Reports meets the requirements of the exemption when Hemmera’s earlier involvement was publicly available.

[41]I conclude that much of the information contained within the Reports is available from public sources.

Was the information communicated with a reasonable expectation of confidentiality?

[42]Trigon asserted that it supplied the Reports to DFO solely for the purpose of obtaining authorization under paragraphs 34.4(2)(b) and 35(2)(b) of the Fisheries Act. Trigon represented that disclosing the information would discourage future project proponents from submitting similar materials to DFO. Trigon also represented that the Reports are subject to a non-disclosure and confidentiality agreement between Trigon and Hemmera, and indicated that this same expectation of confidentiality would extend to the same materials submitted to DFO.

[43]Trigon did not provide my office with a copy of any contract or non-disclosure agreement it had with DFO or Hemmera concerning the Reports to substantiate this claim. The existence of a non-disclosure agreement between Trigon and its contractor (i.e. Hemmera) is not binding on the government institution and the parties have not provided any basis on which DFO would be bound by the non-disclosure clause.

[44]In its representations, DFO asserted that should another access request for the same information be received in 2025, its approach to the review of the records would change in accordance with the status of the project and publicly available information. This implies that applicants of such projects to the Minister do not have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality to the entirety of the information.

[45]Paragraphs 34.4(2)(b) and 35(2)(b) of the Fisheries Act do not contain any statutory prohibitions against the disclosure of information provided to the Minister. Further, in the Applicant's Guide Supporting the Authorizations Concerning Fish and Fish Habitat Protection Regulations it states that “Information submitted to DFO may be shared with other federal, provincial, or territorial departments and agencies, Indigenous groups, and other stakeholders as part of the review process”, which clearly indicates that the information submitted by third parties cannot reasonably be expected to be kept confidential in its entirety in all instances.

[46]Finally, with regard to the reasonable expectation of confidentiality, the Federal Court has found that “[t]o meet this test, one must have regard for the nature of the relationship between the government and the third party. […] The expectation of confidentiality must be less where a third party is attempting to persuade government to grant it some concession or licence, then [sic] where the third party is assisting government in carrying out its mandate.” (see AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2005 FC 189, para. 69, affirmed in 2006 FCA 241). In the present instance, Trigon was seeking authorization from the Minister to carry out activities that could affect fish habitats; the information was therefore not provided by the third party to assist the government in carrying out its mandate and the expectation of confidentiality would be less.

[47]I conclude that the parties have failed to demonstrate that the Reports, in their entirety, originated and were communicated with a reasonable expectation of confidentiality. Furthermore, neither DFO nor the third parties attempted to address such an expectation over specific information within the record. Therefore, I conclude the information was not communicated with a reasonable expectation of confidentiality.

Was the relationship fostered for public benefit by maintaining confidentiality?

[48]The third condition of confidentiality requires that the information was communicated within the context of a relationship fostered for public benefit by the communication’s confidentiality.

[49]In its representations, Trigon asserted that keeping the information confidential would foster the relationship between itself and DFO and therefore be in the public interest, as it allows open and frank communication between the third party and the government institution. Trigon further represented that disclosing the Reports would undermine the parties’ relationship as it would be a direct contradiction of the circumstances under which Trigon submitted its materials to DFO as part of the authorization process for the project. Trigon indicated it would be less inclined to engage in full and frank communication involving commercially sensitive information with DFO if the information were to be disclosed, as it continues to engage with DFO on a regular basis.

[50]DFO represented that had the authorization been denied, Trigon would have been required to amend its plans, rendering the information in the current records inaccurate and providing the public with a false representation of the project and potentially prejudicing the proponent’s ability to negotiate with contractors with whom they intended to do business. However, these representations did not speak to the relationship between DFO and Trigon.

[51]Regarding Trigon’s assertion that it would be less likely to submit materials to DFO in the future for similar projects, I find that Trigon would be obliged to submit any materials and communicate with DFO as necessary to gain authorizations for projects, as these authorizations are required under the Fisheries Act, regardless of the quality of the relationship between the parties.

[52]I am therefore not convinced that the relationship would be fostered for public benefit by maintaining confidentiality.

[53]In light of the above, I conclude that the information at issue is not objectively confidential and does not meet the second requirement of paragraph 20(1)(b).

Was the information supplied by a third party to a government institution?

[54]I accept that Trigon supplied most of the information in question to the government institution, with the exception of the records on pages 71-78 and 236-243. Information created by DFO does not meet this requirement, except for any portions of information provided by Trigon that were replicated in those records.

Has the third party consistently treated the information as confidential?

[55]Trigon undertook public consultations on this matter in 2019 as indicated above, and distributed the Draft 2019 Report for viewing among the public. Trigon has also publicly provided updates regarding this project, as well as more recently reporting on federal funding acquired from Transport Canada in 2022.

[56]A page from one of the reports (p. 96) indicates that it is a working document to be used by multiple parties, including several external parties. This would require it to be shared with multiple individuals outside of Trigon.

[57]It therefore appears unlikely that the entirety of the contents of this report were consistently treated as confidential and as a result, the fourth criterion for the exemption is not met in all instances.

[58]As detailed above, it has not been shown that all of the information meets the first, second, third or fourth requirement for the exemption.

[59]Consequently, I conclude that the information does not meet the requirements of paragraph 20(1)(b).

[60]Since the information does not meet the requirements of paragraph 20(1)(b), I also examined whether DFO had properly applied paragraph 20(1)(c) to the same information.

Paragraph 20(1)(c): financial impact on a third party

[61]Paragraph 20(1)(c) requires institutions to refuse to disclose information that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to have a material financial impact on a third party (that is, a private company or individual, but not the person who made the access request) or harm its competitive position.

[62]To claim this exemption with regard to financial impact on a third party, institutions must show the following:

Disclosing the information could result in material financial loss or gain to the third party.
There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility.

[63]To claim this exemption with regard to competitive position, institutions must show the following:

Disclosing the information could injure the competitive position of the third party.
There is a reasonable expectation that this prejudice could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility.

[64]When these requirements are met, and the third party to whom the information relates consents to its disclosure, subsection 20(5) requires institutions to reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

[65]In addition, when the requirements are met, subsection 20(6) requires institutions to reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information for public health or public safety reasons, or to protect the environment, when both of the following circumstances (listed in subsection 20(6)) exist:

disclosure of the information would be in the public interest; and
the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any financial impact on the third party, any prejudice to the security of the third party’s structures, networks or systems, or competitive position, or any interference with its contractual or other negotiations.

[66]However, subsections 20(2) and 20(4) specifically prohibit institutions from using paragraph 20(1)(c) to refuse to disclose information that contains the results of product or environmental testing carried out by or on behalf of a government institution, unless the testing was done for a fee for an individual or an organization other than a government institution.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[67]The exemption was applied concurrently with paragraph 20(1)(b) to withhold the records in their entirety.

[68]The relevant jurisprudence makes clear that a party resisting disclosure based on paragraph 20(1)(c) bears the onus of establishing in more than just a general way that there is a reasonable expectation of a probable harm described in paragraph 20(1)(c) occurring if the information is disclosed (see: Les Viandes du Breton Inc. c. Canada (Department of Agriculture), 2000 CanLII 16764 (FC), at para 12). This requires that a party opposing disclosure demonstrate that the harm is reasonably probable and must be assessed based on facts and on the specific records at issue in an access request (see: Samsung Electronics Canada Inc. v. Canada (Health), 2020 FC 1103, at para 113). DFO and/or Trigon had to demonstrate a clear and direct connection between the disclosure of specific information and a risk of harm well beyond the merely possible (Merck Frosst at paras. 197, 206).

[69]DFO and Trigon argued that disclosure of the Reports would give rise to probable financial and competitive harm, as the Reports contain commercially sensitive information.

[70]Trigon represented that the mere presence of competing projects within the Port gives rise to a reasonable expectation of probable harm to Trigon that goes beyond a mere possibility should the information be released. Trigon stated that the Reports contain a “ready-made checklist” which would allow competitors to prepare their own reports for DFO approval processes. It could also help them expedite federal authorizations and secure private or public funding and contracts more quickly. As a result, competitors might gain an advantage before Trigon is able to secure its own approvals or funding, causing harm to its competitive position and potentially leading to material financial loss.

[71]I am not convinced by Trigon’s assertion that the Reports could be used by competitors in a manner that could reasonably be expected to result in competitive harm to Trigon. While Trigon has argued that releasing the information would give its competitors a “heads up” on how to create a successful application, it is unclear how the Reports would differ significantly in purpose and style from those created independently by Trigon’s competitors. Trigon, for instance, did not argue that the Reports disclose some proprietary methodology developed by Trigon that could then be recreated by a competitor.

[72]In addition, as noted, some of the information that was withheld is publicly available in other places, suggesting that the likelihood of financial or competitive harm resulting from releasing similar information is small (see Merck Frosst, paras. 208‐210).

[73]In light of the above, I conclude that the information does not meet the requirements of paragraph 20(1)(c).

Paragraph 20(1)(d): negotiations by a third party

[74]Paragraph 20(1)(d) requires institutions to refuse to disclose information that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to interfere with the contractual or other negotiations of a third party (that is, a private company or individual, but not the person who made the access request).

[75]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

A third party is or will be conducting contractual or other negotiations.
Disclosing the information could interfere with those negotiations.
There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility.

[76]When these requirements are met, and the third party to whom the information relates consents to its disclosure, subsection 20(5) requires institutions to reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

[77]In addition, when the requirements are met, subsection 20(6) requires institutions to reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information for public health or public safety reasons, or to protect the environment, when both of the following circumstances (listed in subsection 20(6)) exist:

disclosure of the information would be in the public interest; and
the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any financial impact on the third party, any prejudice to the security of the third party’s structures, networks or systems, or competitive position, or any interference with its contractual or other negotiations.

[78]However, subsections 20(2) and 20(4) specifically prohibit institutions from using paragraph 20(1)(d) to refuse to disclose information that contains the results of product or environmental testing carried out by or on behalf of a government institution, unless the testing was done for a fee for an individual or an organization other than a government institution.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[79]While DFO only applied paragraphs 20(1)(b) and 20(1)(c) to withhold the Reports, Trigon provided representations in support of the concurrent application of paragraph 20(1)(d) along with paragraphs 20(1)(b) and 20(1)(c).

[80]This exemption, as with other harm-based exemptions, requires a clear and direct connection between disclosure of specific information and a risk of harm well beyond the merely possible or speculative (Merck Frosst, paras. 195, 197, 206). Trigon asserted that disclosure of the Reports would interfere with its ongoing and immediately contemplated contractual negotiations, given that the project is ongoing, and Trigon remains engaged in contractual negotiations with various parties. I accept that Trigon is or will likely be conducting relevant contractual or other negotiations as the project remains ongoing. Trigon represented that its suppliers, contractors, customers and competitors could use this information to the prejudice of Trigon in negotiations related to both the current Berth Expansion Project and any future projects.

[81]While Trigon has indicated that the various contractual negotiations are ongoing or will be initiated in the future, I do not believe it has demonstrated that there is a reasonable expectation that disclosing the information could interfere with those negotiations. Interference in this context must be in the nature of obstruction (Canada Post Corp. v. National Capital Commission, 2002 FCT 700, para. 18). Despite the fact that Trigon has identified relevant negotiations, it has not shown that there is a reasonable expectation that disclosure would interfere with those negotiations.

[82]When invited to provide representations in support of the application of paragraph 20(1)(d), DFO indicated that it could have applied paragraph 20(1)(d) when it responded to the access request in 2022 as had the authorization been denied, the third party would have been required to amend its plans, and competitors would have potentially been at an advantage or ahead of the game with the reports in hand. I do not find these submissions sufficient to establish the application of paragraph 20(1)(d).

[83]I conclude that the information does not meet the requirements of paragraph 20(1)(d).

Outcome

[84]The complaint is well founded.

Order

I order the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to disclose all of the withheld information, with the exception of the information that meets the requirements of subsection 19(1).

Initial report and notice from institution

On December 18, 2025, I issued my initial report to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans setting out my order.

On January 19, 2026, the Acting Director of the Access to Information and Privacy Division gave me notice that DFO would be implementing the order.

Review by Federal Court

When an allegation in a complaint falls under paragraph 30(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (d.1) or (e) of the Act, the complainant has the right to apply to the Federal Court for a review. When the Information Commissioner makes an order(s), the institution also has the right to apply for a review. The complainant and/or institution must apply for a review within 35 business days after the date of this report. When they do not, third parties may apply for a review within the next 10 business days. Whoever applies for a review must serve a copy of the application for review to the relevant parties, as per section 43. If no one applies for a review by these deadlines, the order(s) takes effect on the 46th business day after the date of this report.

Other recipients of final report

As required by subsection 37(2), this report was provided to Trigon and Hemmera.