Employment and Social Development Canada (Re), 2026 OIC 32

Date: 2026-03-13
OIC file number: 5823-03487
Access request number: A-2020-01751

Summary

The complainant alleged that Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) improperly withheld information under the following provisions of the Access to Information Act:

subsection 16(2) (facilitating the commission of an offence);
subsection 19(1) (personal information);
paragraph 20(1)(b) (confidential third-party financial, commercial, scientific or technical information);
paragraph 20(1)(c) (financial impact on a third party);
paragraph 21(1)(a) (advice or recommendations);
paragraph 21(1)(b) (accounts of consultations or deliberations); and
section 23 (solicitor-client and litigation privilege)

This was in response to an access request for records related to the Canada Student Service Grant. This allegation falls under paragraph 30(1)(a) of the Act.

The complainant also alleged that ESDC did not conduct a reasonable search for records in response to the same access request. This allegation falls under paragraph 30(1)(a) of the Act.

ESDC did not establish that the requirements of certain exemptions were met or that it had reasonably exercised its discretion where the requirements for discretionary exemptions were met. The Information Commissioner ordered that ESDC disclose certain information and re-exercise discretion. ESDC gave notice to the Commissioner that it would comply with the order but indicated it intends to apply additional exemptions not raised during the investigation. The complaint is well founded.

Complaint

[1]The complainant alleged that Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) improperly withheld information under the following provisions of the Access to Information Act:

subsection 16(2) (facilitating the commission of an offence);
subsection 19(1) (personal information);
paragraph 20(1)(b) (confidential third-party financial, commercial, scientific or technical information);
paragraph 20(1)(c) (financial impact on a third party);
paragraph 21(1)(a) (advice or recommendations);
paragraph 21(1)(b) (accounts of consultations or deliberations); and
section 23 (solicitor-client and litigation privilege)

[2]This was in response to an access request for records related to the Canada Student Service Grant (CSSG). This allegation falls under paragraph 30(1)(a) of the Act.

[3]The complainant also alleged that ESDC did not conduct a reasonable search for records in response to the same access request. This allegation falls under paragraph 30(1)(a) of the Act.

[4]During the investigation, the complainant decided it was no longer necessary for the Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC) to investigate subsections 16(2) and 19(1) and it was only necessary for the OIC to investigate:

Third-party exemptions claimed on pages 30, 85, 87, 88, 168, 239, 550, 685, 1482, 1622-1636, 2423, 2433, 2441, 2476, 2485, 2493, 2499, 2521, 2563, 2997, 3992, 4006 and 4047-4069;
Section 21 exemptions claimed on pages 4, 5, 81, 686-688, 735, 1052, 1167, 1536-1538, 1548, 1550, 1556, 1777-1808, 1849-1876, 1925, 1927, 2121-2225, 2250-2304, 2309-2335, 2423-2425, 2433-2435, 2441-2444, 2476-2479, 2485-2488, 2493-2495, 2500-2502, 2521-2523, 2650-2671, 2740-2756, 2998-3041, 3203, 3204, 3226, 3228, 3229, 3232, 3233, 3235-3238, 3249-3251, 3291, 3292, 3305, 3567, 3571, 3693, 3694, 3998, 3999, 4178, 4214-4217 and 4220; and
Section 23 exemptions claimed on pages 687, 1047, 1050, 1052, 1053, 1056, 1150-1160, 1536, 1542, 1547, 1926, 1927, 2423, 2424, 2433, 2434, 2441-2443, 2476-2478, 2485-2487, 2493, 2494, 2500, 2501, 2521, 2522, 3042, 3325, 3326, 3574-3685, 3695-3697, 3701-3704, 3712, 3713, 3759, 3760, 3798-3804, 4007- 4031 and 4205-4209.

Investigation

[5]When an institution withholds information, including information related to third parties, the third parties and/or the institution bear the burden of showing that refusing to grant access is justified.

[6]The OIC sought representations from the third parties identified as being the relevant ones, which included WE Charity and six third parties named in the records. Disclosure of these six third parties’ names would reveal they had been identified for potential delivery of the CSSG. Notice was also sent to these third parties pursuant to section 36.3.

[7]WE Charity, and three other third parties responded that they did not have representations to make or had no issue with disclosure of the information related to them.

[8]One third party indicated that it opposes disclosure of the information related to it and provided detailed representations.

[9]The other third parties were unreachable or did not respond to the OIC’s request for representations.

[10]The representations received from the third parties, ESDC and the complainant were all considered in coming to my conclusions.

Paragraph 20(1)(b): confidential third-party financial, commercial, scientific or technical information

[11]Paragraph 20(1)(b) requires institutions to refuse to disclose confidential financial, commercial, scientific or technical information provided to a government institution by a third party (that is, a private company or individual, but not the person who made the access request).

[12]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

The information is financial, commercial, scientific or technical.
The information is confidential.
The third party supplied the information to a government institution.
The third party has consistently treated the information as confidential.

[13]When these requirements are met, and the third party to whom the information relates consents to its disclosure, subsection 20(5) requires institutions to reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[14]ESDC withheld the following information related to WE Charity under paragraph 20(1)(b), concurrently with paragraph 20(1)(c):

References to and copies of a report prepared by WE Charity in May 2020 on pages 685, 1622-1636, 2423, 2433, 2441, 2476, 2485, 2493, 2499 and 2521;
Two bullets of “Additional Information”, as found with a document about “ESDC History with WE Charity”, prepared for a Finance Committee meeting dated July 16, 2020 on pages 30, 85, 168, 239, 2997, 3992 and 4006;
Tables detailing WE Charity’s past applications for funding (pages 87 and 88); and
A chart consisting of emails that were pre-redacted and translated for the purpose of production before the Standing Committee on Finance on pages 4047-4069.

[15]ESDC also relied on paragraph 20(1)(b) on pages 550, 1482 and 2563 to withhold the names of six third parties, other than WE Charity, that were identified in early 2020 for potential delivery of the CSSG. None of the third parties indicated that they oppose disclosure of this information based on paragraph 20(1)(b).

[16]With respect to the first requirement of the exemption, that the information be “financial”, “commercial”, “scientific” or “technical”, the Supreme Court of Canada in Merck Frosst v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2012 SCC 3 (Merck Frosst) stated at paragraph 139 the terms “commercial”, “technical” or “scientific” information, in paragraph 20(1)(b), “should be given their ordinary dictionary meanings.”

[17]In the present instance I accept that some, but not all, of the information redacted under paragraph 20(1)(b) meets this first requirement of the test. In particular, I am satisfied that information related to funding requests is “financial information” within the ordinary meaning of that term. I am also satisfied that information about WE Charity’s capabilities and offerings in the WE Charity Report is “commercial information”, as that term is ordinarily understood.

[18]ESDC, however, did not demonstrate that any other information withheld under paragraph 20(1)(b) is financial, commercial, scientific or technical information, so as to meet the first requirement of this exemption. This includes references to the WE Charity Report and contextual factual information such as population statistics and information regarding the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Canadians.

[19]The second requirement of paragraph 20(1)(b), that the information is confidential, must be based on an objective standard. This requires that each of the following conditions are met:

The information must not be available from sources otherwise accessible by the public.
It must originate and be communicated with a reasonable expectation that it will not be disclosed.
It must be communicated, whether required by law or otherwise, in a relationship between government and the party supplying it that is either a fiduciary relationship or one that is not contrary to the public interest. This relationship must be fostered for public benefit by the confidential communication. (see: Air Atonabee Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Transport), 1989 CanLII 10334 (FC)).

[20]Certain information related to the third parties was publicly available at the time the request was processed:

Some details of the proposed project (see: the Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner’s report of findings under the Conflict of Interests Act, dated May 2021, at: Trudeau III Report);
The number of projects WE Charity requested funding for and the status of those applications at the time of the Minister of Diversity and Inclusion and Youth’s appearance before the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics on August 11, 2020 (see: Overview of WE Charity Projects Funded by ESDC - Canada.ca); and
The organizations’ names appear in a list of “organizations that were consulted and/or considered by ESDC officials to deliver a student service program” (see: public evidence before the Standing Committee on Finance, dated October 28, 2020, at: Evidence - FINA (43-2) - No.4 - House of Commons of Canada ).

[21]To the extent that this information is substantially the same as some of the information at issue, I am not satisfied that the first condition of the objective confidentiality test is met.

[22]Where I have found the information to be public it cannot meet the requirements of objective confidentiality. As a result, I did not examine whether the other conditions for confidentiality are met for the publicly available information.

[23]Turning to whether any of the information at issue originated and was communicated with a reasonable expectation that it would not be disclosed, the courts have recognized that parties seeking government approvals, government funds or government contracts cannot expect the same degree of confidentiality as a party who is assisting government (see: AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2005 FC 189 at para 76, affirmed in 2006 FCA 241). This undermines claims that there was a reasonable expectation of confidentiality involving information communicated by WE Charity for the purpose of obtaining government approval, funding or contracts.

[24]As for the final condition of the objective confidentiality test, ESDC did not establish that information emanating from WE Charity in furtherance of being granted the CSSG project was communicated to the government within the context of a relationship fostered for public benefit by confidentiality.

[25]Based on the above, collectively it was not established that any of the withheld information meets the objective confidentiality requirement of paragraph 20(1)(b).

[26]Turning to the third requirement of the exemption, not all of the information redacted under this exemption was supplied by a third party to the government. In particular, the following information does not meet this requirement:

ESDC’s decision to fund projects, or not to fund them;
ESDC’s work product, such as the template elements of the tables it put together;
portions of email chains that contain information originating from the government; and
a list of names of organizations compiled by ESDC for consideration to run the program.

[27]As for the final requirement needed to establish the application of paragraph 20(1)(b), I also note that neither ESDC nor any relevant third party established that any third parties have consistently treated the information at issue as confidential.

[28]I conclude that the information does not meet the requirements of paragraph 20(1)(b).

Paragraph 20(1)(c): financial impact on a third party

[29]Paragraph 20(1)(c) requires institutions to refuse to disclose information that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to have a material financial impact on a third party (that is, a private company or individual, but not the person who made the access request) or harm its competitive position.

[30]To claim this exemption with regard to financial impact on a third party, institutions must show the following:

Disclosing the information could result in material financial loss or gain to the third party.
There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility.

[31]To claim this exemption with regard to competitive position, institutions must show the following:

Disclosing the information could injure the competitive position of the third party.
There is a reasonable expectation that this prejudice could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility.

[32]When these requirements are met, and the third party to whom the information relates consents to its disclosure, subsection 20(5) requires institutions to reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[33]ESDC also applied paragraph 20(1)(c) to withhold the same information it withheld under paragraph 20(1)(b).

[34]Paragraph 20(1)(c) requires evidence showing the financial impact disclosing the information could have on a third party or the harm that disclosure could cause to its competitive position, and how likely that impact would be. The parties must demonstrate a clear and direct connection between the disclosure of specific information and a risk of harm well beyond the merely possible (see: Merck Frosst, paras 197, 206), which may not be possible in cases where the information has been made public.

[35]WE Charity indicated it had no representations to make supporting that any of the information related to it is exempt from disclosure. ESDC asserted that disclosure of certain WE Charity information would provide its competitors with information it could use to “gain advantage over WE Charity”. ESDC did not, however, provide any detail as to how such harm could reasonably be expected to occur.

[36]Of the other third parties, only one identified a harm it asserted could result from disclosure of the information at issue. It indicated that disclosure could both cause it material financial harm and harm to its competitive position.

[37]ESDC asserted that disclosure of the names of the third parties listed on pages 550, 1482 and 2563 could be seen as indicative that these other parties were not selected to administer the CSSG because they were inferior to WE Charity.

[38]Given that very similar information is already public, it is difficult to envision how disclosure could result in an injury described in paragraph 20(1)(c), much less how such an injury could reasonably be expected to occur.

[39]The courts have been sceptical of claims that public misunderstanding of disclosed information will inflict harm on third parties (see: Merck Frosst at para 224). Moreover, in the present instance, any misunderstandings that could possibly arise from the disclosure of the list could readily be mitigated by an explanatory note indicating that the list of names should not be taken as denoting that these third parties had expressed interest in administrating the program and, in turn, that the WE Charity’s proposal beat out the proposals of any of these third parties.

[40]Beyond the above, the third party claimed that the disclosure of its name will diminish its ability to assert its right to control the use of its name in the future. According to the third party, this in turn would result in a material loss to it and prejudice its position with regards to obtaining government funding and charitable donations.

[41]I do not find these representations persuasive. The third party did not cogently explain how ESDC’s consideration of it, among other third parties, as a potential administrator of the program, amounts to a misappropriation and/or unauthorized “use” of its name. In addition, for reasons already explained, any claims of prospective injury from the disclosure of its name in context are capable of being mitigated against by the issuance of an explanatory note indicating that WE Charity cannot be assumed to have been selected above any of the other entities listed, as they may not have expressed interest in administering the CSSG program.

[42]I conclude that the information does not meet the requirements of paragraph 20(1)(c).

Paragraph 21(1)(b): accounts of consultations or deliberations

[43]Paragraph 21(1)(b) allows institutions to refuse to disclose accounts of consultations or deliberations in which government employees, ministers or members of a minister’s staff took part.

[44]To qualify for exemption under paragraph 21(1)(b), the records that contain the information must have been created less than 20 years before the access request was made.

[45]To claim this exemption, institutions must then show the following:

The information is an account—that is, a report or a description.
The account is of consultations or deliberations.
At least one of an institution’s directors, officers or employees, a minister or a member of a minister’s staff was involved in the consultations or deliberations.

[46]When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

[47]However, subsection 21(2) specifically prohibits institutions from using paragraph 21(1)(b) to refuse to disclose the following:

records that contain reasons for or accounts of decisions that affect the rights of a person made by institutions when exercising discretionary powers or carrying out adjudicative functions; and
reports prepared by consultants or advisers who were not directors, officers or employees of an institution or members of a minister’s staff at the time.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[48]ESDC applied paragraph 21(1)(b), concurrently with paragraph 21(1)(a) and section 23 in some cases.

[49]The records were created less than 20 years before the access request was made. In most, but not all, cases, the information redacted under paragraph 21(1)(b) consists of information which reports or describes consultations or deliberations involving at least one federal public servant.

[50]The exceptions are portions of the records that:

consist of information of a largely factual nature, as found on pages 81, 1167, 1536, 1925, 3567, 3693-3694, 3998-3999, 4214-4215, 4216-4217; and
reflect final decisions, as found on pages 2121-2225, 2250-2304, 2309-2335, 2650-2671, 2740-2756, 2998-3041, 3203-3204, 3291-3292, 3567, 3693-3694, 3998-3999.

[51]It is my view that this information is not inextricably linked to any account of consultations or deliberations held. It therefore must be severed and disclosed in accordance with the requirements of section 25 of the Act, save for if another exemption is shown to apply (see, for example: 3430901 Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Industry), 2001 FCA 254; Canada (Office of the Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Prime Minister), 2019 FCA 95).

[52]I conclude that the information meets the requirements of paragraph 21(1)(b), apart from the factual information and information reflecting final decisions/versions.

[53]Since some of the information meets the requirements of paragraph 21(1)(b), I did not examine the other exemptions ESDC applied to the same information.

Paragraph 21(1)(a): advice or recommendations

[54]Paragraph 21(1)(a) allows institutions to refuse to disclose advice or recommendations developed by or for a government institution or a minister.

[55]To qualify for exemption under paragraph 21(1)(a), the records that contain the information must have been created less than 20 years before the access request was made.

[56]To claim this exemption, institutions must then show the following:

The information is advice or recommendations.
The information was developed by or for a government institution or minister.

[57]When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

[58]However, subsection 21(2) specifically prohibits institutions from using paragraph 21(1)(a) to refuse to disclose the following:

records that contain reasons for or accounts of decisions that affect the rights of a person made by institutions when exercising discretionary powers or carrying out adjudicative functions; and
reports prepared by consultants or advisers who were not directors, officers or employees of an institution or members of a minister’s staff at the time.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[59]ESDC applied paragraph 21(1)(a) to withhold some information, always concurrently with paragraph 21(1)(b) and in some cases also concurrently with section 23.

[60]As laid out with respect to paragraph 21(1)(b), paragraph 21(1)(a) was in some cases applied concurrently with paragraph 21(1)(b) to factual information severable from any information meeting the requirements of the exemption, or the information reflects final decisions, rather than revealing advice or recommendations that led to a decision.

[61]I conclude that the information does not meet the requirements of paragraph 21(1)(a) where it was applied to withhold factual information and information reflecting final decisions.

Did the institution reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to disclose the information?

[62]Since some of the information meets the requirements of paragraph 21(1)(a) and paragraph 21(1)(b), ESDC was required to reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to disclose the information. In doing so, ESDC had to consider all the relevant factors for and against disclosure.

[63]Despite being asked to do so, ESDC did not provide any information indicating that it had considered its obligation to exercise its discretion to decide whether to disclose the information. I must conclude that ESDC did not show that it had reasonably exercised its discretion.

Section 23: solicitor-client privilege

[64]Section 23 allows institutions to refuse to disclose information subject to solicitor-client privilege or the professional secrecy of advocates and notaries when the information relates to legal advice given to a client. Section 23 also allows institutions to refuse to disclose information subject to litigation privilege when the information was prepared or gathered for the purpose of litigation.

[65]To claim this exemption with regard to solicitor-client privilege, institutions must show the following:

The information consists of communication between a lawyer or notary and his or her client.
That communication relates directly to the seeking or giving of legal advice, including all the exchanges of information needed to give legal advice.
The parties intend the communication and advice to remain confidential.

[66]When these requirements are met, institutions (as the owner of the privilege) must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[67]ESDC relied on section 23 to withhold information on pages 687, 1047, 1050, 1052-1053, 1056, 1150-1160, 1536, 1542, 1547, 1926, 1927, 2423, 2424, 2433, 2434, 2441-2443, 2476-2478, 2485- 2487, 2493, 2494, 2500, 2501, 2521, 2522, 3042, 3325, 3326, 3574-3685, 3695-3697, 3701-3704, 3712, 3713, 3759, 3760, 3798-3804, 4007-4031 and 4205-4209.

[68]I am satisfied that the vast majority of information redacted under section 23 falls within the continuum of communications between solicitor and client and consists of communications between the government and its legal counsel for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, that was intended to remain confidential by the parties.

[69]During the investigation, ESDC conceded that more information could be released on pages 1150 and 1926 without revealing the nature of any legal advice requested or given. I agree. More specifically:

The information on page 1150 does not meet the requirements of section 23, apart from the attachment name and body of the lower email;
The information on page 1926, does not meet the requirements of section 23, apart from the email subject, a portion of the 2^nd line in the email body, the three bullet points and a portion of the last paragraph.

[70]Evidence was provided by the complainant showing that the Privy Council Office (PCO) released some information that was withheld by ESDC on pages 687, 1047 and 1926. Although ESDC was not aware of PCO waiving privilege over any of the withheld information, the requirements of section 23 cannot be met once the government has waived privilege. ESDC indicated it is willing to release the information in light of PCO’s having disclosed it.

[71]I conclude that the information meets the requirements of section 23, other than the information that does not meet the requirements of the exemption on pages 687, 1047, 1150 and 1926.

Did the institution reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to disclose the information?

[72]Since some of the information meets the requirements of section 23, ESDC was required to reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to disclose the information. In doing so, ESDC had to consider all the relevant factors for and against disclosure.

[73]Despite being asked to do so, ESDC did not provide any information indicating that it had considered its obligation to exercise its discretion to decide whether to disclose the information. I must conclude that ESDC did not show that it had reasonably exercised its discretion.

Reasonable search

[74]ESDC was required to conduct a reasonable search for records that fall within the scope of the access request—that is, one or more experienced employees, knowledgeable in the subject matter of the request, must have made reasonable efforts to identify and locate all records reasonably related to the request.

[75]A reasonable search involves a level of effort that would be expected of any fair, sensible person tasked with searching for responsive records where they are likely to be stored.

[76]This search does not have to be perfect. An institution is therefore not required to prove with absolute certainty that further records do not exist. Institutions must however be able to show that they took reasonable steps to identify and locate responsive records.

Did the institution conduct a reasonable search for records?

[77]The complainant raised that many emails seemed to be missing from ESDC’s response compared to responses received from other institutions on the same subject matter, and that handwritten notes and Microsoft Teams messages were not included in the response. Additionally, the complainant raised that potential cabinet confidences may have been excluded from the response without his consent.

[78]When questioned regarding the lack of handwritten notes in the response, ESDC provided a cogent explanation of why such records would be unlikely to exist, but would have been collected as part of ESDC’s search, if they existed. The request covers a time period when employees were mainly working from home due to the pandemic. ESDC explained that the practice at the time was therefore to carry out all work electronically and to avoid entering any information of business value in Microsoft Teams, since the security of the system was not yet confirmed. No evidence was found that key decisions were not recorded.

[79]Beyond the above, the OIC also noted in reviewing the records that there were emails referencing or otherwise alluding to attachments which were not included in ESDC’s response. ESDC confirmed that it processed all attachments which were retrievable, but that some of the attachments had not been retained when saving email chains to corporate repositories. In those cases, ESDC was not able to access attachments.

[80]While I cannot determine with certainty whether the missing email attachments had business value or should have been retained, I have consistently encouraged institutions to follow sound informationmanagement practices. The right of access depends on the existence of records; it is therefore contingent on institutions properly documenting and retaining records that hold business value.

[81]That being said, the Minister should ensure that ESDC’s employees receive training and support on information management responsibilities and procedures. Effective information management is crucial for organizational efficiency, accountability and transparency.

[82]I turn next to the complainant’s assertion that cabinet confidences seem to be missing from the response. The access request outlined several classes of records that could be excluded from the response. One of the classes of records excluded from the request “records tabled with the Standing Committee on Finance in response to its orders”. ESDC identified this as the main reason records containing cabinet confidences were not part of ESDC’s response, as such records had been part of the records provided to the Standing Committee on Finance. The request text also identified some specific types of cabinet records that were excluded from the request, which also reduced the likelihood of potential cabinet confidences being among the responsive records.

[83]Having considered ESDC’s representations and what was expressly excluded from the request, I have no reason to conclude that cabinet confidences ought to have been found.

[84]As the Federal Court recently agreed, a “mere suspicion or belief that further records exist is not sufficient” (see: Govier v. Canada (Natural Resources), 2025 FC 1655 at para 49). I was unable to find any evidence that ESDC’s search was not reasonable or that relevant records were improperly excluded from the response.

[85]I conclude that ESDC conducted a reasonable search for records.

Outcome

[86]The complaint is well founded.

Orders and recommendations

I order the Minister of Employment and Social Development to do the following:

Disclose the information withheld under third-party exemptions on pages 30, 85, 87, 88, 168, 239, 550, 685, 1482, 1622-1636, 2423, 2433, 2441, 2476, 2485, 2493, 2499, 2521, 2563, 2997, 3992, 4006 and 4047-4069;
The factual information and final decisions withheld under section 21 on pages 81, 1167, 1536, 1925, 2121-2225, 2250-2304, 2309-2335, 2650-2671, 2740-2756, 2998-3041, 3203-3204, 3291-3292, 3567, 3693-3694, 3998-3999 and 4214-4217; and
Disclose the information withheld under section 23 on pages 687, 1047, 1150 and 1926 that I have found not to meet the requirements of section 23;
Re-exercise her discretion to decide whether to disclose the information to which ESDC applied paragraph 21(1)(a) and paragraph 21(1)(b); and
Re-exercise her discretion to decide whether to disclose the information to which ESDC applied section 23, taking into account all relevant factors for and against disclosure.

Initial report and notice from institution

On February 2, 2026, I issued my initial report to the Minister of Employment and Social Development setting out my orders.

On March 4, 2026, ESDC gave me notice that it would be implementing my orders. ESDC provided details as to the steps it had already taken towards implementing the orders. These steps include re-exercising its discretion where section 23 was applied, taking into consideration all relevant factors, and applying severance to pages subject to the order to disclose specific portions.

ESDC also indicated that it intends to apply subsection 19(1) and section 23 to certain information on pages subject to my orders. As indicated in my initial report, once my findings are made, no further representations will be considered. ESDC offered no explanation as to why it did not make its submissions during the investigation itself. My order therefore stands. I remind the Minister that, if she does not intend to fully implement my order, she must apply to the Federal Court for a review by the deadline set out below.

Review by Federal Court

When an allegation in a complaint falls under paragraph 30(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (d.1) or (e) of the Act, the complainant has the right to apply to the Federal Court for a review. When the Information Commissioner makes an order(s), the institution also has the right to apply for a review. The complainant and/or institution must apply for a review within 35 business days after the date of this report. When they do not, third parties may apply for a review within the next 10 business days. Whoever applies for a review must serve a copy of the application for review to the relevant parties, as per section 43. If no one applies for a review by these deadlines, the order(s) takes effect on the 46th business day after the date of this report.

Other recipients of final report

As required by subsection 37(2), this report was provided to WE Charity and the four other third parties that made representations during the investigation.