Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada (Re), 2026 OIC 3

Date: 2026-01-06
OIC file number: 5825-01230
Access request number: CIRNAC-A-2025-00049

Summary

The complainant alleged that Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada (CIRNAC) took an extension for an unreasonable amount of time under subsection 9(1) of the Access to Information Act, and that it improperly processed two requests as one. The request was for updated Consultation Agreement between Canada and the MNA and related documents from January 1, 2024, to May 20, 2025. The allegation falls under paragraph 30(1)(c) of the Act.

The Information Commissioner concluded that the time extension taken by CIRNAC was unreasonable. In particular, a consultation with 12 pages of records was sent to the Department of Justice (Justice) with a response time of an estimated 90 days, based on Justice’s service standards. In the absence of any additional complexity, the Information Commissioner determined that the 90-day timeline was not justified.

The Information Commissioner concluded that it was not unreasonable for CIRNAC to treat the request as singular, in the circumstances of this request.

The Information Commissioner ordered that CIRNAC provide a complete response to the access request no later than 36 business days following the date of the final report.

CIRNAC gave notice to the Commissioner that it would be implementing the order.

The complaint is well founded.

Complaint

[1]The complainant alleged that the extension of time Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada (CIRNAC) took under subsection 9(1) of the Access to Information Act to respond to an access request was unreasonable, and that it improperly processed two requests as one. The request was for the following:

1. Copy of the updated Consultation Agreement between Canada and the MNA, the Metis Nation of Alberta Association, also known as the Metis Nation within Alberta, also known as the Otipemisiwak Metis Government (the "Agreement")
2. Copy of any internal government records, such as memoranda, briefings, briefing notes, directives, policy, policy decisions, analyses, reports, correspondence as to how to implement the Agreement generally and how to implement the Agreement in relation to other Metis groups, entities, or communities in Alberta

[2]Date range from January 1, 2024 to May 20, 2025, for the records requested.

[3]The allegation falls under paragraph 30(1)(c) of the Act.

Investigation

[4]CIRNAC received the access request on May 20, 2025, and extended the period within which it had to respond by 180 days under paragraph 9(1)(a), 90 days under paragraph 9(1)(b), and 30 days under paragraph 9(1)(c). Taking into account the total length of the extension (300 days), the time limit for a response would be April 20, 2026.

Reasonable length of extension of time

[5]Paragraphs 9(1)(a), (b) and (c) allow institutions to extend the 30-day period for responding to access requests if the length of the extension of time is reasonable and justified in the circumstances. If this requirement is not met, the extension of time is not valid, with the result that 30 days remains the applicable time limit for responding to the request.

[6]In taking an extension of time, an institution must show the following:

• It made a serious effort to assess the necessary length of the extension of time.
• There is a link between the reasons the extension of time is needed and the length of the extension.
• The calculation of the length of the extension was sufficiently rigorous, logical and supportable, such that it would pass a reasonableness review.

Was the length of the extension under 9(1)(a) reasonable given the circumstances?

[7]CIRNAC claimed a total of 180 days for volume-related interference.

[8]In their representations, CIRNAC stated that a total of 485 pages of electronic records were retrieved in response to the request and noted a standard search for these records. CIRNAC did not provide any justifiable evidence to support that the number of records would unreasonably interfere with their operations. In light of this, I am not satisfied that the request produced a large volume of records, or that it required a search through a large volume of records, and that the processing of such would unreasonably interfere with CIRNAC’s operations.

[9]Based on the above, I conclude that CIRNAC failed to demonstrate that the length of time claimed under paragraph 9(1)(a) is reasonable.

Was the length of the extension under 9(1)(b) reasonable given the circumstances?

[10]CIRNAC claimed 90 days in order to consult with the Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) and the Department of Justice (Justice).

• CIRNAC stated that 12 pages of records were sent to both PSPC and Justice on September 22, 2025.
• CIRNAC stated that Justice’s service standards state that consultations will take between 90 and 180 business days regardless of page count. In light of this, CIRNAC set a consultation response deadline of October 22, 2025, but also noted that Justice’s service standards may affect this timeline.

[11]Together, however, the above facts do not demonstrate that there is a link between the reasons for the extension of time and its length or that CIRNAC made a serious attempt to determine the length of the extension under paragraph 9(1)(b).

[12]While service standards of other government departments can reasonably be part of the decision-making process, it should not be the only factor considered when determining timelines. Justice’s estimate of a minimum of 90 days for 12 pages equates to a review of a mere 1/10th of a page per day. CIRNAC’s representations lack evidence of sufficient volume, security classification, or any other complexity to support this timeline.

[13]Based on the above, I conclude that CIRNAC failed to demonstrate that the length of time claimed under paragraph 9(1)(b) is reasonable. CIRNAC did not provide sufficient evidence to show that claiming an additional 90 days for consultations was reasonable in the present circumstances.

Is the length of the extension of time under paragraph 9(1)(c) reasonable given the circumstances?

[14]CIRNAC took the 30-day portion of the extension of time under paragraph 9(1)(c).

[15]However, CIRNAC had not responded to the access request when the 30-day extension expired on July 19, 2025. I therefore conclude that CIRNAC did not meet its obligation to respond to the request within the extended period. The issue of whether the extension of time under paragraphs 9(1)(c) was reasonable is moot.

Subsection 10(3): deemed refusal of access

[16]Since the extensions under paragraph 9(1)(a) and (b) are invalid, and CIRNAC did not respond by the extended time limit it took under paragraph 9(1)(c), I conclude that CIRNAC is deemed to have refused access pursuant to subsection 10(3).

[17]As a result, CIRNAC officials were asked to provide further information about the processing of the request.

[18]CIRNAC stated that it was still awaiting responses for consultations from both PSPC and Justice, as well as one third-party. As such, CIRNAC’s planned response date was set to March 16, 2026.

[19]CIRNAC has a statutory obligation to ensure that access requests are responded to in accordance with the requirements of the Act on records that are under its control. While recognizing that in some circumstances, it may be appropriate for an institution to consult another one for the purpose of responding to a request, the institution in receipt of the request bears the ultimate responsibility in ensuring that the consultation process does not unduly delay access.

[20]Where a consulted institution fails to provide recommendations within a reasonable period of time, the institution in receipt of the request is ultimately required to provide the requester with a timely response, without the benefit of the consulted institution’s recommendations.

[21]Any additional day that is taken to respond to this request is another day by which the complainant’s rights of access are being denied. This lack of responsiveness is in clear contravention of CIRNAC’s obligations under the Act and undermines the credibility of the access system.

Subsection 30(1)(f)

Did CIRNAC improperly process two complaints as one?

[22]The complainant stated that the original request email submitted reflected two separate requests. In their original access request, the complainant specifies that the email they submitted is for “two requests”, and proceeds to numbering them accordingly. As such, the complainant expected that this request was being processed as two separate requests rather than being treated as one.

[23]In representations provided by both CIRNAC and the complainant, a series of email correspondences regarding the request were issued.

• May 20, 2025: CIRNAC issued an acknowledgement letter to the complainant via email. The subject line and body of the email differ, in that the subject refers to a singular “request”, and the body refers to plural “requests”. However, the complainant had been assigned a single access request number by CIRNAC.
• May 23, 2025: CIRNAC issued a request for clarification. As the complainant made the same request to both Indigenous Services Canada (ISC) and CIRNAC, the letter addresses them both, thereby referring to two separate access request numbers.

[24]While the complainant believed that they were clear in defining their request as two unique requests, individual requests are usually made separately, and it is also not uncommon for a request to come in the form of a numbered list. As such, it is not beyond reason for CIRNAC to have still interpreted it as a single request. Furthermore, while the inconsistent nature of the wording in CIRNAC’s correspondence to the complainant could have been misconstrued as the request having been interpreted as either one or two requests, the assignment of a single access request number provided sufficient indication of the former.

[25]Accuracy of interpretation of requests is a combined effort between the requester and the requested institution. While CIRNAC bears some responsibility, their interpretation is justified, and in this case, it was equally the responsibility of the complainant to ensure that their request was being treated in the way they intended. Indeed, the information provided in CIRNAC’s correspondence provided indication of this misinterpretation and presented ample opportunity for the complainant to clarify and amend CIRNAC’s treatment of the requests as singular before processing began.

[26]As such, the OIC is satisfied that CIRNAC was justified in processing the requests as one.

Outcome

[27]The complaint is well founded.

Order

I order the Minister of Crown-Indigenous Relations to provide a complete response to the access request no later than 36 business days following the date of the final report.

Initial report and notice from institution

On December 5, 2025, I issued my initial report to the Minister setting out my order.

On December 22, 2025, the Corporate Secretary gave me notice that CIRNAC would be implementing my order.

Review by Federal Court

When an allegation in a complaint falls under paragraph 30(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (d.1) or (e) of the Act, the complainant has the right to apply to the Federal Court for a review. When the Information Commissioner makes an order(s), the institution also has the right to apply for a review. Whoever applies for a review must do so within 35 business days after the date of this report and serve a copy of the application for review to the relevant parties, as per section 43. If no one applies for a review by this deadline, this order takes effect on the 36th business day after the date of this report.