Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Re), 2025 OIC 7

Date: 2025-02-13
OIC file number: 5819-04297
Access request number: A-2016-08588

Summary

The complainant alleged that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) had improperly withheld information in response to an access request under numerous provisions of the Access to Information Act. The request was for applications for legal funding at public expense and included information related to British Columbia’s (B.C.) Braidwood Commission on the death of Robert Dziekanski. The allegation falls under paragraph 30(1)(a) of the Act.

The Information Commissioner concluded that some information did not meet the requirements of paragraphs 13(1)(a) and (c) (confidential information from government bodies), section 14 (federal-provincial affairs), subsection 15(1) (international affairs) and section 23 (solicitor-client privilege) and ordered the RCMP to disclose it. Of note with regard to section 23 is that the RCMP was also unable to show that letters from legal counsel to the Braidwood Commission were privileged information in any regard, including common interest privilege, raised by the RCMP.

In addition, the Commissioner concluded that the RCMP had not taken reasonable steps to seek the consent of the B.C. government to disclose the information that qualified for exemption under subsection 13(1), as is required by subsection 13(2). The Commissioner ordered the RCMP to take these steps and then, if it received consent, to reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

The RCMP gave notice to the Commissioner that it would not be fully implementing her orders.

The complaint is well founded.

Complaint

[1]      The complainant alleged that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) improperly withheld information under the following provisions of the Access to Information Act:

• paragraphs 13(1)(a), 13(1)(c), 13(1)(d) (confidential information from government bodies);
• section 14 (federal-provincial affairs);
• subsection 15(1) (international affairs);
• subsection 16(2) (facilitating the commission of an offence);
• subsection 19(1) (personal information);
• paragraph 21(1)(a) (advice or recommendations);
• paragraph 21(1)(b) (accounts of consultations or deliberations); and,
• section 23 (solicitor-client privilege).

[2]      This was in response to an access request for all documents produced for specified Legal Funding at Public Expense (LFPE) applications, as well as all documents held in the related LFPE file at E Division Civil Litigation.

[3]      The allegation falls within paragraph 30(1)(a) of the Act.

[4]      The Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC) separately investigated the complainant’s allegation that the RCMP did not conduct a reasonable search in response to this access request (5819-04298).

Investigation

[5]      When an institution withholds information under an exemption, it bears the burden of showing that refusing to grant access is justified.

[6]      On March 6, 2024, the RCMP disclosed some information that it had withheld under section 23, subsections 16(2) and 19(1), and paragraphs 13(1)(c) and 13(1)(d) when it responded to the access request, conceding that this information did not meet the requirements for exemption. The RCMP continues to withhold information under sections 14 and 23, subsections 15(1) and 19(1), and paragraphs 13(1)(a), 13(1)(c), 13(1)(d), 21(1)(a) and 21(1)(b).

[7]      The following analysis relates to the remaining information at issue.

Subsection 19(1): personal information

[8]      Subsection 19(1) requires institutions to refuse to disclose personal information.

[9]      To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

• The information is about an individual—that is, a human being, not a corporation.
• There is a serious possibility that disclosing the information would identify that individual.
• The information does not fall under one of the exceptions to the definition of “personal information” set out in paragraphs 3(j) to 3(m) of the Privacy Act (for example, business contact information for public servants).

[10]    When these requirements are met, institutions must then consider whether the following circumstances (listed in subsection 19(2)) exist:

• The person to whom the information relates consents to its disclosure.
• The information is publicly available.
• Disclosure of the information would be consistent with section 8 of the Privacy Act.

[11]    When one or more of these circumstances exist, subsection 19(2) of the Access to Information Act requires institutions to reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[12]    The RCMP applied subsection 19(1) to withhold the information of identifiable individuals in the context of an RCMP-conducted energy weapon (Taser) incident at the Vancouver Airport which resulted in the death of Robert Dziekanski.

[13]    The RCMP’s representations demonstrate that the information is about individuals, that disclosing it could result in these individuals being identified, and that it does not fall under any of the exceptions set out in the Privacy Act.

[14]    In light of the above, I conclude that the information meets the requirements of subsection 19(1).

Did the institution reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to release the information?

[15]    Since the information meets the requirements of subsection 19(1), the RCMP was required to reasonably exercise its discretion under subsection 19(2) to decide whether to disclose the information when one or more of the circumstances described in subsection 19(2) existed when it responded to the access request. In doing so, the RCMP had to consider all the relevant factors for and against disclosure.

[16]    The RCMP’s representations demonstrated that the circumstances outlined in subsection 19(2) did not exist:

• The RCMP gave specific reasons why it would not have been reasonable to seek the consent of the individuals to whom the personal information relates;
• It showed that the information is not publicly available;
• It demonstrated that the disclosure of the information would not be consistent with section 8 of the Privacy Act.

[17]    In light of the above, I accept that the circumstances set out in subsection 19(2) did not exist when the RCMP responded to the access request. Consequently, there is no need to examine the issue of discretion.

Section 23: solicitor-client privilege

[18]    Section 23 allows institutions to refuse to disclose information subject to solicitor-client privilege or the professional secrecy of advocates and notaries when the information relates to legal advice given to a client. Section 23 also allows institutions to refuse to disclose information subject to litigation privilege when the information was prepared or gathered for the purpose of litigation.

[19]    To claim this exemption with regard to solicitor-client privilege, institutions must show the following:

• The information consists of communication between a lawyer or notary and his or her client.
• That communication relates directly to the seeking or giving of legal advice, including all the exchanges of information needed to give legal advice.
• The parties intend the communication and advice to remain confidential.

[20]    To claim this exemption with regard to litigation, institutions must show the following:

• The information was prepared or gathered for the dominant purpose of litigation.
• The litigation either is in progress or is reasonably expected to occur.

[21]    Litigation privilege generally expires when the litigation ends, except when related litigation is pending or is reasonably expected to occur.

[22]    When these requirements are met, institutions (as the owner of the privilege) must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[23]    The RCMP applied section 23 to withhold information in emails, briefing notes, and other documents that relate to topics including: British Columbia’s (BC’s) public inquiry into the death of Robert Dziekanski at the Vancouver Airport (the Braidwood Commission); requests from RCMP members for LFPE; and the BC coroner’s inquest into Dziekanski’s death.

[24]    The RCMP advised that it was claiming solicitor-client privilege over the information. The RCMP advised that some portions of the information could also be considered subject to litigation privilege, though it did not indicate which specific information could be considered as such.

[25]    Based on the RCMP’s representations, I am satisfied that most of the information withheld under section 23 consists of communications between clients and their lawyers that relates to legal advice, and that the parties intended for the communications to remain confidential.

[26]    During the investigation, the RCMP advised that it was also using section 23 to withhold information on pages 600-601, 733-735, and 918-919 because, according to the RCMP, the information was, “clearly solicitor client privilege / Litigation Privilege.” These pages contain letters from legal counsel to the Braidwood Commission.

[27]    The RCMP has failed to demonstrate that the letters are subject to either solicitor-client privilege or litigation privilege, in order to fall within the scope of section 23.

[28]    With respect to solicitor client privilege, I am not convinced that the letters are either communications between a lawyer and their client or that they are communications for the purpose of seeking or obtaining legal advice. In addition, on their face the letters do not appear to have been intended to be confidential given that they involve communications between a lawyer and an entity (the Braidwood Commission) that is outside the solicitor-client relationship.

[29]    With respect to the RCMP’s further claim that the letters are subject to litigation privilege, the RCMP failed to establish that the letters were prepared or gathered for the dominant purpose of “litigation” in order to meet the first requirement of the test. No cogent representations were offered by the RCMP to explain how the Commission bears the hallmarks of an adversarial process and/or amounts to litigation within which a claim of litigation privilege might be made.

[30]    Despite the above, the RCMP argued during the investigation that the relevant parties and the Braidwood Commission share a common interest (namely to determine the circumstances surrounding a death), which renders the letters privileged information either in the form of solicitor-client privilege or litigation privilege. I do not accept this argument.

[31]    While recognizing that the courts have accepted that the sharing of solicitor-client privileged and/or litigation privileged information outside the solicitor-client relationship may not constitute a waiver of privilege if it is established that the parties share a common interest, here, the RCMP failed to show that the requirements of either privilege were ever met.

[32]    Moreover, even if the RCMP had shown that solicitor-client or litigation privilege at one point applied, the RCMP fell well short of establishing that the interests of the relevant parties and the Braidwood Commission were so aligned that the sharing of information, as between them, would not amount to a waiver of the privilege claimed. As RCMP indicated, “[t]he result of this inquiry had legal ramifications both civilly and criminally for the Province of British Columbia, the RCMP and the four (4) RCMP members involved in this matter.” In these circumstances, it is clear that the interests of the parties were not sufficiently aligned with those of Commission counsel.

[33]    Thus, the RCMP did not establish that the records were ever subject to solicitor-client or litigation privilege. It also did not establish the existence of a common interest privilege, much less one that could render the letters privileged even though the RCMP did not show how the requirements of solicitor-client or litigation privilege are met.

[34]    In light of the above, I conclude that the information on pages 600-601, 733-735, and 918-919 does not meet the requirements of section 23.

Did the institution reasonably exercise its discretion?

[35]    Since some of the information meets the requirements of section 23, the RCMP was required to reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to disclose the information. In doing so, the RCMP had to consider all the relevant factors for and against disclosure.

[36]    The RCMP does not have to provide a detailed analysis of each factor it considered and explain how it weighed one against the other. However, a blanket declaration that it had exercised its discretion and considered all relevant factors is not sufficient.

[37]    I conclude that the RCMP considered all relevant factors when it decided not to disclose the information. Consequently, the exercise of discretion by the RCMP was reasonable.

Subsection 13(1): confidential information from government bodies

[38]    Subsection 13(1) requires institutions to refuse to disclose information obtained in confidence from certain government bodies.

[39]    To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

[40]    The information was obtained from one of the following government bodies:

• a government of a foreign state or an institution of a foreign state;
• an international organization of states or an institution of such an organization;
• a provincial government or institution;
• a municipal or regional government or institution; or
• an aboriginal government or council listed in subsection 13(3).

[41]    The information was obtained from the government body in confidence—that is, with the understanding that it would be treated as confidential.

[42]    When these requirements are met, institutions must then consider whether the following circumstances (listed in subsection 13(2)) exist:

• The government body from which the information was obtained consents to its disclosure.
• That body has already made the information public.

[43]    When one or both of these circumstances exist, subsection 13(2) requires institutions to reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[44]    The RCMP applied paragraph 13(1)(a) to withhold information on page 302.

[45]    I accept that some of this information was obtained in confidence from the government of foreign states. However, I am not convinced that all of the information meets this requirement (e.g., the last three sentences of the first withheld paragraph and the last two sentences of the second withheld paragraph).

[46]    During the course of the investigation, the RCMP agreed to release the last three sentences of the first withheld paragraph.

[47]    Regarding the last two sentences in the second withheld paragraph, the RCMP claims that the information is intertwined and disclosure would reveal problems facing investigators. Having reviewed the record, I am not convinced that these last two sentences contain any information provided by a foreign government.

[48]    Consequently, I conclude that the last three sentences of the first withheld paragraph and the last two sentences of the second withheld paragraph on page 302 do not meet the requirements of paragraph 13(1)(a).

[49]    The RCMP also applied paragraph 13(1)(c) to withhold information on pages 31-33, 109-110, 136-139, 141-146, 168-169, 174, 270-271, 284-285, 321, 328, 330-332, 335-338, 371, 385, 444-445, 455, 456, 595-597, 600-601, 729, 733-735, 736-737, 792-794, 918-919, 931-935, 936, 965-966, 970, 1048-1065, 1277-1278, 1791, 2070-2132, and 2140-2148.

[50]    As I have already accepted that section 23 applies to pages 444 and 931-935, there is no need to examine the application of paragraph 13(1)(c) to withhold the same information.

[51]    I accept that most of the above-noted records were obtained from BC or an institution thereof, subject to the following exceptions: Pages 136-138, 141-143, 168-169, 337, 371, 600-601, 733-735, 918-919, 970 which contain letters or emails sent to the Braidwood Commission. The RCMP states that portions of these records contain information that was provided in confidence by the Braidwood Commission or BC Coroner’s Office. To the extent that certain portions of these letters and emails reflect information provided by BC or an institution thereof, I accept that that information can be considered obtained from the province. However, the remainder of these records cannot be considered obtained within the meaning of paragraph 13(1)(c).

[52]    Regarding pages 2140-2148, it appears from the email chain at the bottom of page 2134 that these records were provided to the RCMP by external counsel acting on behalf of RCMP members. As a result, I conclude that these records were not obtained from BC or an institution thereof.

[53]    Turning to the final requirement of paragraph 13(1)(c), the RCMP must demonstrate the confidential nature of the information at issue. The RCMP’s representations indicated that there was no formal agreement with BC regarding the confidentiality of shared information but that it was, “simply understood that in most cases, information shared between governments is done so in confidence. In many of the correspondence from the Braidwood Inquiry, an annotation can be found, stating that the document/email contains confidential information intended only for the addressee.”

[54]    The RCMP was asked to provide details regarding the parameters of the Braidwood Commission, including the relationship between the federal government and the Commission. The Commission appears to have held evidentiary hearings in a Federal courtroom in Vancouver and its findings were published in at least two publicly-available reports (https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/law-crime-and-justice/about-bc-justice-system/inquiries/braidwoodphase2report.pdf; https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/law-crime-and-justice/about-bc-justice-system/inquiries/braidwoodphase1report.pdf). As such, it is not clear to what degree the inquiry, including negotiations between federal lawyers and the Commission, was conducted in private. General statements at the end of emails have not been found persuasive by courts for establishing confidentiality, particularly if the actual practice of the stakeholders differs.

[55]    According to the RCMP:

“The RCMP was the main agency that provided support to the Braidwood Commission, this was done so as to assist them in conducting this inquiry. Most of the communications and support between the RCMP and the Commission was done in confidence. These type [sic] of inquiries require the total openness from all stakeholders, however, this does not mean that all records should be made available to the public. Releasing these type [sic] of records could result in loss of trust between the RCMP and the Province of British Columbia.”

[56]    I accept that the information at pages 792-794 was provided to the RCMP in confidence. Given the sensitivity of these records and the fact that they are clearly noted as confidential, it is reasonable in this case to accept that they were supplied to the RCMP with an implied confidentiality. Consequently, I conclude that pages 792-794 meet the requirements of paragraph 13(1)(c).

[57]    For the remaining information at issue, the RCMP did not provide representations that persuasively demonstrate that these records were obtained in confidence, beyond mere assertion. As a result, I conclude that the remaining information does not meet the requirements of paragraph 13(1)(c).

[58]    The RCMP used paragraph 13(1)(d) to withhold information in emails on pages 1337-1338 from the Richmond City Financial Officer that related to the legal costs for the RCMP’s Richmond Detachment as a result of the Braidwood Commission. I accept that this information was obtained in confidence from a municipal government.

[59]    In light of the above,

• Only portions of information withheld on page 3023 meet the requirements of paragraph 13(1)(a);
• Only information withheld on pages 792-794 meets the requirements of paragraph 13(1)(c);
• Only information withheld on pages 1337-1338 meets the requirements of paragraph 13(1)(d).

[60]    All remaining information does not meet the requirements for exemption pursuant to subsection 13(1).

Did the institution reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to release the information?

[61]    Since some of the information meets the requirements of subsection 13(1), the RCMP was required to reasonably exercise its discretion under subsection 13(2) to decide whether to disclose the information when:

• the government body from which the information was obtained consents to its disclosure; or
• that body has already made the information public when it responded to the access request.

[62]    I accept that the information has not been made publicly available by the government bodies.

[63]    Regarding paragraph 13(2)(a), the RCMP advised that,

“Discretion, the RCMP relies on partners to be able to provide policing services to the communities that it serves. Releasing any documents or information where sections 13(1)(a), 13(1)(c) or 13(1)(d) could compromise the ability for the RCMP to obtain information from partners if their information is being released. Therefore, discretion could not be applied in those instances.”

[64]    The RCMP did not believe that anything prevented it from consulting with BC regarding consent, though the RCMP advised that, “from experience this results in confirmation that the records were provided in confidence.” The RCMP provided no further representations on this issue. While I recognize that the stakeholders may be unwilling to provide consent, I did not receive any representations demonstrating why it would have been unreasonable for the RCMP to seek consent.

[65]    In light of the above, I must conclude that the RCMP’s decision not to seek consent for the release of information relating to BC was unreasonable in the circumstance. 

Section 14: federal-provincial affairs

[66]    Section 14 allows institutions to refuse to disclose information that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to harm the conduct of federal-provincial affairs.

[67]    To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

• Disclosing the information could harm the Government of Canada’s conduct of federal-provincial affairs (for example, information on federal-provincial consultations or deliberations, or Government of Canada strategy or tactics related to the conduct of federal-provincial affairs, as set out in paragraphs 14(a) and (b)).
• There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility.

[68]    When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[69]    The RCMP applied section 14 to withhold information on pages 136-139, 141-146, 168-169, 174, 270-271, 321, 328, 330-332, 335-338, 371, 385, 444-445, 600-601, 733-735, 918-919, 931-935, 936, 970, 1048-1065, 2140-2148 and 2070-2132. This information was withheld concurrently with paragraph 13(1)(c) which I have already determined does not apply.

[70]    The RCMP provided representations arguing that these records relate to highly sensitive and public inquiries into the death of Dziekanski, were shared with the RCMP in confidence, and, therefore, that disclosing them would be injurious to federal-provincial relations.

[71]    Regarding the Braidwood Commission, the RCMP advised that it was,

“the main agency that provided support to the Braidwood Commission, this was done so as to assist them in conducting this inquiry. Most of the communications and support between the RCMP and the Commission was done in confidence. These type [sic] of inquiries require the total openness from all stakeholders, however, this does not mean that all records should be made available to the public. Releasing these type [sic] of records could result in loss of trust between the RCMP and the Province of British Columbia.”

[72]    While I recognize that this harm might be possible, no representations were provided to demonstrate that there is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur that is well beyond a mere possibility.

[73]    In my decision in Ingenium – Canada’s Museums of Science and Innovation (Re), 2024 OIC 11, I similarly concluded that Ingenium had failed to identify any specific harm to the conduct of federal-provincial affairs that could flow from the disclosure of the information.

[23]   As noted in Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Prime Minister), 1992 CanLII 2414 (FC), [1993] 1 F.C. 427, the party seeking to withhold a record must establish with clear and direct evidence that there will be a reasonable expectation of probable harm from disclosure of specific information: “the more specific and substantiated the evidence, the stronger the case for confidentiality. The more general the evidence, the more difficult it would be for a court to be satisfied as to the linkage between disclosure and the harm alleged”.

[24]   In Criminal Trial Lawyers’ Association v. Canada (Justice), 2020 FC 1146, para. 59, the judge further noted: “It is not enough for the [Access To Information and Privacy] Director to state that disclosure would be injurious to [Federal Provincial and Territorial] relations, without specific evidence in support.”

[74]    Ingenium made reference to “document sharing” between organizations being potentially affected, but did not provide an explanation beyond that, nor did it make the connection to federal-provincial affairs. Similarly, assertions of “interference” with federal-provincial affairs, without additional evidence to illustrate the nature of such interference, is insufficient to establish the criteria of section 14.

[75]    In light of the above, I conclude that the information does not meet the requirements of section 14.

Subsection 15(1): international affairs

[76]    Subsection 15(1) allows institutions to refuse to disclose information that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to harm the conduct of international affairs, defence or national security (for example, information related to military tactics, weapons capabilities or diplomatic correspondence, as set out in paragraphs 15(1)(a) to (i)).

[77]    To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

• Disclosing the information could harm one of the following:
  • the conduct of international affairs;
  • the defence of Canada or any state with which Canada has an alliance or treaty, or any state with which Canada is linked, as defined in subsection 15(2); or
  • the detection, prevention or suppression of specific subversive or hostile activities, as defined in subsection 15(2).
• There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility.

[78]    When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[79]    The RCMP used subsection 15(1) to withhold information on page 302.

[80]    I have already accepted that some of this information meets the requirements of paragraph 13(1)(a) and therefore I have not examined whether subsection 15(1) may be used to withhold the same information. My analysis is therefore limited to the application of subsection 15(1) to withhold the last three sentences of the first withheld paragraph and the last two sentences of the second withheld paragraph. 

[81]    In response to the OIC’s questions, the RCMP agreed to release the information from the first withheld paragraph.

[82]    Regarding the last two sentences of the second withheld paragraph, the RCMP states that releasing this information could lead to the disclosure of problems facing investigators. 

[83]    The RCMP did not provide any representations to demonstrate that there is a reasonable expectation that harm could occur that is well beyond a mere possibility, should this information be released.

[84]    In light of the above, I conclude that the information does not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

Paragraph 21(1)(a): advice or recommendations

[85]    Paragraph 21(1)(a) allows institutions to refuse to disclose advice or recommendations developed by or for a government institution or a minister.

[86]    To qualify for exemption under paragraph 21(1)(a), the records that contain the information must have been created less than 20 years before the access request was made.

[87]    To claim this exemption, institutions must then show the following:

• The information is advice or recommendations.
• The information was created by or for a government institution or minister.

[88]    When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[89]    The RCMP applied paragraph 21(1)(a) to withhold information on pages 1075, 1077, and 1079. The withheld information was contained in briefing notes by an RCMP employee from E Division’s Employee and Management Section.

[90]    I accept that the information consists of recommendations created by and for a government institution less than twenty years before the request was made.

[91]    In light of the above, I conclude that the information meets the requirements of paragraph 21(1)(a).

Did the institution reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to release the information?

[92]    Since the information meets the requirements of paragraph 21(1)(a), the RCMP was required to reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to disclose the information. In doing so, the RCMP had to consider all the relevant factors for and against disclosure.

[93]    The RCMP’s representations demonstrate that it considered a variety of relevant factors for and against disclosure.

[94]    In light of the above, I conclude that the RCMP reasonably exercised its discretion.

[95]    Since the information meets the requirements of this exemption, I did not examine the RCMP’s application of paragraph 21(1)(b) to withhold the same information

Outcome

[96]    The complaint is well founded.

Orders

I order the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to:

1. Disclose all information that does not meet the requirements of section 23, paragraphs 13(1)(a) or (c), section 14 or subsection 15(1). The information that must be disclosed is found on pages 31-33, 109-110, 136-139, 141-146, 168-169, 174, 270-271, 284-285, 302, 321, 328, 330-332, 335-338, 371, 385, 445, 455, 456, 595-597, 600-601, 729, 733-735, 736-737, 918-919, 936, 965-966, 970, 1048-1065, 1277-1278, 1791, 2070-2132 and 2140-2148;
2. Take reasonable steps to determine if consent exists pursuant to subsection 13(2) and, if it does exist, reasonably exercise discretion to decide whether to release the information.

Initial report and notice from institution

On January 13, 2025, I issued my initial report to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness setting out my orders.

On February 7, 2025, the Director General, Access to Information and Privacy Branch gave me notice that they would be only implementing my order as it relates to page 302. More specifically, the Director General indicated that the RCMP would release the last two sentences of the second withheld paragraph on page 302. The Director General indicated that the last three sentences of the first withheld paragraph on page 302 have already been released.

Regarding my order to disclose the information on pages 31-33, 109-110, 136-139, 141-146, 168-169, 174, 270-271, 284-285, 321, 328, 330-332, 335-338, 371, 385, 445, 455, 456, 595-597, 600-601, 729, 733-735, 736-737, 918-919, 936, 965-966, 970, 1048-1065, 1277-1278, 1791, 2070-2132, and 2140-2148, the Director General advised that the RCMP has sent these pages to BC for consultation despite my finding that this information did not meet the exemptions and therefore, that no such consultation is necessary. A response to the consultation is expected on or before February 21, 2025. The Director further indicated that “[o]nce a response to the outstanding consultation with the Province of BC is received, we will prepare a supplemental release to be provided to the complainant.”

The Director General failed to indicate whether the RCMP would comply with the second part of my order, which requires that the Minister take reasonable steps to determine if consent exists pursuant to subsection 13(2) with regards to the information I found met the requirements of subsection 13(1) on pages 302, 792-794, and 1337-1338.

The actions taken and those proposed to be taken as described by the Director General, on behalf of the Minister, do not constitute full implementation of my order. I must therefore remind the Minister that if they do not intend to fully implement my order they must apply to the Federal Court for a review by the deadline set out below.

Review by Federal Court

When an allegation in a complaint falls under paragraph 30(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (d.1) or (e) of the Act, the complainant has the right to apply to the Federal Court for a review. When the Information Commissioner makes an order(s), the institution also has the right to apply for a review. Whoever applies for a review must do so within 35 business days after the date of this report and serve a copy of the application for review to the relevant parties, as per section 43. If no one applies for a review by this deadline, the order(s) takes effect on the 36th business day after the date of this report.