Global Affairs Canada, (Re), 2026 OIC 53

Date: 2026-07-15
OIC file number: 5823-05002
Access request number: A-2022-03894

Summary

The complainant alleged that Global Affairs Canada (Global Affairs) had improperly withheld information under subsection 13(1) (confidential information from government bodies) and subsection 15(1) (international affairs, national security, defence) of the Access to Information Act in response to an access request for information about consultations on military operations. The allegation falls under paragraph 30(1)(a).

Global Affairs issued one supplementary disclosure during the investigation and continued to withhold certain portions of the records under subsections 13(1) and 15(1). Global Affairs could not show that it met all the requirements of the exemptions claimed nor that it reasonably exercised its discretion to decide whether to disclose the subject information.

The Information Commissioner informed Global Affairs of her intention to order the Minister to disclose certain information in the records and to re-exercise discretion under subsections 13(2) and 15(2), and to provide a new response no later than 36 business days after the date of the final report.

Global Affairs gave notice to the Commissioner that it would implement her orders. Before the Final report could be issued, Global Affairs released all of the information previously withheld from disclosure.

Therefore, an order to disclose is not necessary since Global Affairs released all of the withheld information.

The complaint is well founded.

Complaint

[1]The complainant alleged that Global Affairs Canada (Global Affairs) had improperly withheld information under subsection 13(1) (confidential information from government bodies) and subsection 15(1) (international affairs, national security, defence) of the Access to Information Act in response to an access request for information about an email sent from Richard Colvin on November 7, 2001, about consultations on military operations. The allegation falls under paragraph 30(1)(a).

Investigation

[2]When an institution withholds information under an exemption, it bears the burden of showing that refusing to grant access is justified.

[3]Global Affairs conceded that some exemptions were not properly applied and issued a subsequent disclosure on February 4, 2025, by releasing four additional phrases that it previously withheld from disclosure.

Subsection 13(1): confidential information from government bodies

[4]Subsection 13(1) requires institutions to refuse to release information obtained in confidence from certain government bodies.

[5]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

• The information was obtained from one of the following government bodies;
  • a government of a foreign state or an institution of a foreign state;
  • an international organization of states or an institution of such an organization;
  • a provincial government or institution;
  • a municipal or regional government or institution; or
  • an aboriginal government or council listed in subsection 13(3).
• The information was obtained from the government body in confidence—that is, with the understanding that it would be treated as confidential.

[6]When these requirements are met, institutions must then consider whether the following circumstances exist:

• The government body from which the information was obtained consents to its release.
• That body has already made the information public.

[7]When one or both of these circumstances exist, subsection 13(2) requires institutions to reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to release the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[8]The responsive record is a two-page email, which contains talking points prepared for a discussion to be held between the Canadian ambassador, Michael F. Kergin, the United States (US) of America and the US Undersecretary of State, Marc Grossman. Subsection 13(1) was applied partially to some information found within the two pages of responsive records.

[9]In its representations, Global Affairs stated that it applied subsections 13(1) and 15(1) concurrently to specific portions of the records, namely the first and second redacted bullets in the “Tasking” section, sentences two, three, four, and eight in the “Basing” section, and the first sentence in the “Force Contributions” section.

[10]The Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC) agrees with Global Affairs’ position regarding sentences two, three, and eight of the “Basing” section and do not dispute the application of subsection 13(1) to those portions of the records.

[11]However, upon review of Global Affairs’ representations, the remaining application of subsection 13(1) to the redacted material appears unsupported in the record. While Global Affairs maintains that certain information was obtained from foreign governments or institutions, the content of the record does not demonstrate this.

[12]For example, portions of the “Tasking” section and the “talking points” on page 1 clearly reflect Canadian positions (e.g., “We still don’t know (…) We understand the complexities…”), rather than foreign-sourced information.

[13]Similarly, in the “Basing” section, references such as “we would like” do not clearly indicate US origin, and sentences beginning with “Canada’s preferred…” clearly reflect domestic views. Therefore, the basis for applying subsection 13(1) on some information is not convincing enough to allow the OIC to conclude that the requirements were met.

[14]On the same note, the first sentence of the “Force Contributions” section on page two does not appear to be foreign-sourced. As mentioned during the investigation, it is publicly known that Germany deployed troops to Afghanistan, as confirmed in open-source reporting (e.g., The Washington Post, November 7, 2001). Since Germany’s contribution was already a matter of public record, the redaction cannot reasonably be justified on the basis that it would disclose confidential information received from a foreign entity. Regarding the remainder, the connection between this material and information provided by foreign governments has not been demonstrated by Global Affairs. Rather, the passage reads more as a Canadian commentary and analysis, as opposed to content received from an external source.

[15]In addition, much of the currently redacted information had already been released previously by Global Affairs. This information includes references to “operations beyond Afghanistan,” at the top of the second page, which remain redacted by Global Affairs in the most recent disclosure. Global Affairs did not offer any explanation for this inconsistency, nor did it indicate that prior disclosure was in error.

[16]In light of the above, the OIC concludes that portions of the information do not meet the requirements of subsection 13(1).

Did the institution reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to release the information?

[17]Since portions of the information meet the requirements of subsection 13(1), Global Affairs was required to reasonably exercise its discretion under subsection 13(2) to decide whether to disclose the information when one or both of the circumstances described in subsection 13(2) existed when it responded to the access request.

[18]Subsection 13(2) provides government institutions with the discretion to disclose information obtained in confidence under subsection 13(1), where the originating government, organization, or institution has either consented to the disclosure or has made the information public. Given that subsection 13(1) is a mandatory exemption intended to safeguard Canada’s ability to receive information from trusted partners, it is crucial that institutions demonstrate they have seriously considered the potential for disclosure under subsection 13(2). This includes making reasonable efforts to verify whether the source has released the information publicly or is willing to consent to its release.

[19]While Global Affairs response indicates that discretion under subsection 13(2) was exercised through severing information and consulting internally with program areas, this approach appears insufficient when measured against the specific conditions of subsection 13(2).

[20]While Global Affairs asserts that the principle of severability was applied where feasible, the fact that several portions of the document that had been disclosed in response to a prior access request have now been re-redacted undermines this claim. The repeated redaction of information previously released suggests that cross-referencing prior disclosures and consulting program areas is not being applied consistently or meaningfully. This pattern raises serious questions about Global Affairs’ representations regarding severability.

[21]Also, subsection 13(2) contemplates disclosure if the originating government consents or if the information is publicly available. Global Affairs did not seek consent from the foreign government nor verify public availability, relying instead on internal considerations and expectations of confidentiality. While internal severing and program-area consultation demonstrate that discretion was partially exercised, they do not fully satisfy the obligation to seriously consider whether disclosure could occur under the conditions set out in subsection 13(2).

[22]In light of the above, the OIC concludes that Global Affairs did not exercise its discretion reasonably when deciding not to release the information.

Subsection 15(1): international affairs, national security, defence

[23]Subsection 15(1) allows institutions to refuse to release information that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to harm the conduct of international affairs, or defence or national security (for example, information related to military tactics, weapons capabilities or diplomatic correspondence, as set out in paragraphs 15(1)(a) to (i)).

[24]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

• Disclosing the information could harm one of the following:
  • the conduct of international affairs;
  • the defence of Canada or any state with which Canada has an alliance or treaty, or any state with which Canada is linked, as defined in subsection 15(2); or
  • the detection, prevention or suppression of specific subversive or hostile activities, as defined in subsection 15(2).
• There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility.

[25]When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to release the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[26]Global Affairs applied subsection 15(1), in part, on both pages of the relevant records. As noted previously, certain portions of the information were also withheld through the concurrent application of subsection 15(1) with subsection 13(1).

[27]Global Affairs stated that disclosing the information could significantly compromise the conduct of international affairs as well as defence and that the records contain sensitive details, which, if made public, could undermine Canada's relationships with its allies or expose vulnerabilities to adversaries.

[28]First, as raised above, the review of previous disclosures made by Global Affairs shows that some of the withheld information has already been disclosed in response to a separate request (e.g.: A-2010-01967), undermining the claim that its release would now be injurious. Global Affairs had the opportunity to provide an explanation for this re-redaction but did not offer any justification, further calling into question the credibility of the claimed harm.

[29]Second, Global Affairs rationale rests on the assertion that disclosure could be harmful. However, jurisprudence is clear that a mere possibility of harm is insufficient; Global Affairs must demonstrate a reasonable expectation of probable harm that goes well beyond speculation. In this instance, no explanation on the specific and direct harm has been provided as to how the release of the information would cause injury to Canada’s international relations or defence interests.

[30]As an example, Global Affairs justifications invoking “current regional tensions” in the Middle East are insufficient, as tensions are ongoing in the Middle East and in this case, unspecified. A meaningful application of subsection 15(1) would require identifying specific tensions and their relevance to the information withheld. Discussions from 2001 between the US Central Command (CENTCOM) and Canada regarding potential Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) in Oman are not presumptively injurious under subsection 15(1). The information originates principally from Canadian institutions, namely National Defence (DND) and Global Affairs and reflects Canada’s own diplomatic assessments and policy deliberations rather than sensitive foreign-origin intelligence. Lawful disclosures of historical SOFA and basing records by close allies demonstrate that high-level diplomatic and legal discussions about military access, even when involving CENTCOM, are not automatically injurious decades later. In the absence of identifiable, present-day operational or intelligence harm, these discussions do not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

[31]Portions of the records reflect Canada’s historical preferences for basing locations in the Middle East. The OIC is of the view that the disclosure of this information poses minimal risk of harm to international relations or national defence, as it does not reveal active operational plans or troop deployments. Although the records show that Canada sought US assistance, this reflects only Canada’s position and does not confirm US support and therefore poses minimal risk if disclosed. Portions that explicitly indicate US backing or the reasoning behind basing decisions, however, involve sensitive diplomatic considerations and justify withholding. Evidence provided by Global Affairs during the investigation is otherwise insufficient to support or validate the application of subsection 15(1). For these reasons, the OIC agrees that only the redaction of the last sentence in the “Basing” section should be maintained.

[32]As a second example, Global Affairs stated that the disclosure of the information redacted in ‘’basing’’ section of page one would be injurious to bilateral relations since it constitutes confidential diplomatic discussions exchanged between Global Affairs, DND, and foreign states. However, when reading the first sentence, it is clear that the information should not be redacted on the basis of national security or international relations, as it does not reveal sensitive operational details. At the time of the request, it was widely known and publicly acknowledged that Canada did not maintain permanent naval or air bases in the Middle East, nor did it have standing, region-wide SOFAs with host states.

[33]Global Affairs’ concern that the information could be injurious because it might be construed as a criticism of the US must be considered in the context of existing public records. Numerous declassified assessments produced by both the Government of Canada and the US on subjects such as Iraq have been disclosed and are available in such repositories as the Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project (CFIHP). These records routinely contain frank evaluations of foreign leaders and candid analyses of controversial state positions, demonstrating that the presence of critical or sensitive commentary does not, on its own, establish a reasonable expectation of injury.

[34]Finally, Global Affairs argument that disclosure could undermine trust and future information-sharing if Canada is “not seen to be a trustworthy ally” is not persuasive on its own; such generalized statements are insufficient to meet the burden of demonstrating a clear and well-founded expectation of harm under subsection 15(1).

[35]As mentioned during the investigation, relevant information regarding some of the redacted information is available in the public domain (e.g.: NATO's Role in Kosovo, The New Humanitarian | NATO-led forces, aid agencies agree new modus operandi, German Support of the War Against Iraq | War Resisters' International, etc.). While Global Affairs relied on section 15 to withhold information on the basis that its release could reasonably be expected to harm Canada’s international relations or national security interests, the representations do not address the significant amount of publicly available information identified during the investigation. Numerous sources (e.g.: CENTCOM’s FOIA Library, GovernmentAttic.org, the National Security Archive, the CFHIP database and the United States Army Heritage and Education Center), contain similar or related information that has already been released. By failing to consider or acknowledge these publicly accessible sources, Global Affairs’ argument that disclosure would cause harm is weakened, as some of the information is not entirely confidential or sensitive.

[36]Despite being asked to provide specific representations prior to the preparation of the Commissioner’
s initial report, Global Affairs did not address any of the multiple examples of declassified material that were identified. This raises concerns regarding the institution’s level of diligence in responding to the issues raised. A proper application of subsection 15(1) would require a demonstration that the withheld information is truly capable of causing the anticipated harm, taking into account what is already in the public domain.

[37]When considering previous disclosures of similar information and the apparent lack of injury as a result of these disclosures, the OIC is of the view that Global Affairs has not sufficiently demonstrated how disclosing the requested records could lead to a reasonable expectation of probable harm pursuant to subsection 15(1).

[38]In light of the above, the OIC concludes that portions of the information do not meet the requirements of subsection 15(1).

Did the institution reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to release the information?

[39]Since Global Affairs was of the view that the information meets the requirements of subsection 15(1), it was required to reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to nonetheless disclose the information. In doing so, it had to consider all the relevant factors for and against disclosure.

[40]An institution’s decision not to disclose information must be transparent, intelligible and justified. The OIC will deem the institution’s explanation sufficient when it provides details of how it made the decision, and when the documents related to the institution’s decision-making process shed light on why the institution proceeded as it did.

[41]An institution must be able to demonstrate that it independently assessed whether disclosure was appropriate, not that it reconsidered its position only after oversight intervention. The disclosure of additional information following the filing of the complaint indicates that Global Affairs reconsidered its initial exercise of discretion.

[42]However, Global Affairs representations focus on general processing practices—such as severability, cross-referencing with previous files, and consultations with program areas—but does not show that a record-specific and principled assessment was conducted with respect to the information withheld.

[43]Notably, Global Affairs did not explain how the relevant discretionary factors were weighed in relation to the remaining withheld information. While it refers to the passage of time and to publicly available information as grounds for releasing additional portions, it fails to articulate why those same considerations did not support further disclosure. The explanation provided does not clearly articulate the basis on which distinctions were made between information that was disclosed and information that remains withheld.

[44]Finally, Global Affairs representations on this matter suggest that discretion was effectively deferred to program areas. Once the Access to Information and Privacy unit determined that the passage of time and public availability supported additional disclosure, Global Affairs was required to independently assess whether continued withholding remained justified. The explanation does not demonstrate that such an assessment was conducted.

[45]Even if Global Affairs had successfully demonstrated that the requirements of the exemption were met, the OIC is not satisfied that Global Affairs properly exercised its discretion when it decided against disclosing the information that remains withheld. In reaching this conclusion, the OIC considered several factors, including the purpose of the Act, public availability of subject information, the age of the records and the public interest in disclosure.

Outcome

[46]The complaint is well founded.

Initial report and notice from institution

On April 14, 2026, the Information Commissioner issued her initial report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs setting out her orders that Global Affairs disclose the following:

1. Disclose the responsive records as follows:
2. All information in point 1.
3. In point 2 in the ‘‘Issue’’ section: Sentences one, four and five.
4. In point 2 in the ‘‘Talking points’’ section: Sentences three, four and five.
5. All information in point three.
6. All information in point four.
7. All information in point five.
8. Reconsider whether either of the circumstances in subsection 13(2) are present, and if so, re-exercise her discretion to decide whether to disclose information that met the requirements of subsection 13(1), taking into account all relevant factors for and against disclosure.
9. Re-exercise her discretion to decide whether to disclose information that met the requirements of subsection 15(1), taking into account all relevant factors for and against disclosure.
10. Provide a new response no later than 36 business days following the date of the final report.

On June 1, 2026, the Director, Access to lnformation and Privacy Protection Division, gave notice that Global Affairs would be implementing the orders.

After the Information Commissioner issued her initial report, Global Affairs issued two supplementary releases on June 9 and July 3, 2026, respectively, disclosing all of the information previously withheld from disclosure.

Therefore, it is not necessary for the Information Commissioner to order Global Affairs to do so.

Review by Federal Court

When an allegation in a complaint falls under paragraph 30(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (d.1) or (e) of the Act, the complainant has the right to apply to the Federal Court for a review. When the Information Commissioner makes an order(s), the institution also has the right to apply for a review.

Whoever applies for a review must do so within 35 business days after the date of this report and serve a copy of the application for review to the relevant parties, as per section 43. If no one applies for a review by this deadline, the order(s) takes effect on the 36th business day after the date of this report.