Privy Council Office (Re), 2026 CI 50

Date: 2026-06-29
OIC file number: 5820-00652
Access request number: A-2017-00670

Summary

The complainant alleged that the Privy Council Office (PCO) had improperly withheld information under subsections 13(1) (confidential information from government bodies) 15(1) (international affairs, security, defence), 16(1) (law enforcement and investigations), 16(2) (facilitating the commission of an offence), section 18 (economic interests of Canada), 19(1) (personal information), and 24(1) (disclosure restricted by another law) of the Access to Information Act in response to a request for records contained in the files entitled: “Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) Mandate and Membership.” The allegation falls under paragraph 30(1)(a) of the Act.

During the course of the investigation, the Information Commissioner sought representations from PCO on the applicability of the aforementioned exemptions. PCO never responded to any requests for representations. The Commissioner concluded that the exemptions were not properly applied and ordered that PCO fully disclose all of the responsive records.

PCO gave notice that they would not fully implement the Commissioner’s orders and, while disclosing some of the information previously withheld, PCO indicated that they would maintain certain redactions.

PCO also provided submissions in its notice in an effort to bolster its continued application of these exemptions. However, the Commissioner’s initial report made it explicitly clear that this was not an opportunity for additional representations to be made. Therefore, the Commissioner did not consider PCO’s response to her initial report and the order stands.

The complaint is well founded.

Complaint

[1]The complainant alleged that the Privy Council Office (PCO) had improperly withheld information under subsections 13(1) (confidential information from government bodies) 15(1) (international affairs, security, defence), 16(1) (law enforcement and investigations), 16(2) (facilitating the commission of an offence), section 18 (economic interests of Canada), 19(1) (personal information), and 24(1) (disclosure restricted by another law) of the Access to Information Act in response to a request for records contained in the files entitled: “IAC Mandate and Membership.”  

[2]The allegation falls under paragraph 30(1)(a) of the Act.  

[3]During the investigation, the complainant decided it was no longer necessary for the Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC) to investigate the redactions made on pages 57-70 as well as to the application of subsection 19(1) to personal signatures.

Investigation

[4]When an institution withholds information under an exemption, it bears the burden of showing that refusing to grant access is justified. 

[5]During the investigation, the OIC sought representations from PCO to justify its application of exemptions to withhold information. No representations were received during the investigation. 

[6]The complainant maintains that the information should be disclosed in its entirety. In support of their position, the complainant provided examples of the exact or similar information that had been previously disclosed through other access requests, either by PCO, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), or elsewhere. 

[7]What follows is an assessment of the exemptions applied by PCO.

Subsection 13(1): confidential information from government bodies

[8]Subsection 13(1) requires institutions to refuse to disclose information obtained in confidence from certain government bodies.

[9]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

• The information was obtained from one of the following government bodies;
  • a government of a foreign state or an institution of a foreign state;
  • an international organization of states or an institution of such an organization;
  • a provincial government or institution;
  • a municipal or regional government or institution; or
  • an aboriginal government or council listed in subsection 13(3).
• The information was obtained from the government body in confidence—that is, with the understanding that it would be treated as confidential.

[10]When these requirements are met, institutions must then consider whether the following circumstances (listed in subsection 13(2)) exist:

• The government body from which the information was obtained consents to its disclosure.
• That body has already made the information public.

[11]When one or both of these circumstances exist, subsection 13(2) requires institutions to reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[12]Subsection 13(1) requires PCO to demonstrate that the information withheld under this provision was obtained from a foreign government, an international organization of states, or one of the other entities listed, and that it was provided in confidence. These elements must be established in order for the exemption to apply. 

[13]Across the pages where subsection 13(1) was invoked (pp. 165, 171, 188–189, and 260), the redactions cover passages that consist of Canadian officials’ assessments, views, and/or analysis concerning foreign governments or international events. These passages reflect internal Canadian observations and judgments. Little in the records indicates that the information originated from a foreign government or international organization, nor that it reproduces or reveals information supplied by such a source. 

[14]The fact that the subject matter relates to foreign affairs does not satisfy the statutory requirement that the information be obtained from a foreign government. While subsection 13(1) protects incoming information provided by foreign partners in confidence, it does not extend to Canadian-authored analysis, even where that analysis concerns foreign actors or international developments. 

[15]Since the withheld information is of Canadian origin, and considering the absence of representations from PCO, the threshold requirement of demonstrating that the information was obtained from a foreign government or international organization in confidence has not been met. 

[16]In light of the foregoing, and considering the lack of representations provided by PCO, I cannot conclude that the information meets the requirements of subsection 13(1). 

Subsection 15(1): international affairs, national security, defence

[17]Subsection 15(1) allows institutions to refuse to disclose information that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to harm the conduct of international affairs, defence or national security (for example, information related to military tactics, weapons capabilities or diplomatic correspondence, as set out in paragraphs 15(1)(a) to (i)).

[18]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

• Disclosing the information could harm one of the following:
  • the conduct of international affairs;
  • the defence of Canada or any state with which Canada has an alliance or treaty, or any state with which Canada is linked, as defined in subsection 15(2); or
  • the detection, prevention or suppression of specific subversive or hostile activities, as defined in subsection 15(2).
• There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility.

[19]When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[20]Subsection 15(1) was applied on pages: 17-20, 22, 26-27, 31-56, 71-78, 83-134, 139-145, 147, 150-151, 157-165, 171, 184-187, 190-191, 193, 196-204, 207, 210, 214, 219-220, 223, 226, 228, 230, 233-242, 245-246, 248-266, 268-287, 297-311, 316-317, 319-323, 340, 343-353, 357-373, 375-380. 

Previous Disclosures 

[21]During the investigation, the OIC advised PCO that the documents found at pages 17–22 and 71–72 had previously been disclosed by LAC (LAC File: A-2016-00315), copies of which were provided for PCO’s review.  

[22]Prior disclosure of the same information by another federal institution significantly undermines any assertion that disclosure could reasonably be expected to result in harm under subsection 15(1). Without evidence from PCO explaining why harm would arise in this instance, the continued application of the exemption is not justified. 

Distribution markings 

[23]Throughout the records, PCO redacted the distribution markings. PCO has disclosed these markings, including the release of an Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) document (PCO File: A-2023-00882) while other departments, such as National Defence (DND) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), have disclosed these markings in comparable circumstances. No harm has been identified as a result of those disclosures.  

[24]This history of disclosure without adverse consequences tends to confirm that the use of subsection 15(1) to withhold distribution markings in the present case is not justified, particularly considering the lack of evidence from PCO demonstrating a reasonable expectation of probable harm arising from disclosure of the markings in this specific context. 

Inconsistent redactions 

[25]The records contain multiple instances of the same document appearing in different locations with inconsistent redactions. For example, the document at pages 83–88 is more heavily redacted than the identical document at pages 282–287. Similarly, pages 171–175 and 185–187 contain two versions of the same telegram, yet the first version contains significantly more redactions than the second. 

[26]Such inconsistencies suggest that subsection 15(1) was applied in an arbitrary or inconsistent manner. This significantly weakens any argument that disclosure of the withheld information could reasonably be expected to result in harm. If the same information can be disclosed elsewhere in the records without apparent concern, it becomes difficult to sustain a claim, particularly in the absence of any supporting representations, that harm would result from disclosure of the more heavily redacted versions. 

Remaining applications of subsection 15(1) 

[27]In addition to the issues noted above, PCO applied subsection 15(1) to a substantial number of pages, including: 26–27, 31–56, 73–78, 89–134, 139–145, 147, 150–151, 157–165, 184, 190–191, 193, 196–204, 207, 210, 214, 219–220, 223, 226, 228, 230, 233–242, 245–246, 248–266, 268–281, 297–311, 316–317, 319–323, 340, 343–353, 357–373, and 375–380. 

[28]On its face, the evidence of a reasonable expectation of harm in disclosing the information redacted on these pages is far from apparent. This concern is heightened by the fact that, apart from notations in the working file, PCO did not provide the OIC with the requested representations during the investigation. Further, PCO did not provide the OIC with the requisite working copy of the records for pages 361-373, despite having been asked to do so multiple times throughout the investigation. 

[29]Without representations explaining the nature of the harm, the connection between the information and the alleged harm, or the context in which harm could reasonably be expected to occur, the institution has not met its burden under subsection 15(1). 

[30]In light of the foregoing, including the absence of representations from PCO, the prior disclosure of identical information, the inconsistent application of redactions, and the lack of evidence demonstrating a reasonable expectation of probable harm, I cannot conclude that subsection 15(1) applies to the records at issue. 

Paragraph 16(1)(a): investigative bodies 

[31]Paragraph 16(1)(a) allows institutions to refuse to disclose information obtained or prepared by specific investigative bodies in the course of investigations. 

[32]To qualify for exemption under paragraph 16(1)(a), the records that contain the information must have been created less than 20 years before the access request was made. 

[33]To claim the exemption, institutions must then show the following: 

• The information was obtained or prepared by one of the investigative bodies listed in Schedule I of the Access to Information Regulations.
• The information was obtained or prepared during a lawful investigation that is within the authority of the investigative body.
• The information concerns an investigation related to one of the following:
• the detection, prevention or suppression of crime;
• the enforcement of any law of Canada or a province (including municipal laws); or
• activities suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada, as defined in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. 

[34]When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Paragraph 16(1)(b): investigative techniques, investigation plans 

[35]Paragraph 16(1)(b) allows institutions to refuse to disclose information about investigative techniques or plans for specific lawful investigations. 

[36]To claim this exemption with regard to investigative techniques, institutions must show that the information relates to investigative techniques. 

[37]To claim this exemption with regard to plans for specific lawful investigations, institutions must show that the information relates to plans for specific lawful investigations that are within the authority of an institution and are one of the following: 

• being conducted to administer or enforce an Act of Parliament or authorized under such an Act; or
• of the types described in Schedule II of the Access to Information Regulations. 

[38]When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information. 

Paragraph 16(1)(c): law enforcement, conduct of investigations 

[39]Paragraph 16(1)(c) allows institutions to refuse to disclose information that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to harm federal or provincial law enforcement or the conduct of investigations (for example, information about the existence of an investigation that would reveal the identity of a confidential source or that was obtained during an investigation, as set out in subparagraphs 16(1)(c)(i) to (iii)). 

[40]To claim this exemption with regard to the enforcement of federal or provincial laws, institutions must show the following: 

• Disclosing the information could harm the enforcement of any law of Canada or a province.
• There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility. 

[41]To claim this exemption with regard to the conduct of investigations, institutions must show the following: 

• disclosing the information could harm the conduct of lawful investigations—that is, investigations that are within the authority of an institution and are one of the following:
• being conducted to administer or enforce an Act of Parliament or authorized under such an Act; or
• of the types described in Schedule II of the Access to Information Regulations. 

[42]When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information. 

Paragraph 16(1)(d): security of penal institutions 

[43]Paragraph 16(1)(d) allows institutions to refuse to disclose information that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to jeopardize security at penal institutions. 

[44]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following: 

• Disclosing the information could injure the security of penal institutions.
• There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility. 

[45]When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information. 

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption? 

[46]PCO applied subsection 16(1), concurrently with subsection 15(1), to portions of an Economic Intelligence Committee memorandum from 1983 without specifying which paragraph, (a), (b), (c), or (d), was being relied upon. In the absence of representations from PCO, there is no basis on which to assess the applicability of any of the specific harms set out in subsection 16(1). 

[47]The age of the information is also a significant factor. The memorandum is more than four decades old. Subsection 16(1) is designed to protect information where disclosure could reasonably be expected to harm ongoing or reasonably foreseeable law enforcement, investigative, or institutional security interests. Given the passage of time, it is difficult to conceive how disclosure of a memorandum from 1983 could reveal active investigative techniques, compromise ongoing law enforcement matters, or endanger the security of a penal institution.  

[48]Furthermore, the content of the memorandum, as reviewed, does not appear to relate to law enforcement investigations, investigative techniques, or the security of penal institutions in a manner that would bring it within the scope of subsection 16(1). The exemption is not intended to shield historical policy analysis or economic intelligence assessments where no contemporary harm is apparent. 

[49]In light of the absence of representations, the failure to identify the specific paragraph of subsection 16(1) being invoked, the dated nature of the information, and the lack of any evident connection between the withheld information and the harms contemplated by subsection 16(1), I am unable to conclude that the exemption applies. 

Subsection 16(2): facilitating the commission of an offence 

[50]Subsection 16(2) allows institutions to refuse to disclose information that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to facilitate the commission of an offence. 

[51]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following: 

• Disclosing the information (for example, information on criminal methods or techniques, or technical details of weapons, as set out in paragraphs 16(2)(a) to (c)) could facilitate the commission of an offence.
• There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility. 

[52]When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information. 

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption? 

[53]PCO applied subsection 16(2) to a wide range of information on pages: 17, 24, 26, 31-32, 36-41, 44-47, 53, 192, 244, 249, and 362-373.  This includes portions of an Economic Intelligence Committee memorandum from 1983 (also redacted under subsection 15(1)); office numbers, telephone numbers, and postal codes from documents dating back to the 1980’s; a chart showing economic indicators of foreign countries from the same period; and, several pages where the requisite working copy of the record was not provided to the OIC for review.  

[54]Much of the information withheld under subsection 16(2) is several decades old. This provision is intended to protect information whose disclosure could reasonably be expected to facilitate the commission of an offence or compromise current security-related functions.  

[55]Given the age of the information, it is difficult to conceive how disclosure today could give rise to such harm. Without representations from PCO explaining how the historical information could be used to facilitate an offence or compromise security, the exemption cannot be sustained. 

[56]Moreover, the information exempted on pages 32 and 37 do not appear to relate to law enforcement, criminal activity, or security-sensitive operational information. Subsection 16(2) is not intended to shield historical analysis or dated assessments where no contemporary harm is apparent.  

[57]Given the absence of representations from PCO, the dated nature of the information, the presence of publicly known material, and the lack of any evident connection between the withheld information and the harms contemplated by subsection 16(2), I cannot conclude that the exemption applies. 

Paragraph 18(a): government trade secrets, government financial, commercial, scientific or technical information 

[58]Paragraph 18(a) allows institutions to refuse to disclose trade secrets or financial, commercial, scientific or technical information of the Government of Canada or a government institution when that information has or is likely to have substantial value. 

[59]To claim this exemption with regard to trade secrets, institutions must show the following: 

• The information is a trade secret—that is, a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound that possesses all four of the following characteristics:
• It is secret—that is, it is known only by one or a relatively small number of people.
• The Government of Canada or the institution intended to treat the information as secret.
• The information has industrial or commercial application.
• The Government of Canada or the institution has an interest worthy of legal protection (that is, an economic interest).
• The trade secret belongs to the Government of Canada or one of its institutions. 

[60]To claim this exemption with regard to financial, commercial, scientific or technical information, institutions must show the following: 

• The information is financial, commercial, scientific or technical.
• The information belongs to the Government of Canada or one of its institutions.
• The information has substantial, rather than nominal, market value or is reasonably likely to have such value in the future. 

[61]When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information. 

Paragraph 18(b): competitive position of government institutions, negotiations by government institutions 

[62]Paragraph 18(b) allows institutions to refuse to disclose information that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to harm the competitive position or interfere with contractual or other negotiations of a government institution. 

[63]To claim this exemption with regard to competitive position, institutions must show the following: 

• Disclosing the information could injure the competitive position of a government institution.
• There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility. 

[64]To claim this exemption with regard to contractual or other negotiations, institutions must show the following: 

• Contractual or other negotiations are under way or will be conducted in the future.
• Disclosing the information could interfere with the negotiations.
• There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility. 

[65]When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information. 

Paragraph 18(c): government scientific or technical information obtained from research 

[66]Paragraph 18(c) allows institutions to refuse to disclose scientific or technical information stemming from government research that, if disclosed, could jeopardize government researchers’ chance to publish their findings first. 

[67]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following: 

• The information is scientific or technical.
• This information was obtained through research by a government employee or officer.
• Disclosing the information could threaten the exclusive rights of government researchers to publish the results of their research first.
• There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility. 

[68]When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information. 

Paragraph 18(d): government financial interests, government of Canada’s ability to manage the economy, undue benefit to an individual 

[69]Paragraph 18(d) allows institutions to refuse to disclose information that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to materially harm their financial interests or the Government of Canada’s ability to manage the Canadian economy, or could unduly benefit someone. 

[70]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following: 

• Disclosing the information (for example, details about Canada’s currency or a contemplated change in the bank rate, as set out in subparagraphs 18(i) to (vi)) could do one of the following:
• materially harm a government institution’s financial or economic interests;
• materially harm the Government of Canada’s ability to manage the economy of Canada; or
• result in an individual or corporation receiving a larger than necessary, improper or unwarranted benefit.
• There is a reasonable expectation that this harm could occur—that is, the expectation is well beyond a mere possibility. 

[71]When these requirements are met, institutions must then reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information. 

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption? 

[72]PCO applied section 18 on pages 148 and 337 consisting of an agenda item of the Economic Intelligence Committee from 1988, and a portion of document containing a section entitled “Particulars of Discussion”, containing a mention of the FLQ crisis from the early 1970’s. 

[73]PCO did not specify which paragraph of section 18 it was relying upon, nor did it provide representations despite being invited to do so. 

[74]The information on both pages is historical in nature. The agenda item dates from 1988, and the FLQ-related discussion concerns events from the early 1970s. Section 18 is intended to protect information whose disclosure could reasonably be expected to harm Canada’s current economic interests, financial negotiations, competitive position, or proprietary information. It is difficult to conceive how disclosure of decades-old agenda items or historical discussions could now prejudice Canada’s economic interests or the competitive position of a government institution. 

[75]Moreover, the content at issue does not appear to relate to trade secrets, commercially valuable information, competitive positioning, or ongoing financial or contractual negotiations. Historical agenda items and discussions of the FLQ crisis do not, on their face, appear to fall within the types of information protected by section 18(a) to (d). 

[76]Given the absence of representations from PCO, the historical nature of the information, the lack of any apparent connection to the harms contemplated by section 18, I cannot conclude that section 18 applies to the information at issue. 

[77]Accordingly, I find that the information does not meet the requirements of section 18. 

Subsection 19(1): personal information

[78]Subsection 19(1) requires institutions to refuse to disclose personal information.

[79]To claim this exemption, institutions must show the following:

• The information is about an individual—that is, a human being, not a corporation.
• There is a serious possibility that disclosing the information would identify that individual.
• The information does not fall under one of the exceptions to the definition of “personal information” set out in paragraphs 3(j) to 3(m) of the Privacy Act (for example, business contact information for public servants).

[80]When these requirements are met, institutions must then consider whether the following circumstances (listed in subsection 19(2)) exist:

• The person to whom the information relates consents to its disclosure.
• The information is publicly available.
• Disclosure of the information would be consistent with section 8 of the Privacy Act.

[81]When one or more of these circumstances exist, subsection 19(2) of the Access to Information Act requires institutions to reasonably exercise their discretion to decide whether to disclose the information.

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption?

[82]Subsection 19(1) remains applied by PCO on pages: 168, 170, and 182-183 to withhold the personal information of other individuals. 

[83]The OIC concludes that the information meets the requirements of the exemption because it is about identifiable individuals and does not fall under one of the exceptions to the definition of personal information. 

Did the institution reasonably exercise its discretion to decide whether to release the information? 

[84]Under subsection 19(2), PCO was required to exercise its discretion to decide whether to release personal information when one or more of the circumstances set out in subsection 19(2) exists. 

[85]In this case, none of those circumstances applied: PCO did not have the consent of the individual; the information is not publicly available; and none of the exceptions set out in section 8 of the Privacy Act were relevant in this case.

[86]In light of the above, the OIC is satisfied that the circumstances set out in subsection 19(2) did not exist. Consequently, there is no need to determine whether PCO had exercised its discretion to decide whether to release the information. 

Subsection 24(1): disclosure restricted by another law 

[87]Subsection 24(1) requires institutions to refuse to disclose information the disclosure of which is restricted by a provision set out in Schedule II of the Access to Information Act. 

Does the information meet the requirements of the exemption? 

[88]This provision was applied on page 55, 76, 97, 163-164, 167, 250, of the responsive records. It was applied concurrently with subsections 15(1) and 19(1).

[89]In light of the absence of representations from PCO, it is presumed that section 18 of the CSIS Act is being relied upon to withhold the names of CSIS employees that were in attendance at committee meetings as well as the acronym of CSIS itself.

[90]The acronym “CSIS” does not fall within the scope of the statutory prohibition in section 18 of the CSIS Act. The existence, name, and acronym of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service are publicly known and widely used in legislation, government publications, and public communications. In addition, there are ample examples where departments such as CSE and PCO, have disclosed the CSIS acronym previously (i.e. PCO File: A-2024-00104).

[91]The names of certain CSIS employees may fall within the scope of section 18 of the CSIS Act if they identify individuals who were, at the time, covert employees or whose identities remain protected. However, PCO did not provide representations explaining whether the individuals named were covert employees, whether their identities remain protected today, or how the statutory prohibition applies to these specific names.

[92]Given the absence of representations from PCO, I cannot conclude that subsection 24(1) applies to the information at issue.

Accordingly, I find that the information does not meet the requirements of subsection 24(1).

Outcome

[93]The complaint is well founded because PCO improperly withheld information under subsections 13(1), 15(1), paragraphs 16(1)(a), 16(1)(b), 16(1)(c), 16(1)(d), subsection 16(2), paragraphs 18(a), 18(b), 18(c), 18(d), and subsection 24(1) when it responded to the access request.

Orders

Under subsection 36.1(1) of the Act, I order the Clerk of the Privy Council to:

1. Disclose the remaining responsive records withheld under subsections 13(1), 15(1), paragraphs 16(1)(a), 16(1)(b), 16(1)(c), 16(1)(d), subsection 16(2), paragraphs 18(a), 18(b), 18(c), 18(d) and subsection 24(1) in their entirety.
2. Provide a new response no later than 36 business days after the date of the final report.

The Clerk must abide by the terms of subsection 37(4) when disclosing any records in response to my order.

Initial report and notice from institution

On May 5, 2026, I issued my initial report to the Clerk of the Privy Council setting out my orders.

On June 5, 2026, PCO issued a supplementary disclosure to the complainant.

On June 8, 2026, the Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Ministerial Services and Corporate Affairs gave me notice that PCO would not fully implement my orders and, while disclosing some of the information previously withheld, PCO would maintain the redactions under subsections 13(1), 15(1) and 24(1) to specific portions of pages 89, 91-92, 97, 164-165, 190-191, 240-241, 320, 349, and 363-366.

PCO provided submissions in its notice in an effort to bolster its continued application of subsections 13(1), 15(1) and 24(1); however, the issuance of my initial report of investigation and intended order under subsection 37(1) was not a further opportunity for PCO to provide new arguments or raise additional grounds for refusing access. My initial report made explicitly clear that this was not an opportunity for additional representations to be made. Meanwhile, PCO offered no explanation as to why it had not made its submissions during the investigation itself.

Certain investigative steps are dictated by the Act. Of relevance, paragraph 35(2)(b) specifies that in the course of the OIC’s investigation of complaint, the head of the institution is to be given a reasonable opportunity to make representations. PCO was provided this opportunity, and chose not to provide representations to the OIC during the investigation. In the reply to my initial report, which contained these additional submissions, the Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet even acknowledged that the investigation had already concluded.

The Act does not envision that following the issuance of my initial report institutions are further authorized or entitled to provide additional representations and / or raise additional basis for refusing access. Paragraph 37(1)(c) expressly states that my initial report is to set out the period within which the head of the government institution shall notify me of the action taken or proposed to be taken to implement the order or recommendation made or reasons why no such action has been or is proposed to be taken. This does not include submitting new arguments or new exemptions for withholding the information at issue. Accordingly, I will not consider PCO’s response to my initial report and my order stands.

I must remind the Clerk that, if he does not intend to fully implement my order, he must apply to the Federal Court for a review pursuant to the statutory timelines highlighted below.

Review by Federal Court

When an allegation in a complaint falls under paragraph 30(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (d.1) or (e) of the Act, the complainant has the right to apply to the Federal Court for a review. When the Information Commissioner makes an order(s), the institution also has the right to apply for a review. Whoever applies for a review must do so within 35 business days after the date of this report and serve a copy of the application for review to the relevant parties, as per section 43. If no one applies for a review by this deadline, the order(s) takes effect on the 36th business day after the date of this report.